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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of four chapters that contribute to studies in empirical finance, 
macroeconomics, monetary policy and asset-pricing. In particular, this thesis examines the interaction 
between Quantitative Easing, asset pricing, asset volatility and financial stress.  
In chapter 2 the financial market impact of QE on asset pricing is analysed. The channels of 
QE are introduced and pricing relationships between gilts, exchange rates, corporate bonds, 
commercial-bank bonds and equities are examined to determine whether the gilt purchase programme 
was translated effectively into the pricing of other assets. This chapter finds the effects of QE are 
inconsistent and weak enough in scale to be lost in the turbulence of the financial crisis period.  
Chapter 3 creates a financial stress index of the UK to examine asset pricing in terms of risk, 
uncertainty and constrained financial conditions. The chapter reviews the most relevant financial 
stress indices and uses these precedents to create a continuous financial stress variable.  
Chapter 4 uses univariate and multivariate GARCH methodologies to examine asset return 
levels and volatility during the financial crisis and subsequent QE programme. Financial stress is 
modelled and the impact of QE on key stress indicators is measured. QE is found to have had a strong 
effect on the pricing and volatility of UK gilts, and to a lesser extent corporate bonds, however UK 
equities and systemic financial stress were largely unaffected. 
Chapter 5 explores the interaction between the market efficiency of UK equities and the 
business and financial cycles and whether variations in market efficiency explain the lack of impact 
of QE on equities. Stock return predictability is the metric through which market efficiency is judged, 
using both economic indicators and technical trading rules as predictors. Stock return predictability 
is found to be positively related to both the business and financial cycles. 
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1.Introduction 
 This thesis examines financial asset pricing in the United Kingdom, focussing on the 
interaction between asset pricing and financial conditions over various time-horizons. Financial 
stress, uncertainty, risk and asset pricing are therefore key concerns of the dissertation. The 
examination of the unconventional monetary policy regime known as Quantitative Easing (QE) 
also takes precedence, with the assets analysed being linked heavily to the markets that were 
primarily affected by QE. Although the primary purpose of QE was macroeconomic in scale, 
this thesis focuses on the less-discussed financial market impact, and specifically focuses on 
the impact of the purchases of government gilts on the pricing and market efficiency of other 
asset types. The close connection between Quantitative Easing and financial conditions is 
therefore a recurrent theme for the thesis. Each chapter of this thesis includes an in-depth 
examination of relevant literature, which is then followed in typical style with an overview of 
the data and methodology before moving on to the discussion of results. Finally, each chapter 
then offers some intermediate concluding remarks to sum up the chapter. 
Chapter 2 can be summarised as an introductory analysis into the financial market impact of 
QE, where the chapter examines the pricing relationships between gilts, exchange rates, bonds 
and equities to determine whether depress gilt yields translated effectively into the pricing of 
other assets. Discussion of the potential effects on bank lending also occurs through the analysis 
of commercial bank bond yields and thereby the cost of lending for UK institutions. The focus 
of the empirical analysis is on short-term causality between QE auctions and thereby to other 
assets, using multivariate autoregressive models. This chapter demonstrates that there are links 
that are stable and significant enough to allow for the transmission of QE, however the effects 
are inconsistent and weak enough in scale to be lost in the turbulence of the financial crisis 
period.  
Chapter 3 is a brief practical chapter that introduces and creates a Financial stress index for 
the United Kingdom to be used in the following chapters. Chapter 2’s presents results that 
suggests that there were several contradictory factors at play in the asset pricing of equities and 
corporate bonds in particular. Chapter 3 therefore creates a financial stress index in order to 
examine asset pricing in terms of risk, uncertainty and constrained financial conditions in order 
to shed further light on the factors that may explain the contradictory results of Chapter 2. The 
chapter reviews the most prominent and relevant financial stress indices from other countries 
and uses these precedents to create a workhorse continuous financial stress variable. 
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Chapter 4 examines asset return levels and volatility during the financial crisis and subsequent 
QE programme using univariate and multivariate GARCH methodologies. Continuing the 
procedure set in chapters 2 and 3, the focus of the study is examining whether QE affected 
assets in ways not captured by the level of prices. The chapter presents the case that a successful 
QE policy would reduce financial stress and volatility in UK financial markets, and that this 
objective, while not stated by the Bank of England, is an important step in the expansionary 
economic goals of the Bank. The focus of the empirical analysis is therefore modelling risk, 
volatility and financial stress reactions to QE. The chapter demonstrates that QE had a strong 
effect on the pricing and volatility of UK gilts, and to a lesser extent corporate bonds, however 
UK equities were overall unaffected by the programme. The chapter also finds little evidence 
that QE reduced financial stress on a systemic level, with the financial stress index created in 
Chapter 3 reporting insignificant reactions to QE events. 
Chapter 5 focuses on more analysis of UK equities in an attempt to clarify the lack of response 
of this asset type to QE intervention. This final chapter explores market efficiency of UK 
equities through analysis of stock return predictability. The intention of this chapter is to 
determine whether market efficiency varies with financial stress, and whether the lack of impact 
of QE can be attributed to reduced market efficiency. The sample period of this section is much 
broader, encompassing a period between 1975 and 2017, and uses a lower periodicity. This 
chapter analyses the interaction between the UK business cycle, financial stress and QE in terms 
of its effect on the market efficiency of equity pricing, demonstrating that the financial cycle 
plays a significant part in reducing market efficiency and allowing the possibility of stock return 
forecasting. These results leave implications on the importance of QE in restoring efficient 
market function. 
In terms of scope, this thesis focuses on the United Kingdom’s experience of the financial 
crisis and QE. The dissertation includes references to the US’, EU’s and Japan’s experiences of 
QE and financial crisis, but these references are viewed through the lens of probable impacts 
upon the UK or points of comparison. Therefore, the conclusions of this thesis should not be 
taken as a generalisation for all QE policies, but rather a focused study on UK’s experience. In 
a similar vein, studies with a variety of periodicities have been cited in this thesis, however the 
focus of this thesis is the short term and the conclusions drawn cannot be extrapolated to overall 
effects over the long-term.  
While QE and asset pricing are areas rich in theoretical literature, this thesis is focused on 
empirical examination, and models its approach as theoretically agnostic. The attempt thereby 
is to capture all potential effects of QE through using methods unrestricted by theoretical 
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modelling, with a focus on finding rigorously evidenced results regardless of their implication 
on the effectiveness of QE as a policy tool. This thesis will remark at several points upon the 
predictions made by theory associated with QE, however the intent of the work is to provide 
evidence as to the outcomes of the policy and the financial crisis in the UK, rather than to 
conclude whether QE achieved its objectives successfully.  
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Chapter.2 
 An Examination of Financial Market Relationships in the UK in the 
Presence of Quantitative Easing 
2.1 Introduction  
By September 2008, the UK financial sector was in a full crisis state. In order to mitigate 
the real effects of the global financial crisis, the Bank of England resorted to unconventional 
monetary policy instruments, in particular to large-scale purchases of public and private assets 
using central bank money. The main objective of such Quantitative Easing measures 
(henceforth QE) had been to boost nominal spending and thus help achieve the 2 percent 
inflation target (Bank of England, 2011). 
The Bank of England conducted this policy in two main phases, one between March 
2009 and February 2010 (QE1) and another between October 2011 and November 2012 (QE2).1 
The Bank purchased via reverse-auctions government gilts of maturities mostly between 5 and 
25 years to the value of £375 billion pounds, with additional purchases of high-rated corporate 
bonds and other financial assets. The Bank expected these measures to be transmitted through 
the financial sector by pushing up asset prices, lowering borrowing costs and increasing wealth 
(Bank of England 2011). For this to work out, the Bank relied upon its ability to affect financial 
asset prices and yields in a predictable way and thus on stable relationships between financial 
market variables – a bold presumption as the financial sector was in a severe crisis state. 
The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, this chapter models the empirical 
relationships between major financial market variables in the UK as they present themselves 
since the onset of the crisis in the second half of 2007 until the end of 2014, focusing on 
causality, significance and stability. Second, it is assessed whether, and to what extent, these 
relationships provide for QE measures to be effective in the way the Bank of England was 
hoping for. These are important empirical questions which should not be taken for granted in 
evaluating unconventional monetary policy. Relationships between financial variables that 
offer favourable conditions for QE have to exist, be significant and stable during the period of 
such unconventional monetary policy, and not at some point in time prior to the crisis or after 
the economy has already recovered. 
This chapter considers yields on government gilts and on commercial bank debt, 
corporate debt, stock prices and exchange rates. Since the Bank of England purchased gilts and 
                                               
1 Some split the latter period into two separate waves of QE, denoted QE2 and QE3 (Joyce et al. 2012).  
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bonds along the term structure, gilts and bonds are also differentiated by 5, 15 and 25 years to 
maturity. The empirical approach is a data driven methodology to explore financial market 
relationships by using VAR modelling with exogenous dummies, which capture the actual 
auction dates for the Bank’s gilts purchases. This approach is chosen for two reasons. One is 
that theory tells little about the transmission of unconventional monetary policy measures in 
periods of crisis. The other is that, since the Bank of England’s objective was to boost nominal 
spending and not to achieve certain yields or asset prices per se, it is arguable that QE measures 
are best modelled as exogenous variables.  
In the first stage of the analysis the focus is on determining the existence of long-term 
relationships between the pricing of gilts, bank/corporate debt and equities. Using the Johansen 
and Juselius (1993) methodology, this chapter tests for cointegration relationships between 
these assets, and determines whether shocks to government yields translate through to the other 
assets over the long term. This chapter finds that long run cointegrating relationships exist in 
both models between government debt and commercial bank or corporate debt yields 
respectively, however UK equities and exchange rates did not exhibit significant long-term 
relationships with government yields over the period. These findings are commensurate with 
other results from the literature, which find equities responses to QE to be the weakest of all 
asset types (Joyce et al, 2011) 
After analysing the long-term, the focus of the analysis moves on to the short-term price 
relationships, where this chapter assumes that gilt purchases have a direct, significant and 
predictable effect on the yield of the gilts bought by the Bank and explores how shocks to those 
yields translate into changes of other financial variables. The results from this are that yields 
for 5-year gilts are Granger causal for stock prices and 5 and 15-year commercial bank bonds 
as well as for 15-year gilts, while yields for 25-year gilts are Granger causal for 15 and 25-year 
commercial bank bonds. Interestingly, a decrease in 25-year gilt yields causes an increase in 
25-year bond yields. In addition, this chapter finds there are significant differences between the 
results for commercial bank bond yields and general corporate bonds, with the key interactions 
going on between the 15 and 25 government yields in the case of the latter. Although all 
variables have been found to be non-stationary, the impulse response functions of a VAR with 
all yields in levels are also considered. These show that all yields respond to changes in 5-year 
gilt yields, but these effects last no longer than eight weeks, while changes in the 25-year gilt 
yields appear to have no effects altogether there. In sum, these findings indicate that, provided 
the Bank of England’s interventions lead to a lower yield for short-term government gilts, the 
Bank could also steer other yields in the same direction. Bringing down long-term gilt yields 
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through asset purchases however, may have increased the cost of long-term funding for private 
borrowers. 
In the final stage of the analysis the effects of the QE dummies on financial variables 
are considered. Without differentiating between the different types of interventions, it appears 
that asset purchases did not have any effect on commercial bank bond or gilt yields or on 
exchange rates. However, the purchases however seem to have significantly affected longer 
corporate bond yields, with 15-year yields being reduced, with the effect being the most 
pronounced during the QE1 period. Stock prices went up in weeks when QE transactions took 
place, but only during the QE1 period. Distinguishing between the market segments in which 
the Bank intervened provides a somewhat differentiated picture. Purchases of gilts with 5 years 
to maturity lead to changes in the yields for 25-year corporate bonds and gilts. However, such 
purchases appear to have increased the borrowing costs. Buying 25-year gilts only had an effect 
on the value of the pound, both in US Dollar and in EURO. Purchases of 15-year gilts had no 
effects at all. If there were any effects, they were mostly contemporaneous or died out after at 
most two weeks. Overall, the found empirical relationships between major UK financial 
variables do not appear to provide the necessary framework for QE to be effective over the 
short term at least.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the literature 
surrounding QE and asset price channels, and then discusses the methodologies of the studies 
that have attempted to quantify QE’s effects. Section 3 presents this chapter’s methodology. 
Section 4 presents the results. Finally, section 5 summarizes the chapter and concludes with 
some critical remarks.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The theoretical foundations for empirical studies of QE go back predominantly to 
macroeconomic portfolio theory developed by Tobin (1958, 1969), Brainard and Tobin (1963), 
and Brunner and Meltzer (1973). The starting point is that money, financial and real assets are 
not perfect substitutes. If they were, all yields would be the same in an arbitrage-free 
equilibrium and a central bank, by swapping one asset for another, would not have any effect 
on rates or prices. If money and gilts are imperfect substitutes, however, a change in their 
relative quantities available to the private sector matters.2 How this change is transmitted into 
                                               
2 Other reasons for why QE could affect asset prices are related to changes in market liquidity (Shleifer and Vishny 
2011), to expectations about the future course of monetary policy (Eggertson and Woodford 2003) or to the ability 
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changes of asset prices and yields depends on the degree of substitutability between gilts and 
other assets. If gilts and corporate bonds were perfect substitutes, their returns would always 
move in tandem. Tobin, however, also pointed out that investors may consider private bonds, 
stocks and public debt as complements rather than substitutes because they carry different risks 
that are not perfectly correlated. If the central bank takes public debt off the market in exchange 
for risk-free, non-interest-bearing money, holding everything else equal the risk of the market 
portfolio may increase for there is less scope for investors to diversify. This could induce risk-
averse investors to reduce their demand for private bonds, leading to an increase in bond yields.  
In a similar vein, Andrés et al. (2004) introduce the notion of imperfect asset 
substitutability in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model. They consider short-term and long-term government bonds as imperfect 
substitutes due to constraints for some investors to directly trade long-term bonds while both, 
short and long-term rates matter to intertemporal optimizing agents. In this framework, the 
quantity of money in addition to the short rate determines the term structure of interest rates 
and thus output and inflation.  
The Bank of England report a range of ‘channels’ through which QE can theoretically 
affect the economy, with some having stronger implications for financial markets than others. 
The Portfolio Balance channel was first proposed by Tobin and is loosely based on Keynes' 
Liquidity Preference model (Tobin, 1958, p.71). It is a popular theoretical concept in Keynesian 
monetary economics, and is recurrent discussion point in articles that analyse central banking 
policy (Andrés et al., 2004). Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, most articles that 
cover 'unconventional' monetary policy in some way have referred to this channel (E.g. in 
Inkinen et al, 2010). Theoretically the portfolio balance channel reflects the impact of changing 
asset quantities in a market on its’ relative expected return. A change in quantity of one asset, 
ceteris paribus, will alter its relative expected return in comparison to competing assets. For 
example, decreased quantity in one type of asset increases its price, thereby lowering its yield 
(interest rate) and will induce portfolio operators to switch out the affected asset for other 
relatively more profitable assets. In effect portfolios are rebalanced away from the asset affected 
by the quantity change, increasing demand and therefore the prices of other assets. 
 For the policy-maker this provides a lever for intervention to increase asset prices by 
modifying the quantity of a particular asset. For the Bank of England, the Bank’s purchases 
                                               
of banks to fund their lending business (Bernanke and Blinder 1988). Regardless which effect is emphasized, a 
necessary condition is that assets are imperfect substitutes. 
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drastically reducing the amount of long-term gilts available to the public, having an effect on 
the remaining gilt’s rates of return relative to assets which were not targeted. As Tobin’s theory 
suggested, the effects of these gilt purchases can cross several asset types, a decrease in the 
amount of available UK gilts causes the relative price of corporate bonds to be low in 
comparison, driving up demand for corporate bonds. Equities prices should also be positively 
affected, with investors being incentivised to sell their gilt holdings to the Bank of England and 
to purchase equities whose rates of return have improved relative to these gilts. The effects of 
the portfolio balance channel are resultantly very widespread, as almost all asset types will see 
their rates of return relative to UK gilts change with large-scale Bank of England intervention.  
In terms of the price relationships between secondary assets, defined here as assets that 
are not directly affected by QE intervention but are rather affected by the changing quantities 
of UK gilts, portfolio balance theory suggests that pricing relationships should stay relatively 
constant. QE purchases could however alter the portfolio decisions made by an economic agent 
when choosing between two secondary assets, corporate bonds and equities, if the reduced 
availability of low-risk gilts induces investors to reduce their holdings in higher-risk equities in 
favour of less risky corporate bonds. In this way investors would be attempting to reduce their 
risk profile down to a level that meets their requirements. However, conceivably since there is 
no dramatic change in the quantity available of either equities or corporate bonds available 
during the period, there should be no large-scale change in price relationships between them. 
In addition, as high-quality corporate bonds and equities can be considered competing assets, 
an increase in the price of one type should coincide with a decreasing price in the other. In this 
way, portfolio balance theory suggests that both corporate bond and equity prices should be 
positively affected by decreasing gilt yields but be negatively associated with changes to their 
rates of return relative to each other. 
The second potential channel that QE has been expressed to work through is the so 
called 'Signalling channel' and the similar ‘Expectations channel’ the latter of which has also 
been referred to as the ‘macro/policy news channel’ and ‘policy signalling effects’ in a Bank of 
England publication (Joyce et al., 2011). The Signalling Channel reflects the impact on 
expectations that occurs when a monetary authority makes a statement of intent about a certain 
macro policy. In these circumstances, individuals can be reassured or worried by the news, and 
alter their expectations of future asset values and yields accordingly (Kapetanios et al., 2012). 
This channel uses the assumption that investors are rational and forward looking, using central 
bank announcements to make market-based decisions. This leads to important implication that 
a large part of the quantitative easing effect will be recorded in the first few days around and 
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announcement. Many of the articles published in the last few years have argued that the 
expectations effect QE creates is just as important as the portfolio balance effect; and as such 
this theory is discussed to a great extent by the articles discussing optimal monetary policy 
(Bernanke et al, (2004) Adam and Billi (2006), etc.). The signalling effect is related to the 
expectations channel but operates in a different way: Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) amongst 
other claim that if the zero-bound interest rate policy of QE is seen to be a credible commitment 
by the Central Bank, individual expectations of future asset performances will be revised 
upwards. A realistic sounding commitment made by a central bank will have ramifications 
before the policy measure has been enacted and will have lingering effects well after the 
intervention has been concluded.  
The Liquidity channel is discussed by many of the same academics who discuss the 
portfolio balance effect, as the two channels are often inter-connected or occur in tandem. As 
such it is mentioned in official publications made by both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England. (See Clouse et al., 2003 and Joyce et al., 2011). This channel covers the results of a 
Central bank being a significant and secure buyer of assets in a market which is suffering from 
market failure resulting from liquidity issues and uncertainty. The central bank provides a 
steady demand and thereby makes the sale of assets less costly to the seller, allowing market 
participants to conduct trading more frequently and with more certainty that there will be a 
buyer if the participant decides to trade. The central bank also provides a steady stream of excess 
liquidity that pervades the market, reducing or nullifying the effects illiquidity had on asset 
prices and yields. Shleifer and Vishny (2011) discuss the importance of the liquidity channel as 
the primary method to avoid dramatic undervaluing of assets through ‘fire-sales’. 
The credit or bank lending channel the final possible transmission mechanism for the 
effects of QE purchases, where the injection of liquidity by the central bank, increases the size 
of a bank’s portfolio, inducing them to lend more at a reduced interest rate. This cheap credit 
theoretically improves the financial ‘health’ of firms and households and supports asset prices 
(Joyce et al. 2011). The financial ‘health’ of the banking sector is particularly relevant for this 
channel, given that the majority of QE purchases are aimed to impact bank balance sheets. 
Clouse et al. (2003) discusses this channel and while they note that due to the zero-bound on 
interest rates lending is unlikely to increase substantially, arguing that banks will absorb this 
excess liquidity in an effort to prepare for future monetary shocks, they concede that an increase 
in lending is likely to manifest in slightly higher asset prices. (Clouse et al 2003). Furthermore, 
with lower interest rates, the relative value of future dividends for equities should increase, 
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increasing demand for such assets. In this way, the credit channel could result in a small increase 
in prices for equities, corporate bonds but the prices for commercial bank bonds in particular. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the effects of the signalling/expectations, bank-lending 
and liquidity channels should reinforce the effects of the portfolio balance channel. Apart from 
the general improvement in market prices across all assets that will be associated with central 
bank intervention, announcements of gilt purchases should encourage the same portfolio re-
balancing behaviour from agents as the actual purchases themselves. Given the mutually 
reinforcing nature of these channels, the intention of this chapter is to at least properly capture 
the entirety of the effects, limiting itself by not attempting to isolate the individual channel 
effects. However, the inclusion of both corporate debt and commercial bank debt in this chapter 
is an attempt to quantify the effects of the bank lending channel beyond the effects of the other 
channels. 
However, it should be noted that the liquidity channel could potentially have an effect 
on the price relationships between relatively liquid equity assets and the more illiquid 
government and corporate bonds. During periods of financial duress, it can be expected that 
economic agents will attempt to have portfolios that are relatively more liquid than under 
normal circumstances. Holding liquid assets allows agents to respond to changing market 
circumstances quicker, which is beneficial when asset markets are volatile. This chapter can 
therefore expect there to be a higher liquidity premium associated with holding longer-term 
bonds and gilts relative to holding equities and more liquid debt assets. With QE intervention 
it could be expected that the excess liquidity injected into the economy will lessen the value of 
holding equities as a liquid asset and therefore lower equity prices compared to bond and gilts. 
A possible expectation of the liquidity channel is therefore that equity prices relative to bond 
and gilts prices will be negatively affected by QE intervention. 
Having established the theoretical routes of QE intervention, this chapter will now 
briefly highlight the empirical studies that have attempted to quantify the impact. When 
compared to the literature discussing the theoretical foundations for QE’s interaction with asset 
prices, there is a relative dearth of studies that have attempted to quantify the effect of the policy 
during the recent financial crisis.  For the US, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
study the effect of QE1 and QE2 on interest rates, using an event-study methodology3. They 
find that yields on Mortgage-backed securities were significantly lowered by QE1, with 
corporate yields being reduced in the same manner. However, they find QE2 to have a much 
                                               
3It should be noted that the dates of QE1 and QE2 in the US do not correspond to their equivalents in the UK.  
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smaller impact, with the purchases of treasuries during QE2 only having a moderate impact 
through the signalling channel. Gagnon et al (2011) find that the term premium was 
significantly reduced by US QE or Large-Scale Asset Purchases, with the estimated effect being 
between 30 and 100 basis points. 
 For the UK Joyce et al. (2011) find that QE1 lowers gilt yields and bond yields by some 
85bps on average. They deploy a VAR model incorporating also changes in quantities (gilt 
shares) in addition to yields.  They also find a substantial effect on corporate yields, with mixed 
responses from UK equities. Bridges and Thomas (2012) estimate changes in the supply of 
broad money as a result of QE1 using a co-integrated structural VAR and look how asset prices 
and nominal spending would need to adjust to clear money market. They find that yields should 
have dropped by 150bps and asset prices increased by 20 per cent. Based on those findings, 
Kapetanios et al. (2012) study the wider effects of such changes in yields on UK output and 
inflation. Cloyne et al. (2015) find that such effects crucially depend on whether and to what 
extent QE promotes bank lending.  
While these studies present encouraging evidence for the positive effect of QE, they 
also leave unanswered issues. First of all, the aforementioned Joyce et al (2011) article is one 
of the few studies to consider the impact on financial assets outside the impact on treasury 
yields. Neely (2010) considers the effect of US 2008-2009 QE on long bond yields and 
exchange rates, finding evidence in support of a portfolio balance model. Breedon et al (2012) 
analyse the effect of QE1 in the UK on equities and corporate bonds using an event study 
technique and find the effects of QE to be muted compared to the effect on gilt yields. Apart 
from these, almost no studies exist that examine the effects of QE on corporate bonds or equities 
in detail, with the common assumption that depressed yields will translate to other assets 
through investor portfolio rebalancing. A more general concern with the QE financial market 
literature is the selection of data and time period. Most studies on UK and US QE have opted 
to use pre-crisis data when analysing the potential outcome of QE on asset prices. The 
assumption therein that asset price relationships are consistent pre and post-financial crisis. 
Joyce et al. (2011), for example, focus solely on QE1 as does Breedon et al (2012). This presents 
the issue as to whether QE2 and QE3 demonstrate the same effects as the initial bout of 
purchases, or indeed whether the price relationships are consistent throughout all three 
intervention periods.  
In the next section, this chapter outlines its own contribution to QE literature, discussing 
how this chapter models price relationships between 2007 and 2014. 
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2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Data selection 
The data selected for this chapter includes the log of the FTSE100 index closing price 
(AVCLOSE100), A-rated corporate bond yields (CORP5, CORP15 and CORP30) and 
government gilt yields each with 5, 15 and 25 years to maturity, as well as the USD-GBP and 
the EUR-GBP exchange rates. This chapter also includes commercial bank bond yields as a 
subset of corporate debt (COMM5, COMM15 and COMM25), aiming to draw some additional 
inferences on UK bank stability and lending by looking at the cost of bank debt. As a concise 
description, this chapter defines UK government gilts as the primary assets involved with QE, 
while corporate bonds, commercial bank yields, exchange rates and the FTSE stock index are 
defined as secondary assets. This distinction is made due to the gilts being directly purchased 
by the APF, while the secondary assets were only to affected indirectly. Yields and prices rather 
than excess returns are considered because of difficulties in differentiating between short-term 
government bond yields and risk-free returns. Moreover, this allows to compare findings 
directly with other studies. The FTSE 100 is obtained from Bloomberg, the corporate bond 
yield data is taken from Reuters Datastream and commercial bond and gilt yields for maturities 
ranging from 1 year to 30 years from the Bank of England’s yield curve data. Exchange rates 
are also available from the Bank of England’s statistical database.  
Data for all variables are weekly averages of daily figures. This choice is driven by the 
relatively short time window in which QE purchases were conducted, implying that modelling 
with monthly data would have been limited to less than 25 observations. The weekly format 
strikes the balance between data availability and model performance. Rather than weekly 
closing data this chapter uses weekly averages of daily figures as it is more representative of 
the volatility from week to week. Data is from 7th of July 2007 to 29th of December 2014, a 
time window which includes all QE purchases as well as the main events of the global financial 
crisis. Many other studies use pre-crisis data for estimating relationships between financial 
variables to infer the impact of QE on financial markets.  However, this requires that the pre-
crisis relationships were unchanged by the financial crisis and the Bank of England’s 
interventions. This chapter avoids such an assumption and lets the data from the crisis period 
speak for itself. 
 This chapter includes dummy variables to capture QE gilt auction dates, differentiating 
between the maturities of assets purchased. This information is publicly available from the Bank 
of England’s website. The purpose of these dummies is to see whether purchases of gilts of 
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distinct maturities affect secondary assets differently. Accordingly, dummy variables are 
assigned the value of 1 in the weeks when the Bank of England purchased gilts of each 
respective years to redemption, and 0 otherwise. These are denoted as D5purchase, 
D15purchase and D25purchase. This chapter also includes a dummy which is valued 1 when 
assets of any maturity are purchased, and 0 otherwise, denoted as DQEAllPurchases. The latter 
is further split into two dummies to distinguish the overall effects for the two phases of QE. 
Accordingly, DQE1 is valued 1 for purchases between 2009 and 2010 and zero otherwise, while 
DQE2 is valued 1 for purchases between 2011 and 2012 and zero otherwise. These dummies 
are used in auxiliary regression which are the same in all other respects as the primary analysis. 
Given that these dummies coincide with the D5purchase, D15purchase and D25purchase, and 
are intended to capture the same effects, the statistical significance of all dummies would be 
expected to be reduced if all were included in one regression model. 
2.3.2 Time series properties of the data 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the endogenous variables, as well as the 
results of the specification tests for variable normality and the presence of unit roots. Table 2.2 
presents the summary statistics for the dummy variables used in the analysis. According to the 
Jarque-Bera statistics, all variables are non-normal. This seems to be driven for most of the 
variables by large kurtosis. As for unit roots, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
was employed. The results were then 
for robustness checked by an ADF test from a GLS regression (GLS-ADF). All tests 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% significance level, the only exception 
being the exchange rate to the Euro which was a borderline case when considering the standard 
ADF test. Regarding their first differences, strong rejections of the null hypothesis of a unit root 
are found for all variables. Hence, all variables are I(1) non-stationary. 
As is general practice after determining the presence of non-stationarity amongst these 
variables, testing for cointegration was conducted. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 summarize the result from 
a Johansen and Juselius (1990) test for cointegration for both the commercial bank yield model 
and the corporate bond yield model. Lag-orders were chosen in both cases based on information 
criterions, and serial correlation in the lags is tested with a LM test. Selection was also made 
with reference to studies such as Ivanov and Kilian (2005) that test the various information 
criterion’s robustness to small sample sizes, non-normality and the issues connected with 
various data intervals. Cointegration rank tests are performed on all types of unit-root processes 
to identify the nature and number of cointegrating variables. For almost all specifications, the 
maximum recommended cointegration rank is one for the commercial yield model, meaning 
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there are long-term relationships between variables. However, there is a large degree of 
discrepancy between the recommended rank of cointegration between Trace test and the Max-
Eigenvalue statistics. Trace tests suggest a maximum rank of two or even three for certain unit 
root specifications, however the Max-Eigenvalue do not corroborate with these results 
consistently, finding a maximum of two rank in the corporate yield model. Given these results, 
the commercial yield model is specified with one cointegrating equation, and two cointegrating 
equations for the corporate yield model. Both models are specified with a constant in the VAR 
model and the cointegrating equation, corresponding to the results in the final two columns of 
tables 2.3 and 2.4.  In addition, seeing as there is a large amount of debate whether yields can 
be non-stationary, VAR specifications of each model are included as well as the VEC.
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
 
AVCLOSE 
100 
COMM5 COMM15 COMM25 DOLLAR EURO GOVT5 GOVT15 GOVT25 CORP5 CORP15 CORP30 
 Mean 8.649 2.759 3.734 3.814 1.651 1.210 2.370 3.765 4.016 4.002 5.190 5.399 
 Median 8.670 2.348 3.845 3.932 1.605 1.196 2.073 3.972 4.235 3.635 5.280 5.467 
 Max. 8.833 6.129 5.534 5.070 2.095 1.491 5.584 5.150 4.865 7.945 7.308 7.264 
 Min. 8.180 0.919 2.138 2.318 1.383 1.029 0.561 2.234 2.631 1.655 3.480 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.140 1.420 0.862 0.617 0.161 0.084 1.284 0.819 0.554 1.651 1.012 1.006 
 Skew. -1.011 0.848 0.132 -0.062 1.359 1.272 0.764 -0.198 -0.351 0.511 0.159 -1.199 
 Kurtosis 3.611 2.663 1.818 1.901 3.817 5.012 2.680 1.665 1.757 1.895 1.920 8.136  
            
 Jarque 
-Bera 72.819 48.819 23.980 19.966 131.652 171.909 39.800 31.698 33.267 36.971 20.717 524.808 
 Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
            
 Sum 3390.551 1081.615 1463.792 1495.243 647.123 474.246 929.213 1475.690 1574.327 1568.891 2034.606 2116.472 
 Sum  
Sq. Dev. 7.660 788.499 290.468 148.716 10.174 2.759 644.221 261.986 119.870 1065.270 400.351 395.921  
            
 Obs. 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 
ADF  
P-Value 
0.374 0.086 0.094 0.251 0.559 0.044 0.197 0.233 0.233 0.6748675 0.8814882 0.8125813 
PP GLS-ADF 
Test  
P-Value 
0.448191 0.0780.417 0.0970.184 0.2090.289 0.707543 0.037023 0.190468 0.253633 0.253732 0.7092743 0.8165980 0.0001337 
Notes. ADF and GLS-ADF tests were performed with an intercept in the test equation. 
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Table 1.2 Dummy Variable Summary Statistics 
 D5PURCHASE D15PURCHASE D25PURCHASE DQEALLPURCHASES DQE1 DQE2 
 Mean 0.181 0.179 0.023 0.247 0.110 0.138 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Std. Dev. 0.386 0.383 0.150 0.432 0.313 0.345 
 Skewness 1.656 1.679 6.370 1.170 2.498 2.102 
 Kurtosis 3.742 3.817 41.579 2.370 7.239 5.419 
       
 Jarque-Bera 188.164 194.982 26960.770 95.992 701.210 384.287 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
 Sum 71 70 9 97 43 54 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
58.140 57.500 8.793 72.997 38.283 46.561 
       
Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 
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Table 2.3 Cointegration Rank Testing Commercial Yield model 
 
No Intercept or  
No Trend  
in CE or test VAR 
 
Intercept in CE, 
No intercept in test VAR, 
 No Trend 
 
Intercept in CE and test VAR, 
 No Trend 
 
 
Trace Max-Eigenvalue Trace Max-Eigenvalue Trace Max-Eigenvalue 
None * 189.58** 53.46* 214.96** 56.23* 205.36** 55.94* 
At most 1  136.12 42.87 158.73 43.40 149.42 41.07 
At most 2 93.24 30.07 115.33 30.24 108.35 29.89 
At most 3 63.17 25.51 85.10 27.26 78.45 25.81 
At most 4 37.66 22.33 57.84 25.25 52.64 23.77 
At most 5 15.33 9.38 32.59 17.41 28.88 15.38 
At most 6 5.95 5.28 15.18 9.32 13.50 9.25 
At most 7 0.67 0.66 5.86 5.22 4.25 3.88 
At most 8 0.01 0.01 0.64 0.64 0.37 0.37 
Rank None* None* None* None* None* None* 
Notes. ** Signifies rejection at 5% level of a maximum of the number of cointegrating equations described in Column 1 of the table. 
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Table 2.4 Cointegration Rank Testing Corporate Bond Yield Model 
 
No Intercept or 
No Trend  
in CE or test VARNo Intercept No 
Trend 
 
Intercept in CE, 
No intercept in test VAR, 
No TrendIntercept No 
Trend 
 
Intercept in CE and test 
VAR, 
No TrendIntercept No 
Trend 
 
 
Trace Max-
Eigenvalue 
Trace Max-
Eigenvalue 
Trace Max-
Eigenvalue 
None * 210.08*** 59.72** 240.85*** 59.72** 236.09*** 58.26* 
At most 1 
* 150.36** 50.99** 181.13** 51.25* 177.83*** 51.25* 
At most 2 99.37 35.67 129.87* 44.90* 126.58** 44.90* 
At most 3 63.70 23.64 84.97 26.78 81.67 26.62 
At most 4 40.06 17.00 58.19 21.95 55.06 21.37 
At most 5 23.06 11.97 36.24 15.83 33.69 15.73 
At most 6 11.09 9.70 20.42 10.78 17.96 9.33 
At most 7 1.40 1.14 9.64 8.63 8.63 8.63 
At most 8 0.25 0.25 1.01 1.01 0.00 0.00 
Rank At most 1 * At most 1 * At most 1 * At most 1 At most 1 * At most 1 
Notes. ** Signifies rejection at 5% level of a maximum of the number of cointegrating equations described in Column 1 of the table. 
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2.3.3 Specification of a VAR model with exogenous variables 
A VAR is a model in which 𝐾 variables are specified as linear functions of 𝑝 of their 
own lags, 𝑝 lags of the other 𝐾 − 1 variables and in this case additional exogenous variables. 
A standard 𝑝-order VAR model is given by 
𝒚𝒕 = 𝒗 + 𝑨1𝒚𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑨𝑝𝒚𝑡−𝑝 + 𝒖𝑡     (1) 
Where 𝒚𝑡 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector of variables, 𝒗 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector of parameters, 𝑨1 − 𝑨𝑝 are 𝐾 × 𝐾 
matrices of parameters and 𝒖𝑡 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector of disturbances which has mean 0 and is i.i.d. 
normal over time. If during cointegration rank testing, cointegration between non-stationary 
variables are found, this VAR(𝑝) can be rewritten as a VECM 
∆𝒚𝑡 = 𝒗 + 𝚷𝒚𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝚪𝒊
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 Δ𝒚𝑡−𝑖 + 𝒖𝑡     (2) 
Where 𝚷 = ∑ 𝑨𝑗
𝒋=𝒑
𝒋=𝟏 − 𝑰𝑘  and 𝚪𝑖 = − ∑ 𝑨𝑗
𝑗=𝑝
𝑗=𝑖+1 . The 𝒗 and 𝒖𝑡 are identical to the VAR case. 
Cointegration can occur when the variables included in 𝒚𝑡 I(1).  If this is the case, the matrix 𝚷 
has rank between 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝐾 where 𝑟 is the number of linearly independent cointegrating 
vectors. If cointegration is found between the non-stationary variables, then a VAR model is 
misspecified because it does not include the lagged level term 𝚷𝒚𝑡−1.  
There are several reasons to be concerned with whether to use a stationary VAR model or a 
VEC model when looking at the data discussed in this chapter. As noted before on a theoretical 
basis bond yields of any category should not be correspond to a non-stationary process over a 
large enough sample, given the constraints on the values interest rate yields can take. 
Furthermore on an empirical basis the unit root tests shown before present some evidence of 
stationarity if the 10% significance level is to be considered. Finally, Aas the results of Johansen 
cointegration rank testing are unclear as to the true number of cointegrating vectors in each 
respective model. As Conducting cointegration tests and thence estimating a VEC model can 
produce results that are as inaccurate as using a VAR when variables are non-stationary,, both 
VAR and VEC models are specified to then compare differences in results, therefore producing 
robust results in either scenario.  In addition, as mentioned above, exogenous dummy variables 
are included in both VAR and VEC models. In the case of the VAR(𝑝) model, including 
exogenous variables changes the equation to the following form 
𝒚𝒕 = 𝒗 + 𝑨1𝒚𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑨𝑝𝒚𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑩0𝒙𝑡 + 𝑩1𝒙𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑩𝑠𝒙𝑡−𝑠 + 𝒖𝑡  (3) 
Where in addition to the already discussed variables, 𝒙𝑡 is an 𝑀 × 1 vector of exogenous 
variables and 𝑩0 − 𝑩𝑠 are 𝐾 × 𝑀 matrices of coefficients. For this chapter, the exogenous 
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variables are restricted to dummy variables to capture the effects of monetary policy 
intervention. 
Having specified the usage of both VAR and VEC models, all models were specified 
with sufficient lags to remove serial correlation in the residuals.  For the commercial yield 
model Information criterion recommended 4 lags according to both AIC and FPE. LM tests for 
autocorrelation found there was no autocorrelation in the residuals at 4 lags, so this lag level is 
chosen for analysis.  The corporate bond model was selected to use 5 lags using the same 
procedure. All models retain the issues of heteroscedasticity and non-normal residuals but 
satisfy stability conditions to allow for forecasting. Newey-West standard errors are used to 
correct residual estimates. 
Given the primary interest in causality and significance of the relationships between the 
financial variables, it is important to test the stability of the models and therein the accuracy of 
the results. As such, structural break testing of the model is used to determine whether there are 
any changes in any of the relationships during the sample.  
2.3.4 Structural break analysis 
 Due to the unstable nature of financial markets over the time period, and the sometimes-
erratic behaviour of financial market participants, it is possible that the relationships that exist 
between different financial assets during normal market function change during crisis periods. 
It is also plausible that during financial crisis periods investors have different preferences for 
the composition of their portfolios, such as the well-known flight-to-quality behaviour, again 
meaning that price relationships may have changed over the course of the time UK financial 
crisis. This chapter pre-emptively tests the validity of the results by testing for structural breaks 
in the coefficient and residuals over the sample period. As an addition, this chapter also 
interprets these structural breaks to determine whether any have links to the QE programme. 
An important possibility for examination of QE is whether any changes in asset relationships 
can be attributed to QE purchases or announcements, or whether they are unrelated to the Bank 
of England’s monetary policy.  
The methodology employed by this chapter follows the structural break tests outlined in 
(Bai and Perron, 2003), which introduces an adaptation to the Quandt-Andrews (Andrews, 
1993) test for an unknown structural break allowing for several unknown breakpoints to be 
tested for simultaneously. Each test tested for breakpoints of the respective independent 
variables and their lags, resulting in the computation of dates after which the coefficient 
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relationship between variables changed significantly. The tests were used in both corporate and 
commercial bond models, both displaying similar results. 
In both models, the relationships between the variables were relatively stable over the 
sample period, with structural breaks mostly occurring before the onset of QE in March 2009. 
In addition, there appears to be no breakpoints that can be interpreted as having links to QE 
purchases, except for 25-year government yields, where a breakpoint occurs around the 19th of 
January 2009. This date saw the British government authorise the Asset Purchase Facility, 
effectively announcing QE would be taking place, but with no mention of the scale of the 
purchases. Additional breakpoints for 5 and 15-year commercial yields around this time may 
be associated with this announcement, however apart from this there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest QE caused structural breaks in the relationships between financial assets. Overall the 
evidence suggests that the asset relationships are stable enough to make the results of the models 
accurate. The assets show surprising stability over the period, with most variables only breaking 
with at most one other variable.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 VECM Results 
Having established the presence of cointegrating relationships between the variables, 
the most interesting area of study becomes to determine whether gilt yields significantly 
contribute to these long run relationships, and therefore whether QE could impact other assets 
over a period which is not captured by short-run analysis. It is also of interest to this chapter to 
test whether commercial bank and corporate bond yields contributed differently to the 
cointegrating relationships found earlier. Using the LR test this chapter looks for which 
variables identify and contribute to the long-term relationship over the sample. Through 
restricting 𝛽 = 0 for certain variables and then testing using the LR statistic it is possible 
determine whether the FTSE, the exchange rates and the various yields contribute to a long run 
relationship. It was found in all cases that the FTSE and both exchange rates were significant 
contributors towards the cointegrating relationship in the Commercial bank yield model and the 
first cointegrating equation in the corporate bond model. It was also found that restricting 5 and 
25-year government yields to zero were not binding restrictions for these first cointegrating 
equations in both models, with the corporate yield model also accepting restricting 15-year gilts 
to zero. Imposing the restriction on the 15-year gilt yields in the commercial bank model did 
decrease the performance of the model according to the LR statistic, however it should be noted 
that the LR statistic was only borderline significant. This suggests that the yield does contribute 
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to the equation, but only weakly. Finally, it was also found that restricting 15-year 
commercial/corporate yields to zero was not a binding restriction in both cointegrating 
equations.  This means that private debt of 5 and 25 years to maturity, contribute to the first 
long-term relationship.  
 For the second cointegrating relationship in the corporate yield model, the FTSE and 
exchange rates could robustly be restricted to zero without binding the model. This suggests 
there are two exclusive long-term equations for corporate yields, one relating private debt and 
equities to the value of the pound and the long-term UK interest rate, while the other deals with 
the long-term relation between corporate and government debt. Restricting any of the other 
variables in addition to these are considered binding by the LR statistic, and therefore yield a 
worse performing model. 
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Table 2.5 Long-Run Cointegrating Relationships 
  FTSE100 Comm5 Comm15 Comm25 Dollar Euro Govt5 Govt15 Govt25 
CE1 1.000 
0.000 
0.337 
9.294 
24.191 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.251 
2.081 
11.480 
0.022 
-0.965 
-4.259 
22.799 
0.000 
-0.965 
-4.259 
22.800 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
-0.709 
-6.960 
21.590 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 T-stat 
LR stat 
P-Value 
𝑬𝑪𝑻𝒕−𝟏 -0.017* 0.022 0.000 0.017 -0.014* -0.044*** 0.000 -0.151*** 0.000  
-1.424 1.162 0.000 0.944 -1.089 -3.536 0.000 -4.122 0.000           
 
FTSE100 Corp5 Corp15 Corp30 Dollar Euro Govt5 Govt15 Govt25 
CE1 1.000 
0.000 
0.663 
9.900 
22.657 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
-1.069 
-8.647 
26.358 
0.000 
-1.931 
-4.503 
18.052 
0.006 
-2.547 
-3.369 
24.541 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 T-stat 
LR stat 
P-Value 
CE2 0.000 
0.000 
1.000 
0.000 
-0.649 
-7.788 
19.449 
0.003 
-0.764 
-8.049 
13.817 
0.032 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
-1.229 
-12.211 
22.667 
0.001 
2.165 
7.516 
22.224 
0.001 
-1.406 
-4.845 
12.817 
0.046 
T-stat 
LR stat 
P-Value 
𝑬𝑪𝑻𝟏𝒕−𝟏 -0.019*** -0.032 0.000 -0.363* 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  
-3.617 -1.100 0.000 -2.659 0.351 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝑬𝑪𝑻𝟐𝒕−𝟏 0.000 0.015 -0.116*** -0.047 0.000 0.000 -0.132*** -0.151*** -0.088  
0.000 0.285 -4.369 -0.400 0.000 0.000 -3.604 2.447 -2.430 
Notes. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. T-stats are given in the second element of each row. 
Binding restriction LR Chi-Squared statistics and P-values are reported. Non-binding restrictions do not always produce valid LR statistics. 
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Table 2.5 shows the long-run cointegrating equations, normalized to the FTSE100 in 
CE1 for both models, and normalized to 5-year corporate yield for CE2. For the commercial 
yield model Table 2.5 shows that there is a positive long-run relationship between the FTSE 
and both exchange rates, as well as the yield for 15-year government debt. Commercial bank 
yields however have a negative long run relationship with the FTSE. As the 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 statistics 
indicate, the FTSE’s price level, the exchange rates and the government 15-yield all have the 
correct negative sign and are significant, meaning that they adjust if their values are too high. 
However, the commercial yields do not adjust quickly if they are too high in value.  The results 
for the first cointegrating equation in the corporate bond model are mostly similar to the 
commercial model. Interestingly, extreme long-term corporate yields have a positive 
relationship with the FTSE, which is the opposite of the longer commercial debt. Overall, the 
first cointegrating equations suggest there is a long run relationship between the value of UK 
private debt, equity and the demand for sterling, a relationship where equity values make the 
largest adjustments to restore equilibrium. The lack of involvement of the other government 
yields in this equation suggests that over the long-term FTSE prices do not react to the level of 
short or very long government yields, with the implication that any QE purchases of these assets 
in the long run would not have an effect on the FTSE.  Furthermore, it appears that commercial 
bank bond yields also do not have a long-term relationship with government gilt yields of 5 and 
25 years to maturity, which again suggests that depression of gilt yields of these maturities does 
little to impact commercial bank debt. 
The second cointegrating equation presents some evidence for the efficacy of QE in 
affecting corporate bond yields. As Table 2.5 shows, there exists a positive long run relationship 
between government and corporate bonds. The adjustments coefficients are significant and of 
the correct sign for the 5 and 15-year government debt, and for the 15-year corporate debt. The 
other maturities appear to adjust slowly to this long run cointegrating relationship. This suggests 
that QE purchases that reduce gilt yields at the shorter end of the term structure will, over the 
long run, cause a similar reaction from corporate bonds. 
It is difficult to determine what these cointegrating relationships represent. One possible 
interpretation of the second cointegrating equation (CE2) in the corporate bond model is the 
relationships between bonds and gilts implied by the liquidity premium or preferred habitat 
theories. The inclusion of just the gilt and corporate bonds in the cointegrating equation implies 
there is a balance between risk and maturities characteristics over time. The other cointegrating 
equations, CE1 in both the commercial and corporate yield models, could also be interpreted as 
the balance between the risk and return characteristics of the other assets apart from the gilt 
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market. The relevance of the exchange rates in this long-term relationship also indicates an 
important international element in the consideration of the valuation of equities, bonds and gilts. 
Overall In terms of policy analysis, these significant cointegrating relationshipsresults also 
present evidence that QE purchases depressing gilt yields would have a significant impact on 
corporate/commercial bank yields over the long term. Purchases at the shorter and longer ends 
of the maturity structure are the main drivers of a QE effect. There does not appear to be such 
a mechanism, however, for gilt yields to affect UK equities and sterling exchange rates. 
 
2.4.2 Granger Causality  
Finding that there are significant long term relationships between the government and 
private debt variables, this chapter moves on to determining the causality and the response to 
shocks over the short run. To demonstrate the significance of the relationships between these 
variables Tables, 2.6-2.9 show the results of granger causality tests over the entire sample for 
both VAR and VECM specifications for each model.  Each cell of these tables contains the 
relevant P-value of the granger causality test with values under 0.05 signifying rejections of the 
null hypothesis of granger non-causality. It can be seen that the results of the VAR and VECM 
in each case are mostly identical in significance, which is expected as in both cases Granger 
Causality tests are conducted in the same way. Tables 2.7 and 2.9 are therefore included as a 
robustness check of these different model specifications. 
Starting with the government yields, which are the focus of any study analysing QE, the 
finding is that 5-year yields are the most granger causal to the rest of the variables in the 
commercial bank yield model. Commercial bank debt of maturities of 5 and 15 years are 
significantly affected, with the 25-year debt being marginally significant at the 10% level. The 
FTSE100 is also significantly granger caused by 5-year government yields. However, exchange 
rates are not affected by these yields of any maturity, except the 15-year yields, suggesting that 
QE depressing gilt yields did not cause the sterling to depreciate. 25-year government yields 
also exhibit granger causality with commercial bank yields, however apart from these caveats 
15 and 25 yields do not significantly impact the other variables, at least at the 5% significance 
level. At the 10% level, these longer yields have an impact on commercial debt of similar 
maturities. This suggests that QE purchases at the long end of the term structure had limited 
impact on private debt, exchange rates and equity. In the corporate bond yield model, the results 
show that in contrast 5-year gilt yields do not significantly Granger cause corporate bonds of 
any maturity, however the longer maturity gilt yields are more significant in their causal 
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relationships with corporate debt. It appears that commercial bank debt is more responsive to 
shorter-term government yields, while more generalised corporate debt responds to yield 
movements of long maturity. The discrepancy could also be because of the additional lag in the 
corporate yield model, which could suggest that the significant causal relationships occur after 
a significant time-lag. Apart from these differences in the significance of 5-year government 
yields, most of the results are comparable between the two models. In summary of both models, 
it is clear that the strongest relationships are between government and private debt, with equities 
and exchange rates being significantly more exogenous. 
Looking at the price relationships the FTSE100 is only significantly affected by the 5-
year yields of commercial bank debt, and the two exchange rates. In addition, the index’s price 
level did not significantly change the yields on either debt types, with a marginally significant 
effect on the euro/sterling exchange rate. It also seems that the FTSE was not significantly 
affected by corporate debt yields of any maturity, but Granger caused the 15 and 30 year 
corporate yields. This interaction is interesting and suggests that equity prices would be more 
responsive to bank lending or debt issuance than to the pricing of general corporate debt. 
For commercial bank debt, only changes to the 5-year yields have significant effects on 
other asset values. In addition to the aforementioned effect on the FTSE price level, commercial 
bank debt yields of relatively short maturities significantly impact gilt yields across the maturity 
spectrum, however longer commercial bank yields did not exhibit significant causal 
relationships with equities, exchange rates or even gilts of similar maturities. Corporate yields 
largely behaved in the same way, with short maturity corporate yields impacting government 
yields of all maturities, however in addition to this 5-year corporate debt yields also 
significantly impact the Dollar/Sterling exchange rate, a relationship that is not found 
significant for commercial bank yields. Again this discrepancy could be caused by the 
additional lag in the corporate yield model. 
 The exchange rates show bi-directional causality with one another, being affected by 
only the FTSE and the 15-year government yields in the case of the Euro. Longer maturity 
government yields are also significantly affected by these exchange rates, but this effect is not 
present in commercial bank yields. All variables in the system were found to not be granger 
exogenous at the 10% level, with the exception of the 5-year government yield, with the 3 
government gilt yields being only significantly responsive to the 5-year commercial bank 
yields. It is also interesting to note the longer maturity yields are the most responsive for both 
commercial bank and government debt.  
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The results of the Granger tests suggest that commercial bank bond yields and UK 
equities exhibit the strongest relationships with short-term government debt, while longer 
maturity yields were only significantly related to commercial and corporate debt of comparative 
maturities. The implication of this for QE is that assuming the purchases lowered gilt yields, 
the purchases at both ends of the maturity spectrum would impact financial assets differently. 
Another interesting implication to note is that according to these results, depressed gilt yields 
of any maturity would not translate through to devaluation of the sterling, at least not in the 
short-term. This outcome was a predicted outcome of the QE policy according to much of the 
theoretical literature, however there appears to be no significant short-term link.   
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Table 2.6 Commercial Bank Bond Granger Causality (VAR) 
Table 2.7 Commercial Bank Bond Granger Causality (VECM) 
  
VAR Granger Causality Statistics FTSE100 Comm5 Comm15 Comm25 Dollar Euro Govt5 Govt15 Govt25 
FTSE100  0.2028203 0.8722 0.2226223 0.1621 0.0391 0.1308131 0.4047405 0.4739474 
Comm5 0.0017002  0.102 0.175 0.5577556 0.5981 0.0144 0.0103 0.02546 
Comm15 0.7417742 0.7011  0.8273 0.2009201 0.79766 0.69439 0.8651 0.815 
Comm25 0.3461346 0.840 0.4291  0.2432 0.56987 0.33987 0.12219 0.1642 
Dollar 0.0466047 0.538 0.52326 0.71162  0.01215 0.214 0.03766 0.12329 
Euro 0.0016002 0.9196920 0.2522 0.0743 0.0479048  0.574 0.1463 0.03549 
Govt5 0.0003 0.0014 0.0084 0.070698 0.7669767 0.6874  0.050498 0.2824 
Govt15 0.6095610 0.12989 0.0734 0.0613 0.5481548 0.0152 0.19219  0.2784 
Govt25 0.2116212 0.20436 0.0194 0.01327 0.9343933 0.1224 0.30766 0.10988  
All 0.000 0.027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.07878 0.02437 0.012 
Notes. Dependent Variables are given in each column of the table. Granger causality P-values are given in the first row of each section. Elements italicised and in bold show significance 
at 5% level. 
 
 
VECM Granger Causality 
Statistics 
FTSE100 Comm5 Comm15 Comm25 Dollar Euro Govt5 Govt15 Govt25 
FTSE100  0.20328 0.74107 0.1783 0.21436 0.1291 0.11105 0.2653 0.26438 
Comm5 0.00218  0.1051 0.1661 0.5773 0.54217 0.0224 0.00876 0.0191 
Comm15 0.76218 0.6803  0.8182 0.21105 0.81767 0.6161 0.8381 0.80985 
Comm25 0.35875 0.8334 0.430  0.2472 0.5642 0.29877 0.116 0.15329 
Dollar 0.0433 0.50325 0.5302 0.6551  0.0222 0.23876 0.04765 0.1391 
Euro 0.0012 0.95325 0.29548 0.098 0.0663  0.6881 0.14986 0.05105 
Govt5 0.0003 0.0013 0.0074 0.06768 0.76548 0.64215  0.0364 0.25766 
Govt15 0.6393 0.1033 0.050498 0.050 0.5781 0.0212 0.1382  0.1752 
Govt25 0.2061 0.200 0.01988 0.0132 0.9314 0.10548 0.2752 0.093  
All 0.0000 0.0272 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0824 0.01108 0.0091 
Notes. Dependent Variables are given in each column of the table. Granger causality P-values are given in the first row of each section. Elements italicised and in bold show significance 
at 5% level. 
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Table 2.8 Corporate Bond Granger Causality (VAR) 
Table 2.9 Corporate Bond Granger Causality (VECM) 
 
VAR Granger Causality Statistics FTSE100 Corp5 Corp15 Corp30 Dollar Euro Govt5 Govt15 Govt25 
FTSE100  0.0001 0.0144 0.3581 0.00439 0.04545 0.008 0.69106 0.715 
Corp5 0.76877  0.0000 0.76329 0.02655 0.27985 0.00105 0.0042 0.0153 
Corp15 0.84769 0.07986  0.5952 0.760599 0.2851 0.4212 0.2044 0.3453 
Corp30 0.9612 0.7922 0.9014  0.8094 0.06327 0.61439 0.51548 0.1772 
Dollar 0.0101 0.516 0.17767 0.72327  0.00219 0.2624 0.1974 0.450498 
Euro 0.0452 0.14877 0.64436 0.01767 0.0232  0.60655 0.0993 0.0263 
Govt5 0.41986 0.7022 0.11545 0.5893 0.3407 0.01329  0.26438 0.1112 
Govt15 0.5744 0.3532 0.00768 0.97656 0.47878 0.1913 0.3114  0.001 
Govt25 0.1873 0.00989 0.04657 0.6117 0.83988 0.25985 0.75986 0.01766  
All 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.03109 0.02546 0.005 
Notes. Dependent Variables are given in each column of the table. Granger causality P-values are given in the first row of each section. Elements italicised and in bold show significance 
at 5% level. 
 
 
VECM Granger Causality 
Statistics 
FTSE100 Corp5 Corp15 Corp30 Dollar Euro Govt5 Govt15 Govt25 
FTSE100  0.00002 0.03768 0.37 0.00549 0.0723 0.008 0.7242 0.6934 
Comm5Corp5 0.7649765  0.0000 0.770699 0.0261 0.3003 0.0000.0005 0.004 0.0152 
Comm15Corp15 0.88769 0.09545  0.59767 0.76107 0.26189 0.43327 0.1883 0.3274 
Comm25Corp30 0.9611 0.75216 0.8772  0.815 0.07105 0.61106 0.56439 0.1954 
Dollar 0.00438 0.350496 0.02988 0.7388  0.00328 0.2694 0.16987 0.4022 
Euro 0.0044 0.0931 0.27328 0.0371 0.0233  0.60547 0.16106 0.0473 
Govt5 0.5504 0.60217 0.06986 0.610097 0.3854 0.040398  0.1943 0.08986 
Govt15 0.80877 0.52658 0.0461 0.97658 0.5083 0.2831 0.32328  0.0000.0008 
Govt25 0.34436 0.01215 0.1111 0.61657 0.8531 0.37655 0.7743 0.01218  
All 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.032 0.0304 0.00657 
Notes. Dependent Variables are given in each column of the table. Granger causality P-values are given in the first row of each section. Elements italicised and in bold show 
significance at 5% level. 
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2.4.3 Impulse Response Functions 
 To further illustrate this analysis, this chapter uses impulse response functions to 
represent the transmission of shocks to each variable. The ordering of variables in VAR is 
frequently discussed as having significant effects on Cholesky impulse response functions, 
therefore this chapter opted to use Generalised impulses, following Pesaran & Shin (1998). 
These are insensitive to ordering of the VAR, which is appropriate given this chapter intended 
to approach the VAR ordering without any theoretical structures. The shocks graphed from the 
impulse variable is a one standard deviation innovation with the confidence intervals being set 
at two asymptotic standard errors. Monte Carlo confidence intervals were also computed but 
demonstrated no different implications in significance from the standard asymptotic standard 
errors. The responses were graphed to 20 periods, but most responses are insignificantly 
different to zero after 5-8 periods. This suggests that shocks during the sample period were of 
a very short-term nature, with most responses dying out after 2 periods, however it should be 
noted that bands of plus or minus two standard error.s is reasonably stringent in considering 
whether the shocks had effects significantly different from zero. For the majority of the plots 
discussed below the same conclusions would hold using a different specification of error bands. 
Impulse responses from each respective VEC model are also displayed following the results of 
the VAR model. 
 Recalling that the focus of this chapter is analysing financial asset price relationships 
and their implications on QE, the discussion here will focus on the impact of shocks to gilt 
yields, and thereby the transmission to other financial assets, rather than include impulse 
responses from every variable. As mentioned before, the main focus of this chapter is to 
examine whether significant, stable relationships existed in the financial crisis period to 
facilitate a successful QE policy. Significant responses to gilt yield shocks suggest that QE 
could be translated through to the different asset types, providing evidence towards the efficacy 
of QE.  
For the commercial bank yield VAR, Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 corroborate the findings of the 
granger causality tests. It can be seen that 5-year yields shown in Figure 2.1 solicit positive 
initial responses from all commercial yields, an initially positive, then negative response from 
the FTSE, and a small but positive response from both exchange rates. Once again, it seems the 
difference in the significance for the granger causality comes down to magnitude of this initial 
response, with the 25-year commercial yields showing a quantitatively smaller response than 
the 5 and 15-year yields. Figure 2.2 shows that shocks to 15-year government yields caused 
qualitatively similar responses from the other variables to that of the 5-year yield, however the 
Formatted: Indent: First line:  0 cm
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effects are smaller in all cases, hence the insignificance of the Granger causality tests. An 
exception to this is the 25-year government yield. This provides evidence that QE purchases of 
this maturity bracket would have had little to no impact on the wider financial markets.  
 32 
 
  
Figure 2.1 GOVT5 Impulse Responses Commercial Bank Bond Model 
Figure 2.2 GOVT15 Impulse Responses Commercial Bank Bond Model 
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The results of the corporate yield model are largely the same as those found in the 
commercial model for the FTSE, exchange rates and gilt yields. However, the impact on 
corporate yields is very different for certain maturities. To start, corporate yields of 30 years to 
maturity do not respond significantly to any of the shocks to government yields of any maturity, 
with the initial positive effects being small in scale and counteracted by negative effects in the 
periods after. This corroborates with the Granger tests that found 30-year corporate debt to 
unaffected by everything except the Euro sterling exchange rate. For the other corporate debt 
yields, the effects from shocks to 5-year government yields occur in both an initial positive 
response and then a secondary positive response after about 7 periods. These effects appear to 
be too small in scale to found be significant by the Granger tests, however. Impulses from the 
15 and 25-year government yields interestingly causes a similar response as shocks to the 5-
year yield on 5-year corporate debt but causes a significant negative impact 3 periods after the 
initial positive response for 15-year corporate yields.  This means that any depression in gilt 
yields of 15 and 25 years raised corporate yields several weeks later. 
 
Figure 2.3 GOVT25 Impulse Responses Commercial Bank Bond Model 
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Figure 2.5 GOVT15 Impulse Responses Corporate Bond Model 
Figure 2.4 GOVT5 Impulse Responses Corporate Bond Model 
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Figure 2.6 GOVT25 Impulse Responses Corporate Bond Model 
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While testing found the government and commercial bank yields to be non-stationary 
processes over the financial crisis period, other commentators have used yields in levels in their 
models. To ensure robustness of the results, and to help comparison, this chapter computes the 
same VAR model with all yields at levels but the equity and exchange rate variables in 
differences. Below are the computed impulse response functions from this auxiliary model. 
Appendix Figures A-1.1-6 show that the relationships between the differenced variables are the 
same as in the standard model and so will not be discussed at any length here. Focusing on the 
debt yields for both commercial and corporate debt, government yield innovations cause 
positive responses from private debt of all maturities. These effects are all significant for over 
ten periods. It appears the effects of these impulses are also stronger on commercial yields than 
corporate bond yields, especially in the case of the 30-year corporate bond yields, where the 
effects are comparatively small. In addition, it appears that shocks to the short end of the term 
structure appear to have the quantitatively strongest effects on both commercial and corporate 
yields. Overall these results reinforce the findings of the two standard models, showing that the 
short end of the term structure demonstrates the strongest impact on the other assets, with 
quantitatively smaller effects coming from innovations to yields of a longer maturity. 
In summary of all of the impulse-response results, it is clear that the strongest 
relationships between government yields and equities, private debt yields and exchange rates 
comes at the short end of the term structure. The causal links between both government and 
commercial debt and the other variables weakens as maturity increases. For QE to have an 
effective transmission mechanism, government gilt yields would have to have a strong causal 
relationship with high-quality equities and commercial bank bond yields. A successful QE 
policy would have required decreasing gilt yields to have decreased commercial bank bond 
yields and increased equity prices. While decreasing short-term gilt yields are shown to 
decrease their commercial bank equivalents, yield changes of longer maturity gilts had little to 
no effect on any of the other variables in the system over the short run, suggesting that QE 
purchases of longer-term gilts had an insubstantial effect on other asset types. 
 
2.4.4 Dummy Variable results 
As discussed earlier dummy variables were used to approximate the effect of QE auction 
events on the various financial assets. Using a methodology similar to the Granger causality 
section described above, this chapter tested the null hypothesis that the effect of these dummies 
was zero using Wald coefficient restriction tests. Table 2.10 and 2.11 show the coefficient 
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estimates and t-stats, with significant coefficients denoted by *, **, *** for 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels of significance respectively. As can be seen from both tables, most dummy variables are 
found to have statistically insignificant effects at the 5% level. Very few of the coefficients are 
found to be significant at even the 10% level. This suggests that these purchases did not have 
any of the intended short run effects, or effects small enough to be lost in the general volatility 
of the period. The response of the financial assets to the auctions can be seen in Figures 2.7-18 
As can be seen from Figures 2.7-18 these responses corroborate with the Wald tests in showing 
the effects of the QE dummies to be relatively small in all cases, with most effects not being 
significantly different from zero and all responses fading away in less than 5 periods. 
Neither the FTSE nor the exchange rates, exhibit any significant relationship with QE 
purchases, with the exception of the QE1 dummy variable for the FTSE, and the purchases of 
25 years-to-maturity gilts for the exchange rates. It seems that the first bout of QE purchases 
had the desired effect of increasing the price level of the FTSE, but whether this is because of 
portfolio re-balancing or from improved investor confidence is unclear. Fig.2.7 shows that 
purchases of long-term gilts caused the FTSE to increase after a short lag, an effect which 
dissipates rapidly. It also shows that QE1 purchases also had a positive impact on the FTSE 
price level, with the effects being more instantaneous but decaying more rapidly. All other 
indicators caused insignificant responses from the FTSE, with the overall purchases effect being 
small and positive. This suggests that the FTSE was not significantly affected by QE, with no 
systematic increase in prices resulting from QE auctions. The significance of the QE1 variable 
could suggest that the effects of QE were over-estimated by equity market participants during 
the first phases, an attitude that disappeared for the second phase. 
For exchange rates it seems that purchases at the far end of the term structure caused a 
slight depreciation in the pound against both the dollar and the euro, however this effect is not 
present in purchases of shorter maturities. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show that the exchange rates 
were unaffected by other QE purchases, with this small depreciation of the pound being the 
only significant effect. 
Bank of England purchases of UK gilts with 5-year to maturity, totalling around 
£24billion of the total purchases over the course of the intervention, had borderline significant 
and positive effects on the yields of the longer maturity commercial and government debt. This 
relationship can possibly be explained by participants selling their holdings in 15 and 25-years 
to maturity gilts in order acquire shorter maturity assets, but in any case, does not reflect the 
expected depressed yields outcome. Figures 2.8-10 show that the commercial bank bonds with 
5, 15 and 25 years to maturity were almost entirely unaffected by QE purchases, with only the 
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25-year commercial bank bond yields showing any statistically significant reaction. Bond 
yields of this maturity increased when gilts of 5-years to maturity were purchased by the central 
bank, which suggests that investors sold long-term commercial bank bonds in order to acquire 
shorter-term more liquid assets, however the effect that is only significant at the 10% 
confidence level.  Tables 2.10-11 and figure 2.13 show that short-term gilt yields were 
unaffected by QE purchases, like their commercial bank equivalents, and were unresponsive 
even to the direct purchases of gilts of their maturity bracket.  
In the corporate yield model, the results tell the same story. In addition to the effects on 
the FTSE is QE1 and the exchange rates from auctions of long maturity gilts, the only 
significant auction effects appear to be at the long end of the term structure. 15-year corporate 
yields were decreased overall by QE purchases in both phases of QE, with all of these dummies 
being significant. It appears the overall effect of all purchases cumulatively reduced longer 
maturity yields but this appears not to as a result of purchases of its own maturity. 30-year 
corporate yields increased due to all purchases over both QE phases, however QE1 is the most 
significant contributor to this effect.  
For all of these results, it is unclear whether QE itself is causing these effects, or rather 
that QE intervention occurred during periods when external factors were causing these 
reactions. In either case, it is clear that QE auctions were not sufficient to drive up FTSE prices, 
or drive down yields over the short-term. While depreciating sterling was an anticipated effect 
of QE, this only happened on a localised sections of QE purchases, meaning the effects were 
limited. Once again, this does not conclusively determine that QE had no effect on these assets, 
as the effects might have taken place over a longer period than captured by these dummy 
variables, however these results do support the conclusion that over the short-term QE auctions 
had little effect in the manner predicted by theory. 
  
3
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Table 2.10 QE Auction Indicator Results Commercial Yields 
Coefficients AVCLOSE100 Comm5 Comm15 Comm25 Dollar Euro Govt5 Govt15 Govt25 
D5PURCHASE 0.001 0.021 0.028 0.031* 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.027 0.043*  
0.270 0.920 1.458 1.868 0.876 -0.480 -0.010 1.169 2.072 
D15PURCHASE -0.001 0.000 0.008 0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.015 0.023 0.014  
-0.130 0.008 0.459 0.462 -0.045 -0.276 0.638 1.019 0.709 
D25PURCHASE 
0.001 -0.016 -0.009 -0.015 -0.009*** 
-
0.006*** -0.027 -0.026 -0.057  
0.175 -0.480 -0.307 -0.611 -1.319 -1.494 -0.754 -0.765 -1.826 
DQEALLPURCHASES 0.006 -0.015 -0.021 -0.020 0.000 0.003 -0.002 -0.031 -0.037  
1.015 -0.621 -1.004 -1.085 0.037 0.849 -0.077 -1.233 -1.631 
DQE1 0.010** -0.003 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.004 -0.004  
2.714 -0.212 0.384 0.630 0.598 -0.138 0.618 0.223 -0.245 
DQE2 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005  
1.292 0.084 0.487 0.808 0.960 0.667 0.205 0.218 0.360 
Notes. Dependent Variables are shown along the first row. T-stats are given in the second row of each section, and are shown in 
italics. 
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Table 2.11 QE Auction Indicator Results Corporate Yields 
Coefficients AVCLOSE100 Corp5 Corp15 Corp30 Dollar Euro Govt5 Govt15 Govt25 
D5PURCHASE -0.003 0.007 0.048 0.020 0.001 -0.003 -0.024 0.001 0.014  
-0.658 0.161 1.440 0.157 0.226 -1.063 -0.991 0.039 0.697 
D15PURCHASE 0.005 -0.100 0.037 -0.064 0.003 -0.001 0.040 0.041** 0.033  
0.924 -2.321 1.097 -0.491 0.610 -0.291 1.627 1.771 1.560 
D25PURCHASE 
-0.002 -0.072 0.008 0.006 -0.008*** 
-
0.006*** -0.041 -0.038 -0.065  
-0.218 -1.129 0.162 0.030 -1.163 -1.580 -1.126 -1.122 -2.107 
DQEALLPURCHASES 0.003 0.061 -0.094* 0.099** 0.000 0.004 -0.009 -0.030 -0.031  
0.566 1.288 -2.544 0.692 0.049 1.170 -0.343 -1.174 -1.330 
DQE1 0.008*** -0.011 -0.038** 0.071** 0.003 0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.005  
2.121 -0.367 -1.631 0.798 0.950 -0.042 0.374 -0.070 -0.357 
DQE2 0.002 -0.012 -0.028** 0.066 0.002 0.001 -0.007 -0.004 0.000  
0.482 -0.460 -1.336 0.832 0.673 0.366 -0.481 -0.299 0.031 
Notes. Dependent Variables are shown along the first row. T-stats are given in the second row of each section, and are shown in 
italics. 
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Figure 2.8 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Comm(5) 
Figure 2.7 Dynamic Multiplier Response of FTSE100 
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Figure 2.10 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Comm(25) 
Figure 2.9 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Comm(15) 
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Figure 2.12 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Euro 
Figure 2.11 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Dollar 
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Figure 2.13 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Govt(5) 
Figure 2.14 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Govt(15) 
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Figure 2.15 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Govt(25) 
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Figure 2.16 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Corp(5) 
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Figure 2.17 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Corp(15) 
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Figure 2.18 Dynamic Multiplier Response of Corp(30) 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 The analysis of this chapter has centred on modelling the short and longer-term effects 
relationships between gilts, equities, exchange rates and the corporate and bank debt, and from 
these models extrapolating the efficacy of QE in affecting all these assets. From the evidence 
presented in this chapter, QE’s effect on financial assets is difficult to interpret but there exists 
a clear discrepancy between the intended outcomes of QE and actual events. 
The clearest answers are the effects on UK equities, where this chapter has finds that 
over the long and short term, gilt yields and thereby QE did not have a significant effect on 
equity prices. As stated earlier, a successful QE policy resulting in lower gilts yields should 
have raised equity prices through a variety of channels. The weekly evidence presented here 
suggests no such relationship existed over the period, with gilt yields of longer maturities 
having consistently insignificant effects on the FTSE’s price level. Only the 5-year gilt yields 
shared a significant relationship with equities prices but considering the negligible effect of QE 
on 5-year yields, this relationship is unlikely to have been a significant vector for raising prices. 
While the sterling exchange rates are found to be an important factor for UK equity prices, the 
evidence suggests that neither of these two variables exhibited strong enough relationships with 
government gilt yields to be a vector for QE’s transmission. It should be noted however, that 
the QE1 purchases did have a positive impact on the FTSE’s price level. This may demonstrate 
a positive macro-economy news effect, i.e. that financial market participants viewed the 
announcements and reverse-auctions made by the Bank of England as positive news on the 
outlook for equity markets and the British economy. This argument is reinforced by the 
evidence that QE2 and the overall purchases were insignificant, suggesting that there was a not 
a systematic positive reaction to the actual gilt purchases and corresponding yield decreases, 
but rather a temporary improvement in investor outlook which boosted FTSE prices. Overall, 
this chapter finds little to suggest that QE had a significant impact on equity prices, rather that 
the FTSE was largely exogenous to government gilts and QE intervention in general. In a 
similar manner there is little evidence to suggest that QE auctions had an impact on the value 
of sterling. Both the long and short run evidence points towards insignificant links between UK 
gilt yields over the period, with the only significant impact occurring during the purchases of 
extremely long-maturity government debt. 
On a more positive note, it appears that commercial and corporate bond yields are 
significantly linked with gilt yields, presenting positive evidence for QE purchases to translate 
its effects through to these assets. The long run cointegration evidence presents a clear link 
between the yields of corporate bonds and government gilts of all maturities, with commercial 
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bond yields having a long-term significant relationship with at least the 15-years to maturity 
gilts. Over the short term these yield relationships still exist, government gilt yields have 
significant positive relationships with commercial and corporate yields. This evidence suggests 
there is indeed an existing mechanism by which lowered gilt yields will translate to private debt 
assets, however it is also important to note that at least over the very short-term, this chapter 
finds little evidence that QE auctions systematically reduced gilts yields. While it should not be 
interpreted from these results that QE did not reduce gilt yields overall, this chapter concludes 
that over the short term the effects of QE were not immediately transferred onto other asset 
types. 
Overall the results of this chapter do not, like most of the other studies on Quantitative 
Easing, point to a clear conclusion to the efficacy of QE channels for financial markets. There 
is strong evidence that the FTSE100 was exogenous to UK gilt yields and therefore QE 
intervention. It also seems that sterling value was also largely unaffected by the £375 billion of 
bond purchases. The conclusions of this chapter are that QE channels did not operate as 
anticipated for these financial variables, with there being no appreciable effect on the FTSE or 
the sterling through the portfolio balance, liquidity, credit or macro-news channels. The 
implications of these conclusions are not catastrophic for the success of QE, granting that the 
policy was aimed at more macroeconomic targets than influencing asset prices. However, as 
these asset prices were considered to be important vectors for the transmission of QE’s effects 
through to the rest of financial sector and thence to the wider economy, such insignificant results 
over the short term present a disappointing conclusion for the policy. At least, the failure of QE 
to significantly impact equity prices and exchange rates should be a cause for some theoretical 
revision of the strength of monetary policy channels on asset pricing. However, this being said, 
there is some evidence that QE did affect commercial bank and corporate bond yields through 
their gilt purchase programme. This caveat suggests that QE channels did operate, however the 
effects were far less widespread than anticipated by the Bank of England. 
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Chapter.3 
A Simple Financial Stress Index for the United Kingdom 
3.1 Introduction 
 After the onset of the global financial crisis the UK experienced a period of significant 
financial stress. In response, the Bank of England lowered its bank rate to 0.5% and undertook 
significant balance sheet intervention in order to stabilise financial markets and ensure that this 
period of financial stress did not lead to a long-term downturn for the UK economy. While the 
Bank of England has not credited financial stress as a significant motivation for this policy 
intervention, monetary policy decisions undeniably have been calculated with reference to their 
impact on the UK’s large and complex financial markets. In addition, as the previous chapter 
found meagre evidence of the Bank achieving its objectives in affecting asset pricingprices, 
examining the policy’s impact on general financial conditions is a useful point of further 
analysis. QE could easily be considered a success if financial market conditions improved under 
the programme, even if the overall impact on asset prices was modest in scale. 
 However, while often cited in connection to the wider economy, analysis of financial 
stress has been rarely discussed in terms of metrics and measurable impacts. Most frequently 
financial stress has been treated as a binary variable; either the economy is in a state of financial 
stress, or alternatively financial conditions are relaxed. Furthermore, the dating of these stress 
events is typically down to the analyst’s discretion, rather than any empirically ascertained 
method. Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) and Radelet & Sachs (1998) amongst many other studies 
on financial crises use such an approach, which gives no measure of the severity of financial 
stress, or indeed an effective comparison to stressful events that came before or after. This 
creates an issue for policy-makers such as the Bank of England, as the decision to remove 
liquidity from the economy or to reverse the previous expansive monetary policies will have a 
short run effect on the stability of financial markets, a potentially dangerous prospect if the level 
of financial stress in the UK is unknown.  
This chapter introduces a financial stress index for the United Kingdom, using 
precedents from the literature to identify and measure financial systemic distress as an ongoing, 
continuous index. The purpose of this is be able to capture risk, uncertainty and constrained 
financial conditions in asset pricing, and to determine the impact of QE on systemic financial 
stress. The creation of such an index is necessary due to the lack of sources currently available 
in the literature for the United Kingdom. While other studies such as Balakrishnan et al (2011) 
and Corbet & Twomey (2014) have created indexes for the UK, neither include the length of 
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sample and the variety of indicators to make them well-suited for capturing the interaction 
between QE and financial stress. Therefore, in this chapter a variety of financial stress indicators 
are selected that are commonly available, relevant to UK financial markets and frequently cited 
in the literature. The indicators are also selected on the basis that they contain information from 
the various sectors of UK financial markets and hence financial stress, including foreign 
exchange, equity and government & corporate debt markets. This selection style not only 
ensures this measure captures all aspects of UK financial stress, it also links this index to the 
asset markets QE was intended to impact. The overall intention with this index is to create a 
workhorse approximation of financial stress, using the empirically successful techniques 
employed in the literature that study financial stress in developed economies. This financial 
stress index is then employed in different ways in the analysis of the following chapters, aiding 
in the examination of the financial market impact of QE in the UK.  
The chapter is organised as follows, firstly this chapter overviews the theoretical basis 
for the study and measurement of financial stress. Then the chapter discusses changing trends 
in financial stress, or the ‘financial cycle’, with regards to its relationship with the wider 
economy. The different types of financial stress are overviewed in terms of the sectors and 
element of the financial sector that are involved. The second section then moves onto the 
practical overview of the financial stress indicators, focusing on the measures this chapter has 
chosen to include, and the rationale for each individual’s inclusion. As the basis for each 
indicators inclusion, the key elements of the literature who have also included such variables 
are discussed in brief. The third section overviews the methods of aggregation for these 
individual indicators into a financial stress index, again highlighting the literature that have 
utilised similar methodologies. Section four discusses the performance of this UK financial 
stress index, comparing it with known stressful events. This section also highlights the practical 
approaches used in the literature in isolating stressful periods. Finally, the conclusion of this 
chapter is made with some remarks on the overall use and performance of this created stress 
index, and how overall it can be used with regards to analysis of UK QE. 
3.2 Literature Review 
As a starting point, it is important to define what financial stress means for an advanced 
economy like the UK. This chapter defines financial stress as any factor related to risk and 
uncertainty about future financial and economic prospects that leads to constrained market 
conditions and the departure of asset pricing away from the levels based on asset fundamentals. 
A financial crisis is therefore defined as periods when these factors become extreme enough for 
the issue to affect multiple markets simultaneously and risk the survivability of otherwise well-
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performing financial institutions. A key issue with financial stress literature has been the 
designation of these financial stress periods. In approach, many studies have simply modelled 
stress as a binary variable or a threshold at which an economy goes from normal financial 
circumstances to a financial crisis period. This approach is problematic as neglects episodes 
that approach but do not exceed crisis conditions, and additionally it makes no distinction 
between crises in terms of severity once past this threshold. Furthermore, while most episodes 
of financial stress are relatively short-term in nature, systemic financial stress can alter 
economic behaviour and change the outcome of normal economic decision-making, making the 
study of periods not extreme enough to be classified as crises, but still having relatively high 
stress levels, a useful exercise. Since the financial volatility surrounding the early 2000s, with 
the stock market downturns and the financial impact of the attack on the World Trade Centre, 
several studies have sought to re-model financial stress as a time-series variable, where the 
extreme values are called a crisis. Oet et al (2011) and Illing and Liu (2006) are two such 
examples of studies that remark on the weakness of a financial stress binary variable.  
Systemic risk has been defined as the risk of correlated failure of otherwise unrelated 
financial institutions leading to negative effects firstly on the liquidity and risk capital of other 
financial institutions and thenceforth on to the real economy (Oet et al, 2011). The difficulty in 
the creation of a stress variable lies with the fact that each financial stress episode is different, 
and there appears to be relatively few characteristics that are systematically present in most or 
all financial crises, especially when comparing across different countries. Discussion of the 
most recurrent characteristics are therefore the starting point when measuring financial stress. 
One of the most frequently cited characteristics is an abrupt increase in perceptions of risk and 
uncertainty in a financial system. Here market participants, particularly lenders, become rapidly 
unwilling to hold risky financial assets, and will often attempt to move their portfolios into 
holdings of relatively safe assets. This drives up the return demanded for risky assets, while 
simultaneously reducing returns of ‘safe’ assets. As discussed by Hakkio and Keeton (2009), 
this flight to quality occurs because of a general underestimation of risk during periods of 
economic boom, and subsequent overestimation of risks during busts. When the turning point 
between boom and bust occurs, perceptions of risk sky-rocket. This ties in with another 
characteristic of financial stress: large shifts in asset prices. Balakrishnan et al (2011) cite this 
as a prominent example of financial stress and is closely tied in with the valuation of risk in a 
market, when risk-aversion increases, or perceptions of risk increase, asset prices adjust rapidly 
as investors fly to quality.  
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Constraints on liquidity is another frequently cited characteristic of financial stress. 
Liquidity in this case being defined as the relative ease an investor has in buying or selling 
assets quickly and without large transaction costs. Market participants with uncertain 
expectations of the future defend themselves from potential adverse circumstances by acquiring 
assets that are highly liquid, rather than focus on non-liquid assets that tend to have higher 
returns. This effect is once again discussed by Hakkio & Keeton (2009) and causes the same 
rapid asset price changes and return spreads, focusing on the liquid and non-liquid assets rather 
than the quality of assets. Another fundamental characteristic of financial stress, linked to both 
the features described above, is increased asymmetrical information between parties. This leads 
to the varied valuations of risk and outlook that drives flight to liquidity and quality and is an 
important characteristic that often follows government and monetary authority policy actions, 
especially if the policy action will affect the health of the banking system and/or investor 
preferences. 
These financial stress characteristics do not always affect different financial sectors 
homogenously or systematically. Because of this, several studies examining financial stress 
separate financial stress characteristics by the type of financial markets that are affected. The 
most frequently cited sectors tied to financial stress shocks include foreign exchange markets, 
banking sectors, debt markets and equity markets (Ishihara, 2005). Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996) discuss banking sector stress and define a crisis qualitatively as an instance where bank 
failures exhaust the supply of bank capital for lending to other financial market participants, 
thereby affecting other sectors. Quantitative measures include the ratio of non-performing loans 
as a percentage of total assets. Foreign exchange stress is usually captured by significant 
devaluations, affecting holders of currency, in addition to large shifts in foreign exchange 
reserves or intervention from monetary authority in terms of interest rate manipulation, which 
affects the wider financial system Illing and Liu (2006). Debt market stress is characterised by 
Bordo and Schwartz (2000) as circumstances that prevent private or public institutions from 
being able to service debt. This factor then plays into the risk spreads discussed above, leading 
to a flight-to-quality and rapidly adjusting asset prices. Equity crises are similar in nature to 
debt crises and occur when there is uncertainty about probability of loss or the profitability of 
firms. It is usually captured by sharp declines in representative equity indices or other return-
volatility measures Illing and Liu (2006). All of these sectors can have individual crises, but 
more often interrelate due to the complex interlinkages of modern financial institutions. 
Financial stress is of concern to financial market participants primarily, however when 
this stress can manifest in reduced economic output, unemployment or recession financial stress 
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becomes a larger concern. Earlier it was mentioned that financial stress considerations can alter 
monetary policy, this is discussed in Hakkio and Keeton (2009) amongst others. Davig and 
Hakkio (2010) discuss the relationship between real activity and financial stress, finding that 
the US exhibits two distinct states, periods of high economic activity and low financial stress, 
and periods of low activity and high financial stress. They present evidence that financial stress 
has a much stronger dampening effect on real activity during these distressed periods and that 
heightened financial stress plays a significant role in moving the economy between the two 
states. In addition, they discuss two potential theoretical frameworks through which financial 
stress affects the wider economy. First, the Real Option Framework incorporates uncertainty 
into the timing of investment, with firms holding off on real investment during periods of high 
financial uncertainty and investing during periods of low stress. The second framework is the 
Financial Accelerator model, initially discussed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), 
which links real investment to the availability of credit or the creditworthiness of borrowers, 
which becomes constrained during periods of financial stress, forcing borrowers to de-leverage 
and thereby amplifying downturns (Hakkio and Darig, 2010). Cardarelli et al (2011) also follow 
this financial accelerator framework as the basis for the impact of financial stress on economic 
activity. Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) Use a regime change model to link financial stress, 
monetary policy and the wider economy and find that stress events are precursors to adverse 
economic events in the US economy. They also find that financial stress has a negligible effect 
on the economy in normal circumstances, but of high significance during high-stress periods. 
A final finding is that monetary policy is not particularly effective during periods of high 
financial stress. 
Overall, there exists a significant literature that defines financial stress, relates it to separate 
sectors of financial markets and form theoretical frameworks for its impact on the wider 
economy. For this chapter the focus is on creating an index that captures financial stress in 
different sectors and for different asset types, while giving a balanced overall measure of stress. 
The next section outlines the methodology that achieves this aim, while discussing the elements 
of the literature the variables and calculations are drawn from. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Indicator Selection 
As mentioned above, there are several prominent stress indexes for the US, Canada and 
the Euro area that share methodologies. Some of the most prominent examples are the Illing & 
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Liu Canadian Financial Stress Index (2006), the Composite Indicator for systemic stress (CISS) 
in the Euro area, the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI) and Cleveland Financial 
Stress Index (CFSI) for the US. Since this chapter does not attempt to empirically prove the 
accuracy of its FSI in capturing stressful events, this chapter attempts to closely follow the 
procedure of these commentators who have tested their FSIs. Many commentators such as Illing 
and Liu (2006) established stressful events by surveying financial experts on the events that the 
experts viewed as stressful for financial markets. They then compare the perceived severity of 
these events with the results of their FSI to confirm the latter’s accuracy. Failure to capture a 
stressful event or falsely indicating stressful periods are both considered failures of an FSI in 
this case. This approach is like the one taken by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, but 
rather than surveying financial experts, they select stressful events based on academic 
consensus. They then test whether their FSIs stressful events correspond to known periods of 
financial stress. Once again, failure to capture stressful events or exhibiting false positives are 
considered failures. By utilising the same methodologies and variables for this chapter’s FSI, 
this chapter relies on the accuracy of these studies to establish a reasonable approximation of 
UK financial stress. 
A second factor this chapter considers when choosing FSI variables is the intention to 
capture financial stress in different sectors of financial markets, specifically equity markets, 
foreign exchange, the banking sector and both private and government debt markets. By 
capturing these different elements within a FSI, more information can be gleaned about the 
nature and cause of financial stress periods. Thirdly, the variables of this chapter’s FSI follows 
the literature on FSIs that most accurately match the UK’s financial markets and economy. To 
be specific, subject to the other factors described above, this chapter intends to use stress 
indicators that are likely to be important for a relatively large open economy with complex and 
developed financial markets. Finally, this chapter’s intention was to create a stress index from 
data that is available on a daily basis. This periodicity was used because it allows the FSI to 
capture the most stressful periods of the financial crisis and ensuing QE intervention in a way 
that lower frequency data would miss. The section below outlines the calculation of each 
variable used in this chapter’s FSI, as well as giving a brief argument for its inclusion and 
discussion of its prevalence in the literature.  
 
Banking Sector Stress 
 Given that the most recent financial crisis involved a large amount of uncertainty and 
stress for the UK’s banking sector, measures capturing banking stress specifically are included 
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in the index. A frequently cited and used measure is the banking sectors 𝛽, a measure of the 
relative equity-return volatility between a countries banking sector and the general market. This 
measure is included in Illing and Liu (2006), Oet et al. (2011), and Balakrishnan et al. (2011) 
amongst others. The financial sector 𝛽 is calculated as 
𝛽 =
cov(𝑟,𝑚)
var(𝑚)
      (1) 
Where 𝑟 and 𝑚 are the total returns, at annualized rates, to the banking sector index and the 
overall market index, respectively. In this case the market index is the FTSE ALLSHARE index 
and the FTSE ALLSHARE Financials is the banking sector index. When 𝛽 is greater than 1 the 
volatility of bank share returns is greater than the volatility of market total returns over the past 
year. Volatility is interpreted as a measure of risk in this case, meaning that greater volatility of 
the banking sector index means that the banking sector is relatively riskier. It should also be 
noted that while popular, the financial 𝛽 may capture many other factors than financial stress. 
As Illing and Liu (2006) comments, what could be interpreted as higher financial stress from a 
large 𝛽, could actually be the result of good news about the financial industry and bullish 
markets. Individual economic sensitivity and regulation changes to the financial sector could 
also cause the 𝛽 to have a large value, but not reflect actual financial stress. Because of this, 
Illing and Liu (2006) also include a refined measure that is not used elsewhere where they 
impose two adjustments on the standard measure. The first is that stressful periods are denoted 
by 𝛽 > 1 and the second that the return to the bank index is lower than the market return. These 
two conditions together suggest periods where the banking sector is riskier because of stress 
rather than being riskier for being in a bullish market. When these two conditions are not met, 
the variable is assigned the value of 0, indicating low stress.  While this chapter considers the 
use of this refined measure, there are drawbacks that justify its omission. Primarily the 
drawback of its formulation, where the indicator is valued at zero except for in extreme 
circumstances, is that it creates an almost binary measure of stress. As discussed earlier, such 
binary measures of stress are specifically avoided in this chapter in order to model stress as a 
continuous variable. Furthermore, inclusion of the indicator within the index tends to cause the 
index to exaggerate or underestimate stress levels. Illing and Liu (2006) include both the 
standard and refined version of this 𝛽 and remark on how the refined version is not significantly 
superior in any particular context.  
 Another measure this chapter uses to approximate banking stress is the spread between 
commercial bank bonds and government bonds. In the literature this is proxied in several ways, 
for example Illing and Liu (2006) use the spread between AA corporate and Government of 
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Canada bond yields, Oet et al. (2011) use the spread between A-rated bank bond yields and 
treasury yields. Choice of bank bond yield to use is typically based on the credit rating of the 
particular countries banking sector. This chapter uses the spread between commercial bank 
yields and government bond yields both of 10-years to maturity, data which is available from 
the Bank of England. This variable is intended to capture the difficulty of commercial banks in 
acquiring finance in debt markets, which typically only occurs for creditworthy institutions like 
bank when lending in a country is particularly constrained. While this spread contains both risk 
and liquidity components, the high-quality nature of bank bonds ensure that the risk component 
is relatively small, and that significant changes in the spread are down to liquidity conditions 
primarily. 
The final two banking sector variables are the spreads between the 3-month LIBOR rate 
and the 3-month Treasury Bill and Bank of England Base Rates, respectively. Equivalent 
spreads are included in Oet et al. (2011), Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Corbet and Twomey 
(2014). Both of these measures capture liquidity and counterparty risk in interbank lending and 
high spreads are therefore indicative of financial stress. 
Foreign Exchange Stress 
 This chapter employs a very commonly cited foreign-exchange market stress measure, 
using the CMAX calculation on the trade-weighted UK effective exchange rate. This CMAX 
calculation is used by the majority of the most frequently cited FSI studies, including Illing and 
Liu (2006) and Oet et al. (2011), and captures the flight from Pound Sterling towards foreign 
currencies, which occurs during periods of UK-specific financial stress. The CMAX calculation 
is as follows, 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 =
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥∈𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗=0,1,…,365]
     (2) 
Where 𝑥 is the trade-weighted £UK Exchange rate index. The calculation represents period 𝑡’s 
exchange rate as a ratio of its one-year high. Rapid reductions in this value indicate strong 
depreciations in the pound, an indicator of flight from sterling-denominated assets. 
Debt Market Stress 
 The most commonly used measures for debt market stress are the spreads between risky 
and risk-free bond yields. The spread between these assets being a function of expected losses 
and therefore risk. When these spreads widen, investors require higher returns to compensate 
for higher perceived probable loss. This chapter and others uses a variety of debt-market spreads 
as indicators for overall stress. This chapter’s approach is agnostic in this regard, attempting to 
 57 
 
accommodate as many of the various spread types that are frequently included in the literature, 
given that there is no clear correct spread to use. 
 The first measure this chapter uses is the covered UK-US 90-day treasury bill spread, 
which proxies uncertainty and captures limited arbitrage in government debt markets. This 
chapter uses the US T-bill rate as it is one of the most competitive rates for UK denominated 
assets. Given that treasury bills have very low probability of default, Covered interest parity 
(CIP) states that with arbitrage there should be no difference or spread between the two treasury 
bill yields. Any movement away from this parity suggest limited arbitrage or investor 
uncertainty and therefore stress. This chapter argues that either a negative or positive spread 
between UK and US debt is indicative of financial stress, meaning that only the absolute size 
of the following equation is taken as the measure, 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡
∗) − (
𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝑡
∗)(1 + 𝑟𝑡)     (3) 
Where 𝑟∗ is the 90-day US Treasury Bill rate, 𝐹 is the 90-day forward rate for the US-UK 
exchange rate, 𝑆∗is the spot US-UK exchange rate, and 𝑟 is the 90-day UK Treasury Bill rate. 
This measure is included in Illing and Liu (2006), Oet et al (2011) and Corbet (2014), for their 
respective country’s debt. 
 The second measure is the spread between 10-year UK AA-rated corporate yields and 
10-year UK government benchmark yields. Like the commercial bank yield spread above, this 
measure captures the risk in corporate debt markets. Greater spreads indicate periods of greater 
financial stress in corporate debt markets. In addition, this chapter also includes the spread 
between BBB and AAA rated corporate debt to further capture increases in risk for lower-
quality debt.  
Yield Curve Stress Measure 
An inverted yield-curve is typically viewed as indicating future slow economic growth 
or recession. In addition, i.e. when the short rate is higher than the long-rate stress is exerted on 
investors as there is an increasing cost in servicing short-term debt obligations. Therefore this 
chapter, amongst many others, includes an inverted yield curve measure as an indicator for 
financial stress. The spread between the 10-year UK government bond yield and the 3-month 
government bond yield is used to represent the yield curve, with periods where this spread is 
zero or negative indicating stress and periods with large positive spreads indicating normal 
market function. 
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Equity Markets 
 Stress in equity markets has most frequently in the literature been captured by large 
price decreases, or periods of high price volatility. The CMAX calculation is used by Illing and 
Liu (2006), Oet et al (2011), Hollo et al (2012) amongst others to capture price levels relative 
to the 1-year high. Large negative deviations in prices compared to this maximum are viewed 
as indicating equity market stress, similar to the case for the effective exchange rate measure. 
A second popular measure, used by Corbet (2014) and Hakkio & Keeton (2009), is Option-
Implied Volatility or VIX option prices. High values of options on equities suggest investor 
uncertainty about fundamentals or the behaviour of other investors. This chapter uses the 
FTSE100 VIX price level, with periods of high prices indicating periods of high financial stress 
and uncertainty. 
Other Measures 
 In addition to the above measures, this chapter followed Illing and Liu (2006) in 
considering three GARCH stress measures. Modelling each variable as a GARCH(1,1) this 
chapter used the FTSE ALLSHARE price index, the FTSE ALLSHARE Financials as a share 
of the FTSE ALL SHARE, and the US/UK Exchange rate. As in Illing and Liu (2006) other 
specifications of GARCH models were considered and tested, but the GARCH(1,1) performed 
the best. In any case, the results of the other GARCH specifications yielded similar results. 
Periods of high volatility correspond to periods of high risk and therefore financial stress. These 
variables were not however included in the final FSI. Illing and Liu (2006) find the measures 
to perform poorly when capturing Canadian financial stress, with larger type one failures, i.e. 
failure to report high stress during a stressful period, than most other measures. Examining plots 
of the three measures in Fig. 3.1, it can be seen that very few periods exhibit high volatility, 
with the 2008 financial crisis being the only period with high volatility as registered by all three 
measures. All the measures considered are summarised in table 3.1. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
summarise the indicators included in the respective indexes, as discussed below.   
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Figure 3.1 GARCH Time Plots 
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Table 3.1a All Considered Financial Stress Indicators 
Market Variable Aspect of Financial Stress 
represented 
Calculation Source 
Interbank  Bank Beta 
(BETAFTAS) 
Strain on bank profitability and 
stability 𝛽 =
cov(𝑟, 𝑚)
var(𝑚)
 
 
Datastream 
Commercial Bank Bond Spread 
(BNKBDSPR) 
Risk in bank debt markets 10-year Commercial bank yields minus 
10-year government bond yields 
Datastream, Bank of 
England Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Liquidity Spread 
(LIBORTBILL) 
Liquidity and counterparty risk in 
interbank lending 
3-month LIBOR minus 3-month UK 
Treasury Bill rate 
Datastream, Bank of 
England Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Cost of Borrowing 
(LIBORBANK) 
Risk premium in interbank borrowing 3-month LIBOR minus BoE Bank rate Datastream, Bank of 
England Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Liquidity Spread 
(LIBORGOVT) 
Liquidity and counterparty risk in 
interbank lending 
3-month LIBOR minus 3-month 
UK government bond rate 
Datastream, Bank of 
England Interactive 
Database 
GARCH(1,1) of ratio between FTSE 
ALLSHARE financials and total 
market indexes  
Volatility and risk in banking sector 
equities 
GARCH(1,1) of daily price ratio of FTSE 
ALLSHARE financials and FTSE 
ALLSHARE total market index 
Datastream 
Foreign Exchange Weighted Sterling Crashes 
(CMAXEFFEX) 
Flight from sterling towards foreign 
currencies 
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 Datastream, Bank of 
England Interactive 
Database 
GARCH(1,1) Sterling Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility and risk in Sterling 
exchange rates 
GARCH(1,1) of daily Sterling Effective 
Exchange rate 
Datastream, Bank of 
England Interactive 
Database 
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Table 3.1b All Considered Financial Stress Indicators (continued) 
Market Variable Aspect of Financial Stress 
represented 
Calculation Source 
Debt Covered Interest Spread 
(CIPUKUS) 
Limited arbitrage and uncertainty in 
government bond markets 
(1 + 𝑟𝑡
∗) − (
𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝑡
∗)(1 + 𝑟𝑡) 
Datastream, Bank of 
England Interactive 
Database 
UK-US Government Bond Spread 
(UKGOVTBUSGOVTB) 
Limited arbitrage and uncertainty in 
government bond markets 
10-year UK Government Bond Yield 
minus 10-year US Government Bond 
Yield 
Datastream, Bank of 
England Interactive 
Database 
AAA-Corporate Bond Spread 
(AAACPSPR) 
Risk in corporate sector debt markets 10-year AAA-rated Corporate bond 
yields minus 10-year government bond 
yields 
Datastream 
AA-Corporate Bond Spread 
(AACPSPR) 
Risk in corporate sector debt markets 10-year AA-rated Corporate bond yields 
minus 10-year government bond yields 
Datastream 
BBB-AAA Corporate Bond Spread 
(BBB-AAACPSPR) 
Risk in corporate sector debt markets 10-year BBB-rated Corporate bond 
yields minus 10-year AAA-rated 
Corporate bond yields 
Datastream 
BBB Corporate Bond Spread 
(BBBCPSPR) 
Risk in corporate sector debt markets 10-year BBB-rated Corporate bond 
yields minus 10-year government bond 
yields 
Datastream 
Yield Curve Spread 
(YLDCURVE10-3) 
Long-term uncertainty and cost of 
short-term borrowing. 
10-year government bond yield minus 3-
month government bond yield 
Bank of England Interactive 
Database 
Equity Stock Market Crash Index 
(CMAX100) 
(CMAXALL) 
Uncertainty in equity valuation and 
expectations of future bank 
profitability  
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 
𝑥𝑡=FTSE100 price index 
Datastream 
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 
𝑥𝑡=FTSEALLSHARE price index 
Equity Option-Implied Volatility 
(FTSE100VIX) 
Uncertainty in equity valuation and 
fundamentals 
Daily price level of FTSE100 VIX index Datastream 
GARCH(1,1) Volatility and risk in equities GARCH(1,1) of FTSEALLSHARE price 
level 
Datastream 
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3.3.2 Aggregation Methods 
 There is a wide array of approaches in combining the individual stress indicators into a 
FSI, each having inherent advantages and disadvantages. Illing and Liu (2006) provide an 
overview of the different weighting methods and tests each method for its impact on the 
effectiveness of the resulting FSI in correctly capturing financially stressful events. For this 
reason, Illing and Liu’s article (2006) is frequently used as a basis or comparison for other FSIs 
created in other studies. As mentioned before, this chapter bases the effectiveness of its FSI on 
the performance of the FSIs it emulates, for this reason this chapter adopts the most frequently 
used approaches and weighting methods, being heavily influenced by Illing and Liu (2006) in 
particular. These methods are summarised below.  
Variance-equal Weights 
 One of the simplest methods of weighting is equal-weighting, where all variables are 
averaged to give a point in time estimate of financial stress. This method is problematic because 
it gives variables with higher variance greater precedence in the resulting FSI. To correct for 
this variance-equal weighting is used, being one of the most frequently cited weighting methods 
in the literature. In this case the variables are all standardised, i.e. the mean is subtracted from 
each observation and then the result is divided by its sample standard deviation. The resulting 
variable is a measure whose unit is its standard deviation. This approach therefore gives each 
variable equal-weighting. A downside of this approach is that it assumes the variables are 
normally distributed, meaning that the sample mean and deviation are appropriate. Given the 
nature of financial data, especially in periods of financial duress, this assumption is often 
viewed as inaccurate. 
Transformation using sample CDFs 
 Because of the normality problem with the variance-equal weighting, many papers use 
cumulative distribution functions (CDFS) rather than assuming normality in standardised 
variables. To generate CDFs takes a few steps. For variable 𝑗 the CDF is the following, 
𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑗𝑡 = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥𝑗𝑡)
𝑥𝑗
−∞
𝑑𝑥𝑗𝑡      (4) 
To calculate this equation, the first stage is to calculate the 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑥𝑗𝑡), the rank ordering of the 
date in the series. The top rank is given to the largest value in the data series, while the smallest 
rank is given the value of one. The CDF for each variable at each point in time is then computed 
by the following equation: 
𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑗𝑡) =
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑥𝑗𝑡)
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
     (5) 
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Where the number of observations is the total number of observations in the sample. For 
example, the largest daily observation in a sample of 6908 daily observations would be ranked 
6908 and would therefore yield a CDF of one. For some of the variables listed above, the reverse 
of this ranking system is calculated, where 1 is the largest daily observation and 6908 given to 
the smallest daily observation. The CMAX calculation of the UK exchange rate, the CMAX of 
the FTSE ALLSHARE and the Yield curve variables are all given this reverse rank. The reason 
for this is that for these variables the smallest values correspond to the highest levels of financial 
stress. For example, the CMAX calculation produces values closer to zero when there are large 
drops in the UK’s exchange rate compared to its one-year maximum, meaning that small values 
indicate large foreign exchange stress. Finally, in cases where a certain value occurs twice or 
more in the sample, the ranking number assigned to each observation is set to the average 
rankings involved.  
By using this calculation, the stress indicators are transformed into variables that are 
unit-free and measured on an ordinal scale between zero and one. This does not require the 
assumption that the variables are normal. The CDFs can then be averaged to create the FSI CDF 
for each period. 
Factor Analysis 
The final method considered by this chapter is the use of factor analysis, specifically 
principal component analysis, to combine the variables into an FSI index. The concept behind 
principal component analysis is to extract a weight linear combination of factors from the 
individual variables, each factor containing the combined information from each variable. The 
first factor is constructed in principal component analysis to capture the maximum co-
movement in all of the variables, i.e. to account for as much variability in the data as possible, 
with each following component capturing the highest variability under the constraint that it is 
orthogonal to the preceding component. By doing this principal component analysis combines 
the information from 𝑛 variables and produces 𝑘 factors with 𝑘 < 𝑛, accounting for as much 
cumulative variance in the data as possible. For financial stress analysis, the principal 
components are intended to parsimoniously capture the financial stress elements of each 
variable, while filtering out the idiosyncratic elements of the each. 
Practically calculating the principal components requires the following steps. First, each 
variable is standardised, i.e. the mean is subtracted and then divided by the standard deviation. 
Then 𝑘 principal components are extracted from the variables that account for approximately 
75-85% of the variability in the data. The 𝑘 components are then combined into a weighted 
  64 
 
vector by taking the weighted-sum of the components at time 𝑡. The weightings in this 
weighted-sum come from the proportion of the variance explained by each component. For 
example, if 𝑘 = 3 and the first principal component explains 35%, the second 20% and the third 
10%, principal component one at time 𝑡 is multiplied by 0.35 and then added to the other 
weight-adjusted components. This method follows Oet et al. (2011). The benefit of using this 
method is that it combines financial stress information while ignoring idiosyncratic factors from 
each of the individual variables, which neither CDF or variance-equal weighting does.  The 
downside to principal components as a method of variable weighting is that it requires the 
weightings for each variable in each component stays constant, forcing relationships to hold 
constant when in reality they may not, especially during periods of financial uncertainty. 
Weighting Comparisons 
 The three methods discussed above are some of the most frequently cited weighting 
methods utilised in the literature. Variance-equal weighting is the most common, often being 
used as a baseline, point of comparison or preliminary analysis before commentators move onto 
more computationally intensive methods. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) use this method as their 
principal analysis as it is the simplest, allowing them to compute FSIs for a large amount of 
economies in their study. It is also used by Illing and Liu (2006) and Oet et al (2011), where 
they both use it as a simple point of comparison between weighting methods. It should be noted 
that although this method is computationally simple, Illing and Liu (2006) compare several 
different weighting methods and find that Variance-Equal weighting outperforms most others 
when it comes to correctly identifying stressful periods. Only the credit-weighted index 
performs better in their study of Canadian data (Illing and Liu, 2006). CDF weighting is used 
for the CISS index in Hollo et al. (2012), Illing and Liu (2006) and Oet et al (2011), and 
performs well in each case, having slightly higher failure rates than Variance-Equal in both type 
I and II errors in Illing and Liu’s examination (2006). The principal component method is also 
used by Illing and Liu (2006) and Oet et al (2011), as well as Hakkio et al (2009), where they 
use it as their primary analysis. Principal components weighting appears to perform the worst 
compared to the other weighting methods, having a larger amount of errors in the testing of 
both Illing and Liu (2006) and Oet et al (2011). 
  
Calculation of the index 
 The sample period for the calculation of the index is an important choice for all FSI 
literature. Data availability is primary concern, especially for emerging market FSIs, and as the 
majority of FSI papers define financial stress with reference to previous stressful periods, data 
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samples that include several stressful episodes is another requirement. While the majority of 
UK financial series are available from the 1980s onwards one problem for this chapter is the 
availability of corporate benchmark spreads for different credit ratings. Benchmark corporate 
yields are only available after 2002, meaning that inclusion of any variables related to these are 
restricted to a shorter sample size. This problem is particularly restrictive as the CDF and 
principal component weighting methods require a common set of dates in order to produce an 
interpretable index. To strike a balance between including as many relevant variables as 
possible, and as long a sample as possible, this chapter calculates the index for two samples. 
The first, beginning on the second of January 1991, does not include any of the corporate bond 
spreads or the FTSE100 VIX measure, which only became available in 1996. The variables 
included in this long index are outlined in Table 3.2. The second shorter sample, begins on the 
12th of April 2002, and contains all of the financial variables outlined above. Both samples end 
in June 2017. Table 3.3 summarises the variables included in this short index. Figure 3.2 below 
shows a time plot of all the standardised variables, using the 2002 sample. 
 Once the two sample periods were determined, the Variance-Equal, Cumulative 
Distribution Function and Principal Component weightings were used to create the three 
versions of the FSI, denoted VEFSI, CDFFSI and PCFSI respectively. To see how much the 
omission of the corporate spread and VIX measures have on the long-sample FSI Figures 3.3, 
3.4 and 3.5 plot the values of the short-sample FSIs against the longer counterparts. As can be 
seen in these figures, for each weighting method the difference between the long and short 
sample calculations are not significant qualitatively, especially in the case of the CDF 
aggregation. In general, inclusion of the corporate spreads and VIX leads to lower estimates of 
stress between 2004 and 2007, but higher estimates of stress between 2009 and 2013. It is 
especially noticeable for the principal component formulation, where post-2009 the short 
sample FSI is consistently higher until 2013. As the results of the long and short samples are 
qualitatively similar, this chapter continues the discussion of the FSI with the long sample as 
the reference for the remaining tables and charts.  
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Table 3.2 Long Sample Financial Stress Indicators 
Market Variable Aspect of 
Financial 
Stress 
represented 
Calculation Source 
Interbank  Bank Beta 
(BETAFTAS) 
Strain on bank 
profitability and 
stability 
𝛽 =
cov(𝑟, 𝑚)
var(𝑚)
 
 
Datastream 
Commercial Bank Bond 
Spread 
(BNKBDSPR) 
Risk in bank debt 
markets 
10-year Commercial bank yields 
minus 10-year government bond 
yields 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Liquidity 
Spread 
(LIBORTBILL) 
Liquidity and 
counterparty risk in 
interbank lending 
3-month LIBOR minus 3-month 
UK Treasury Bill rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Cost of 
Borrowing 
(LIBORBANK) 
Risk premium in 
interbank borrowing 
3-month LIBOR minus BoE 
Bank rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Weighted Sterling 
Crashes 
(CMAXEFFEX) 
Flight from sterling 
towards foreign 
currencies 
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Debt Covered Interest Spread 
(CIPUKUS) 
Limited arbitrage 
and uncertainty in 
government bond 
markets 
(1 + 𝑟𝑡
∗) − (
𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝑡
∗)(1 + 𝑟𝑡) 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
UK-US Government 
Bond Spread 
(UKGOVTBUSGOVTB) 
Limited arbitrage 
and uncertainty in 
government bond 
markets 
10-year UK Government Bond 
Yield minus 10-year US 
Government Bond Yield 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Yield Curve Spread 
(YLDCURVE10-3) 
Long-term 
uncertainty and cost 
of short-term 
borrowing. 
10-year government bond yield 
minus 3-month government bond 
yield 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Equity Stock Market Crash 
Index 
(CMAXALL) 
Uncertainty in 
equity valuation and 
expectations of 
future bank 
profitability  
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 
𝑥𝑡=FTSEALLSHARE price 
index 
Datastream 
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Table 3.3 Short Sample Financial Stress Indicators 
Market Variable Aspect of 
Financial 
Stress 
represented 
Calculation Source 
Interbank  Bank Beta 
(BETAFTAS) 
Strain on bank 
profitability and 
stability 
𝛽 =
cov(𝑟, 𝑚)
var(𝑚)
 
 
Datastream 
Commercial Bank Bond 
Spread 
(BNKBDSPR) 
Risk in bank debt 
markets 
10-year Commercial bank yields 
minus 10-year government bond 
yields 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Liquidity 
Spread 
(LIBORTBILL) 
Liquidity and 
counterparty risk in 
interbank lending 
3-month LIBOR minus 3-month 
UK Treasury Bill rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Cost of 
Borrowing 
(LIBORBANK) 
Risk premium in 
interbank borrowing 
3-month LIBOR minus BoE 
Bank rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Weighted Sterling 
Crashes 
(CMAXEFFEX) 
Flight from sterling 
towards foreign 
currencies 
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Debt Covered Interest Spread 
(CIPUKUS) 
Limited arbitrage 
and uncertainty in 
government bond 
markets 
(1 + 𝑟𝑡
∗) − (
𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝑡
∗)(1 + 𝑟𝑡) 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
UK-US Government 
Bond Spread 
(UKGOVTBUSGOVTB) 
Limited arbitrage 
and uncertainty in 
government bond 
markets 
10-year UK Government Bond 
Yield minus 10-year US 
Government Bond Yield 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
AA-Corporate Bond 
Spread 
(AACPSPR) 
Risk in corporate 
sector debt markets 
10-year AA-rated Corporate 
bond yields minus 10-year 
government bond yields 
Datastream 
BBB-AAA Corporate 
Bond Spread 
(BBB-AAACPSPR) 
Risk in corporate 
sector debt markets 
10-year BBB-rated Corporate 
bond yields minus 10-year AAA-
rated Corporate bond yields 
Datastream 
Yield Curve Spread 
(YLDCURVE10-3) 
Long-term 
uncertainty and cost 
of short-term 
borrowing. 
10-year government bond yield 
minus 3-month government bond 
yield 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Equity Stock Market Crash 
Index 
(CMAXALL) 
Uncertainty in 
equity valuation and 
expectations of 
future bank 
profitability  
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 
𝑥𝑡=FTSEALLSHARE price 
index 
Datastream 
Equity Option-Implied 
Volatility 
(FTSE100VIX) 
Uncertainty in 
equity valuation and 
fundamentals 
Daily price level of FTSE100 
VIX index 
Datastream 
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Table 3.4 Index Correlations 
Correlation VEFSI 
Short 
PCFSI 
Short 
CDFFSI 
Short 
VEFSI 
Long 
PCFSI 
Long 
CDFFSI 
Long 
VEFSI 
Short 1.00      
PCFSI 
Short 0.75 1.00     
CDFFSI 
Short 0.90 0.66 1.00    
VEFSI 
Long 0.83 0.30 0.77 1.00   
PCFSI 
Long 0.86 0.84 0.72 0.62 1.00  
CDFFSI 
Long 0.89 0.62 0.99 0.77 0.67 1.00 
Correlation VEFSI PCFSI CDFFSI 
VEFSI 1.00 
  
PCFSI 0.55 1.00 
 
CDFFSI 0.90 0.40 1.00 
 
Table 3.4 above shows the correlations between the different weighting methods and 
the FSIs which do or do not include the corporate spreads and VIX measures, over the 2002 to 
2017 sample period. The lower panel shows the correlations over the entire 1991 to 2017 period. 
In both panels the strongest correlations are between the VE and CDF weighting FSIs, while 
the lowest correlation is between the PC weighted FSI and the VE method. These results are 
largely in line with those found in Illing and Liu (2006) who also find lower correlation between 
VE and factor analysis weighting methods. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 above plot the stress levels 
calculated by the three aggregation methods. As the CDF can only take values between zero 
and one, it is plotted on a secondary axis. This may make it appear like the CDF calculation 
gives substantially different results, however by looking at Figure 3.7 where the indexes are all 
re-balanced to give the highest observation the value of 100, and the smallest the value of zero, 
it can be seen that the VE and CDF aggregation methods are closely linked. Comparatively, the 
PC aggregation method produces the most different results. In general, the PC method values 
financial stress as lower than the other two measures, however it increases to comparable levels 
during episodes of extreme stress, for example the final quarter of 2008. Illing and Liu (2006) 
note that in their analysis the factor analysis under-estimates the frequency and severity of 
stressful events using Canadian data. They find factor analysis weighting creates the highest 
type I error percentage, with type I errors being failure to report a high-stress event. This 
suggests that factor analysis may also being under-reporting financial stress in this case also. 
The VE FSI appears to be a middle ground between the PC and CDF weighted FSIs, producing 
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estimates that follow the same pattern as the CDF, but with lower values. As many studies 
remark the relatively good performance of VE weighting for correctly reporting financial stress, 
this chapter views VE as the most likely candidate for capturing UK financial stress. 
3.4. Performance of FSIs 
 This chapter has already stated it has not attempted to empirically prove the accuracy of 
the FSI, however it may still be useful to compare high points of the index to the findings of 
other FSIs that have been empirically tested. As can be seen in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, there are 
several peaks where the FSIs report high stress, in Figure 3.7 there are several periods that are 
higher than 80. Given that the UK has no expert data to compare the FSI results with, this 
chapter looks to the literature to establish whether these events match with known periods of 
financial stress. This approach is similar to the one taken by Hakkio and Keeton (2009) where 
they compare their FSI with financial stress periods defined by consensus in the literature. For 
UK data, the findings of Cardarelli et al. (2011) and Balakrishnan et al (2009) are particularly 
helpful as they include UK FSIs in their studies. Cardarelli et al (2011) also take a similar 
approach in consulting the literature to compare with their FSIs   
 The first high point for this chapter’s FSIs, primarily for the VE and CDF weightings, 
is around April 1991. This high point is credited to the Nikkei/junk bond collapse in early 1991 
and is characterised by a sudden spike with a rapid drop-off in both the Cardarelli study and 
this chapter’s FSI (Cardarelli et al, (2011) The second period of high stress is in January 1992, 
which may be associated with the bursting of the Japanese stock bubble in early 1992. Illing 
and Liu (2006) note high stress later on in 1992 associated with credit losses for Canadian banks 
due to a real estate price collapse, but this is likely to be a localised event for Canada only. The 
ERM crisis occurred towards September 1992, but this chapter’s FSI reports low financial stress 
during the early part of this year, which may indicate a failure of the FSIs to capture the high 
interest rate and exchange rate stress prevalent at this time. The FSI does report stress above 75 
for both the VE and CDF around this time, and the PC weighted measure is at its highest point 
pre-2007. It appears therefore that the FSI captures Black Wednesday but does not attribute it 
relatively high stress. 
Both April and September 1993 report very high stress levels, which are not easy to 
interpret. April’s high point could be attributed to the ongoing aftermath of the ERM and 
Scandinavian banking crises, which are cited as the reason in Cardarelli et al (2011), however 
the high-point in September is difficult to attribute to anything. By looking at the individual 
variables, indicators related to equity values are the cause of the high stress.  Another potential 
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false positive from the CDF FSI is the high point in February 1996. Both the PC and VE 
weightings do not report the period to particularly stressful, suggesting that this may be an issue 
with the CDF aggregation method. During the highlighted period in late 1997, both the CDF 
and VE methods report above average stress, which corresponds to the timings of the Asian 
financial crisis, however once again Carderelli et al (2011) do not report high stress during this 
period. Illing and Liu (2006) however remark this period as being comparably stressful 
according to both their FSIs and their expert survey.  
The next high point is captured as a local high point by several different studies 
including Cardarelli et al (2011), Hollo et al (2012), Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Illing and 
Liu (2006). Reasons for this high pointed are cited as the bailout of LTCM (Hakkio and Keeton, 
2009) and the Russian Ruble crisis in August. Both the CDF and VE FSIs capture this high-
point, however the PC weighted FSI does not. This may an example of the high failure rates of 
PC FSIs reported by Illing and Liu (2006) and Oet et al (2011). Unlike several of the other 
studies mentioned above, none of the FSI aggregation methods report significantly high stress 
during the 2000 to 2002 period, which is frequently attributed to the dot com bubble. The 
highest points appear to be at the end of 1999 and the end of 2000, but neither are ranked much 
higher than 60 in the re-balanced results. 
March 2004 exhibits another potential false positive for the CDF weighted FSI. The 
high stress value appears to come from a high interest rate disparity between the UK and US, 
but only the CDF measure is valued higher than 65. This period is not reported as stressful in 
any of the literature, including Cardarelli et al. (2011). After this period the performance of all 
FSIs broadly correspond with results of the literature that use financial crisis data. In most cases 
financial stress increases steadily from 2007 onwards, culminating between November 2008 
and March 2009. The VE and PC measures have global high points during this time period, 
while the CDF has a local peak earlier in 2008. The March 2010 local high-point corresponds 
to a US announcement about a large increase of supplementary financing account and reporting 
of large net losses from Freddy Mac and Fannie Mae.4 
As less of the literature uses post-financial crisis data, sources to compare this chapter’s 
FSIs with are more limited, however the results of all the FSIs are largely in keeping with 
available stress measures. The final FSI high points correspond to events that are not potentially 
related to the financial crisis in the UK, but spill-overs from the European debt crisis after 2012. 
                                               
4 Taken from the St-Louis Fed’s timeline of the Financial Crisis https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-
timeline 
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The June 2013 high-point occurs when bailouts for Greece and Ireland were at their highest. 
June 2013 saw Greece being downgraded to an emerging market, while Ireland was receiving 
bailouts until late 2013.  The final upward trend occurs after the UK’s 2015 general election, 
after which the UK submitted the European Union Referendum Act, which formalised the 
procedure for holding the Brexit referendum. Financial stress was relatively high at the start of 
August for all of the measures, corresponding to the results of the referendum, and has trended 
upwards for the VE and CDF indexes, whereas the PC has stayed relatively constant. The 
CMAX exchange rate variable is the key variable behind these large stress levels, 
commensurate with the nature of the financial news in the referendum results. This can also be 
seen in the GARCH EFFEX measure discussed in earlier sections and recorded in Figure 3.1. 
Overall, each FSI in this chapter performs satisfactorily compared to the results found 
in the literature, however there are several remarks to be made about the potential efficacy of 
the CDF and PC weighting systems. The CDF aggregation appears to exaggerate the frequency 
and severity of financial stress episodes compared to the literature, with a number of periods 
designated as high stress that aren’t found in comparable FSIs. On the contrary the PC method 
appears to fail to capture many consensus stressful episodes. For the purposes of this chapter, 
these shortcomings do not necessarily rule out the use of these aggregation methods to measure 
financial stress. Noting that the CDF and PC weightings tend to exaggerate or underestimate 
financial stress respectively, these measures can be used as more relaxed or stringent measures 
of financial stress, which is useful for the purposes of robustness. As for the VE-weighted 
measure, the fact that it is the middle-ground between the other two aggregation methods does 
not ensure accuracy, however given that it has a noted good performance in other FSI studies, 
and corroborates well with the literature, it is viewed by this chapter as the most accurate 
measure of UK financial stress. 
3.4.1 Identifying periods of financial stress 
 A primary purpose of an FSI is to be a snapshot of financial stress at certain point of 
time. By construction, the FSIs created in this chapter, and many of those cited in the literature 
compare observations of stress to a historical high in order to ascertain the relative level of 
stress in a financial system. Most chapters calculate particularly stressful periods as 
observations that are significantly higher than the mean level of stress over a time-period, 
usually using sample standard deviations as the measuring stick for this purpose. The most 
frequently used calculation for stressful periods is one-tailed one standard deviation away from 
the mean level of stress. Balakrishnan et al (2011) use one and one-point-five standard 
deviations away from the mean, while Illing and Liu (2006) use two standard deviations. The 
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number of deviations depend on the desired stringency of the measure, as noted by Hakkio and 
Keeton (2009), as well as a theory-based interpretation as to what level financial stress becomes 
binding. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) also consider the percentile technique, where they view 
anything above the 90th percentile to be considered stressful. A final approach they consider is 
the comparison of the current stress episode with a historical benchmark, i.e. choosing an 
appropriate date which is widely considered to be stressful period, and then choosing all periods 
with FSIs levels equal-to or greater than this date as stressful periods. A more computationally 
intensive method is used by Hollo et al (2012) where they use a non-linear Markov-switching 
model to determine the thresholds for stressful periods. 
 For the purposes of this chapter, the simple standard deviation method is considered the 
simplest and most appropriate. Because of its computational simplicity, the standard deviation 
method can be used on all of the FSI weighting methods, as well as calculated using different 
levels of stringency. This makes robustness checks easier and more effective. For this reason, 
this chapter takes the benchmark definition of a stressful period as an observation that is one 
standard deviation above the mean, but also tests to see if the results stand when using 1.5 or 
two standard deviations. 
3.4.2 The links between Financial stress and Quantitative Easing 
 A final area of importance for this chapter is outlining the potential links between 
financial stress and the Quantitative Easing strategy. While not often discussed separately from 
other types of monetary policy in the literature, QE can affect several commonly used financial 
stress measures in particular.  To begin, a primary example is the effect QE is likely to have on 
long term government gilts and thereby the yield curve measure. While typically a flattened 
yield curve measure indicates higher financial stress, a successful QE policy will 
simultaneously flatten the yield curve while reducing financial stress through the corresponding 
injection of liquidity (Joyce et al (2011). However, if the depression in gilt yields are not 
commensurate with a reduction on yields of private debt, it can be expected that the corporate 
spread indicators will report higher stress. In effect, the combination of a flattened yield curve 
indicator but widening debt spread indicators presents evidence that QE is successful in 
reducing gilt yields, but the effects are limited in scope to the government debt markets. 
 In addition to this, it can be expected that the measures that approximate liquidity risk 
will report lower stress in response to the introduction of reserves associated with QE (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2011) It can be expected therefore that the interbank lending rates should narrow, 
as well as the spread on commercial bank debt. This increase in liquidity should have the most 
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noticeable effect on these assets given that interbank lending and bank yields come with 
relatively few other types of risk beyond liquidity. For the other assets such as the equity and 
debt market indicators the liquidity effects are more difficult to separate from other channels, 
but the effects of QE on liquidity should still be incorporated. This leads on to the final main 
channel through which QE will operate to reduce financial stress. By conducting purchases, the 
Bank of England announced itself to be a last-resort lender and supporter of financial markets. 
If taken as a serious commitment by financial investors this should signal that the UK economy 
was to be supported, reducing the likelihood of downturns, bankruptcy and default, and 
therefore reducing the risk premiums on the riskier assets (Kapetanios et al., 2012). This effect 
will be strongest for the riskiest of the financial assets included in this chapter, i.e. the low-rated 
debt spreads and the CMAX indicator for equities, which have higher premiums to compensate 
for higher default risk. As such, reduced debt spreads and higher equity prices as a reaction to 
QE policies indicate a successfully translated signalling effect. Furthermore, the VIX option-
implied pricing of volatility and the GARCH indicators could potentially be reduced by QE 
reducing market uncertainty in the same way. 
Finally, Joyce et al (2011) amongst others note that QE should cause a small devaluation 
of sterling due to the injection of reserves into the economy. This should have an impact on the 
CMAX exchange rate and interest parity indicators given that they both include trade-weighted 
sterling value. This effect should however occur over the longer-term and therefore not be 
captured in these measures which focus on the shorter-term. It could be expected that QE 
announcements would cause sudden drops in the value of sterling, which would be registered 
in the CMAX indicator. In these circumstances, this should not be interpreted as increased 
financial stress apart from for participants in currency markets.  
Overall, QE could potentially have a dramatic impact on financial stress in the UK. In 
terms of intentions, the overall desirable effect of the policy, while not being specifically cited 
as an ultimate objective, is the reduction of financial stress. This would allow financial markets 
to translate QE effects to the wider economy effectively, so the inflation and growth targets 
could be achieved. However, this outcome is not necessarily the most probable. Almost all the 
financial indicators included in the index described above could in some way be affected by the 
policy, albeit not in a uniform manner for a financial stress index. The overall stress index value 
could, for example, report high stress from the yield curve and exchange rate indicators, while 
simultaneously reporting lowered stress in terms of default risk and counterparty risk. Such 
contradictions in outcome are difficult to avoid, but nevertheless make the impact of QE harder 
to predict.  
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3.5 Conclusions 
 The purpose of this chapter was to create a workhorse model of financial stress in the 
United Kingdom, by utilising the existing approaches as a basis. By examining the contributions 
of key studies like Illing and Liu (2006), Cardarelli et al (2011) and Oet et al (2011) this chapter 
has used data spanning from 1991 to 2017, and formulated a measure using three of the most 
high-performing aggregation methods. This measure captures financial stress in the UK’s 
equity, foreign exchange, debt and banking sector, and can be used as a general snapshot of 
duress in the UK’s financial system over the course of the 2008 financial crisis and beyond. In 
further chapters of this dissertation this index (henceforth FSI) will be used analysed in greater 
detail to examine the interaction between financial stress, QE and asset pricing. As it has been 
discussed in this chapter that the aggregated index could have many potential responses from 
QE, the individual components of the index are also useful when examining these key 
interactions and will therefore also be examined in further detail. 
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Chapter.4 
The Effect of Quantitative Easing on UK financial stress and the volatility of Gilts, 
Bonds and Equities 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The Bank of England’s Quantitative Easing (QE) policy, enacted in three distinct 
periods between 2009 and 2015, saw the large-scale purchase of long-term UK government 
gilts through a process of reverse-auctions. These purchases, which total more than £375 billion, 
were of gilts with at least 3 years to redemption, and extended across the entire maturity 
spectrum. The intention of the Bank was to improve the stability and function of the UK’s 
financial markets, while achieving the macroeconomic targets of stimulating growth and 
reaching the year’s 2% inflation target. While only an intermediate objective, Quantitative 
Easing was also intended to raise the prices and restore stability of other financial assets than 
UK gilts, namely UK corporate bonds and equities. The examination of the wider economic 
effect of QE has been covered by several studies, while the literature on the financial market 
impact is less extensive but has still produced evidence for the success of QE in achieving its 
objectives.  
This chapter however discusses a gap in the literature surrounding quantitative easing 
by examining the effects of the policy on the volatility of gilts, bonds and equities, additionally 
analysing the spill-over effects between the three asset types. This is important because the 
stable functioning of financial markets, while not traditionally of concern to central banks, was 
an objective given the strained circumstances that existed in the UK in the aftermath of the 2007 
financial crisis. Additionally, as the portfolio-balance and confidence channels rely on reduced 
risk premia on increasing asset prices to transmit the quantitative effects of the policy to the 
wider economy, the volatility of UK asset markets is relevant to the effectiveness of QE (Joyce, 
Tong, & Woods, 2011). Specifically, the Bank of England’s intervention was intended to 
restore market performance to pre-crisis levels through the manipulation of gilt markets, and 
this chapter establishes the efficacy of QE in this regard. A systematic decrease in volatility 
across asset types could be considered a success for QE as a policy tool in that high and stable 
asset prices increase investor confidence, lower equity and corporate bond risk premia and 
lower cost of finance. On the other hand, distortions to relative volatilities of competing assets, 
whether intentional or not, alters the risk characteristics of these assets and therefore the 
purchasing behaviour of financial market participants, resulting in portfolio rebalancing. Given 
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that the BoE QE strategy involves the diversification of portfolios away from gilts into equities 
and corporate bonds, distortionary effects to return volatilities could have helped or hindered 
the policy. 
In a less direct manner, asset volatilities play a key role in the valuation of financial 
assets, being important aspects of popular pricing methods such as Black-Scholes equations 
and the Value at Risk (VaR) calculation method. Any impact of QE on relative asset volatilities 
will therefore have a large impact on the pricing of many financial assets that would otherwise 
be unrelated to QE. Furthermore, capital requirement regulations such as Basel II and later 
Basel III often consider pricing volatility as a measure of market risk, again utilising VaR. This 
means that any policy action that impacts asset volatilities will have a tangible impact on 
optimal bank behaviour. It could be argued therefore that a QE policy that reduced asset 
volatility would also reduce constraints on bank-lending in terms of both regulation as well as 
improving risk to reward ratios. Reduced risk would also increase the incentive of banks and 
other institutions to increase investment, supporting the economic stimulation that QE was 
intended to address. The potential for widespread effects from a monetary policy shock to asset 
volatility is therefore a topic worthy of study, especially when focussing on a time-period of 
financial stress and economic downturn, where large shocks to asset pricing and volatility could 
have potentially led to deepening financial crisis. As a final consideration, this chapter adds to 
this examination of QE’s effect on risk valuations by interpreting the effect of QE auctions and 
announcements on a variety of financial stress indicators, as well as an aggregated financial 
stress index for the UK. By analysing asset price volatilities and measures of financial stress in 
such a framework, this chapter establishes the effect of QE on UK financial market risk. Many 
of these indicators are also popular metrics used in predicting the future economic outlook. Any 
impact of QE that improves the state of these measures may also encourage a more positive 
economic outlook and thereby provide an economic stimulus. 
 The majority of quantitative easing in the UK occurred between March 2009 and 
October 2012, which can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase, which was 
labelled QE1, took place between 2009 and early 2010 and saw over £200 billion spent on 
mostly UK gilts, with relatively small amounts spent on commercial paper and corporate bonds.  
QE2 occurred more than a year and a half later after an announcement by the MPC in October 
2011. This phase lasted until May 2012 and saw the purchase of an extra £75 million worth of 
gilts. The final phase, QE3, took place in July 2012 with the majority of the £50 million 
purchases taking place before the end of October 2012. After this point, relatively small scale 
and isolated purchases occurred at the discretion of the MPC, mostly encompassed within a 
 81 
 
week in the case of each intervention. The interventions themselves occurred in the format of 
reverse auctions, where private investors would allocate the quantity of gilts they were willing 
to sell at their chosen price level, and the Asset purchase facility would purchase at the most 
competitive prices. In terms of the maturity structure of the gilt purchases, £168 billion would 
be spent on assets with maturities between 3 and 10 years, £124 billion on gilts with 10-25 years 
to maturity, and finally £68 billion on assets with 25 plus years to maturity.  
 The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a brief literature review 
of the theoretical and empirical studies that contribute to the methodology of this chapter, as 
well as a brief outline of previous studies that have discussed relevant aspects of QE with 
respect to asset volatility. This section will be concluded with a brief explanation of the gap in 
this literature and therefore the contribution this chapter makes to the analysis of QE as a policy 
tool.  Sections 3 and 4 describe the data sources, structure and sample periods, and outlines the 
empirical methods and model specifications that will be used. Section 5 presents the key results 
of the analysis, along with interpretation and analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes the chapter 
with an overall summary of the findings, with some brief discussion of the importance of these 
findings in the context of the study of asset volatility and QE theory. 
4.2 Literature Review 
As introduced above, quantitative easing was conducted through a series of announced 
auctions when the Bank of England decided it was necessary to intervene to stabilise the UK 
economy. Resultantly, the announcements of gilt purchases contained a large amount of 
macroeconomic news that investors could use to change their portfolio holdings, providing a 
link between information flow and return or price volatility. There are numerous investigations 
of this link in terms of macroeconomic news for a variety of different assets. For example, 
Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998) empirically analyse the effect of macroeconomic data 
announcements on Treasury bond returns, finding that the return volatility is significantly 
higher on the announcement days, albeit with a rapid decay of the effect. De Goeij and 
Marquering (2006) employ a similar study but allow for the effects of negative and positive 
news to be different using a threshold variable. Their findings reinforce the findings of Jones et 
al. (1998) but add that negative news has a greater impact on the volatility of US treasury bonds.  
For equities, Bomfim (2003) similarly uses a Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to analyse the effects of macroeconomic news on stock 
market volatility, specifically looking at pre-announcement ‘calm before the storm effects’. He 
finds that US stock prices do respond reliably to macroeconomic news, and that return volatility 
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is significantly reduced the day before scheduled monetary policy announcements. Flannery & 
Protopapadakis (2002) uses the release of macroeconomic data including CPI, PPI, M1 and M2 
as indicators for equity volatility, finding that volatility exhibit strong responses to at least 6 of 
17 macroeconomic indicators, with more having significant relationships with the returns only. 
Their results reinforce Bomfim’s (2003) in that US stock prices do respond to macroeconomic 
announcements and data releases. Rigobon & Sack (2004) also studies the effects of monetary 
policy on stock prices, finding that the correlation between policy rate and other assets shifts 
significantly on monetary policy dates.  
As quantitative easing is such an unconventional monetary policy tool, there is relatively 
little literature on the volatility effects of the gilt purchase programme. For the US, Tan and 
Kohli (2011) examine the volatility of US stock prices during the US QE programme between 
2008 and 2011. Using both AR and GARCH models, they find that price volatility reduced as 
a result of the programme. The lack of literature is especially apparent for the UK’s experience 
of QE, where only two major studies cover volatility effects. As mentioned in the previous 
chapters Joyce et al. (2011) examine option-implied volatility of the FTSE100 and find 
that it reduced significantly during the duration of the QE1 phase. 
there exists little discussion of the UK’s QE programme and its effect on volatility, especially 
of other assets to UK gilts.  
Secondly, Steeley and Matyushkin (2015), provides the most extensive study, which 
analyses the effects of QE1, QE2 and QE3 on a panel of UK gilts of varying maturities. As this 
chapter builds upon this paper, it is important to elaborate on the methods this paper uses. In 
terms of methods, Steeley and Matyushkin (2015)U useing a GARCH model, they useusing 
dummy variables for QE auctions and announcements, and findfinding that there is a significant 
volatility reduction as a result of the programme, almost down to the levels that were prevalent 
before the collapse of Northern Rock. They also find that QE1’s effect was the most pronounced 
and that longer maturity government gilts reacted the most to the intervention. Rather than 
solely time-series analysis, they also conduct a cross-sectional model to determine the 
characteristics of bonds that make them reactive to QE. They find that bonds with longer time 
to maturity and more QE purchase activity tend to have higher volatility. Finally, they also 
conduct Granger causality tests between money supply and gilt volatility to determine whether 
the monetary transmission mechanism itself drives bond volatility. They find that only 9 of the 
24 gilts they examine produce a significant causal link between the two at the 5% significance 
level. They conclude that the QE had a strong reducing effect on gilt volatility, with the effect 
being most pronounced at the far end of the maturity spectrum. They also found that bonds that 
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had the highest purchase activity had smaller reductions in volatility of the QE periods. The 
final conclusions is that QE was effective in reducing gilt volatility, with the liquidity and 
signalling channels producing the most effect, with a relatively modest effect apportioned to 
the portfolio balance channel.  Apart from these two studies, there exists little discussion of the 
UK’s QE programme and its effect on volatility, especially of other assets to UK gilts.  
Joyce et al. (2011) also examine option-implied volatility of the FTSE100 and find that it 
reduced significantly during the duration of the QE1 phase. Apart from these two studies, there 
exists little discussion of the UK’s QE programme and its effect on volatility, especially of 
other assets to UK gilts.  
There is however significant literature unrelated to QE, which discuss the relationships in 
both returns and volatility between bonds, gilts and equities. Campbell and Taksler (2003) using 
standard OLS analysis find that equity volatility varies inversely with treasury spread yields, 
and additionally finds that equity volatility is a significant indicator for corporate bond spreads. 
Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek (1998) use both Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and 
Autoregressive (AR) models to link information flows between different asset markets. They 
find strong volatility linkages between bond, equity and bill markets in the US.  Gebhardt, 
Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan (2005) discuss stock and bond market interaction when analysing 
the relationships between stocks and bonds issued from the same company. They find 
significant spill-over effects where high-performing equities cause bonds from the same 
company to out-perform others.  
In terms of QE’s effect on financial markets, the purchase of gilts was intended to have spill-
over effects onto asset types that were not directly intervened with. Through the ‘portfolio 
balance’ channel, equity and corporate bond prices were expected to increase when government 
gilts were purchased. The Portfolio Balance channel was first proposed by Tobin and is loosely 
based on Keynes' Liquidity Preference model (Tobin, 1958). It is a popular theoretical concept 
in Keynesian monetary economics, and is recurrent discussion point in articles that analyse 
central banking policy (Andrés, Lopez-Salido and Nelson, 2004). Theoretically the Portfolio 
Balance channel reflects the impact of changing asset quantities in a market on its’ relative 
expected return. A change in quantity of one asset, ceteris paribus, will alter its relative expected 
return in comparison to competing assets. For example, decreased quantity in one type of asset 
increases its price and will induce portfolio operators to switch out the affected asset for other 
relatively more profitable assets. In terms of asset volatility, this channel should translate in a 
spill-over effect from gilts into the returns and volatility of other comparable assets.  
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The second potential channel that QE has been expressed to work through is the so 
called 'Signalling channel' and the similar ‘Expectations channel’ the latter of which has also 
been referred to as the ‘macro/policy news channel’ and ‘policy signalling effects’ in a Bank of 
England publication (Joyce et al., 2011). The Signalling Channel reflects the impact on 
expectations that occurs when a monetary authority makes a statement of intent about a certain 
macro policy. In these circumstances, individuals can be reassured or worried by the news, and 
alter their expectations of future asset values and yields accordingly (Kapetanios et al., 2012). 
This channel uses the assumption that investors are rational and forward looking, and will 
therefore make inferences from central bank announcements, and using this information to 
make market-based decisions. In this way, investors will not only react to a policy made by the 
central bank when it is actually carried out, but also when it is initially announced. This leads 
to important implication that a large part of the quantitative easing effect will be recorded in 
the first few days around and announcement. A further implication, relevant to this chapter, is 
that gilt purchase announcements should not only affect gilt volatility but give information for 
the future prices and values of equities and corporate bonds.  Many of the articles published in 
the last few years have argued that the expectations effect QE creates is just as important as the 
portfolio balance effect; and as such this theory is discussed to a great extent by the articles 
discussing optimal monetary policy (Bernanke et al, (2004) Adam and Billi (2004), etc.).  
This chapter contributes to these literatures in several ways, while tying together many 
of the different strands touched upon in these earlier studies. First of all, it offers an entirely 
new contribution to the volatility and monetary policy literature by examining the effect of 
monetary policy announcements on UK gilts, stocks and equities, providing new analysis on 
calm-before-the-storm effects in the context of unconventional monetary policy 
announcements. Secondly it contributes to the literature on spill-over effects between the 
volatility of different asset types, a subject area that is relatively uncovered especially for data 
from UK financial markets. Finally, this chapter extends the literature discussing the effect of 
QE on the UK, specifically its financial markets and the stress levels therein. It builds upon the 
findings of Steeley & Matyushkin (2015) in its gilt market analysis, extending the effects of QE 
announcements on gilt volatility while observing the secondary effects this volatility effects 
have on other financial assets. In this way, this chapter also provides analysis for the efficacy 
of QE as monetary policy, offering some evidence for the degree to which QE announcements 
and intervention propagated through the UK’s financial markets. 
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Univariate GARCH models 
In the initial examination of asset returns, this chapter uses a univariate Generalised 
AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model (GARCH) to model both the conditional 
mean and variance of bond, gilt and equity returns. The ARCH and GARCH family of processes 
were proposed by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) respectively.  In these univariate models 
the conditional variance of an asset’s return is a linear function of previous conditional 
variances, squared previous errors as well as in this case a series of dummy indicator variables. 
Resultantly the univariate model looks like this: 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖,𝑗
11
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑗,𝑡    𝑗 = 1,2, … ,48  (1) 
𝜀𝑗,𝑡|𝑟𝑗𝑡−1, 𝑟𝑗𝑡−2, … ~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑗,𝑡)       (2) 
ℎ𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑗 + 𝛼𝑗𝜀𝑗,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑗ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
11
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑖,𝑡     (3) 
Where 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is the log return of asset j at time t and D is a selection of dummy variables. As 
(1) shows the mean equation follows a standard ARMA process while the 𝛽𝑗ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1 term in the 
variance specification shows it to be a GARCH(1,1) specification. As will be discussed in more 
detail later, ARMA(1,1) is not the only specification for the mean equation, some variables, 
especially longer term bonds and gilts, contain ARMA(2,2) processes or others. The equation 
above is the general specification that most of this chapter’s analysis uses as a basis.  
For each return variable, this chapter determined the most appropriate ARMA designation 
for use in the mean equation of the GARCH equation. The appropriate lag order for the AR and 
MA terms were selected using the most negative Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion statistics, as well as the models that maximised the log-likelihood 
function. For the vast majority, ARMA (1,1) specifications were the most appropriate, with a 
small amount of the corporate bonds requiring ARMA(2,2) specifications. These models are 
largely in line with the models used in the literature for estimating GARCH equations. ARCH 
tests were then performed on each model to determine the presence of conditional 
heteroskedastic effects. All tests found these ARCH effects, which provides further evidence 
for the appropriateness of a GARCH model. 
Similar to the underlying AR model specification, information criterion and hypothesis 
testing were used to judge between the various specifications of well-performing ARCH and 
GARCH models. Hypothesis tests for GARCH terms for every variable found that there are 
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significant effects from the variance of the error term, however in almost all cases a GARCH-
M specification yielded insignificant GARCH effects in the mean equation. Asset returns that 
did show significant GARCH effects in the mean equation still yielded poorer statistics on the 
information criteria than standard GARCH specifications, so the GARCH term was dropped. 
EGARCH and TGARCH models were also experimented with but did not significantly improve 
the model for any of the assets. Finally, various lag orders for the ARCH and GARCH terms 
for each asset, however the standard GARCH(1,1) specification was found to be the most 
appropriate in all cases.  
Similar to Steeley and Matyushkin (2015) and using concepts originally discussed in 
Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), this chapter determined if negative news has a 
different effect to positive on return volatility. To do this, this chapter included an indicator 
variable labelled 𝐼𝑡 which was valued 1 when 𝜀𝑗,𝑡−1 < 0 and zero otherwise. Including this 
variable makes the GARCH specification the following: 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖,𝑗
11
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝜀𝑗,𝑡−1    𝑗 = 1,2, … ,48 (4) 
𝜀𝑗,𝑡|𝑟𝑗𝑡−1, 𝑟𝑗𝑡−2, … ~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑗,𝑡)       (5) 
ℎ𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑗 + 𝛼𝑗𝜀𝑗,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑗ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝜆𝑗𝐼𝑡𝜀𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
11
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑖,𝑡    (6) 
 
When 𝐼𝑡 equals zero, that element of the equation disappears and the model returns to a standard 
GARCH specification. Empirically this is established, as Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 
(1993) discusses, by the significance of the standard t-test on the coefficient for 𝐼𝑡 which is 𝜆. 
When this is not significantly different from zero, the term is dropped from the equation and 
the standard GARCH (1, 1) is used. 
4.3.2 Dummy Variables 
 For the univariate analysis, this chapter selected to include dummies for important QE 
events as well as others controlling for individual market forces. The first set of dummies cover 
the effects of QE-related announcements, with the value of the variable being 1 on days on 
which news was released from the Bank of England on the subject of QE and valued zero 
otherwise. This chapter also includes dummies for the day before and after these 
announcements, similar to Bomfim’s analysis (2003), to examine for the existence of calm-
before-the-storm effects and post announcement volatility respectively. The choice for these 
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announcements were mainly taken from Joyce et al.’s (2011) event study but extended along 
the same criteria for announcements that took place after the sample period of that study.  
 A similar approach was also taken for the actual auction days for the gilts is the asset 
purchase programme: The dummy variable Auction is given the value of 1 on days on which 
reverse-auctions are held, and 0 otherwise. Like the announcement dummies, this chapter also 
includes dummies for the day before and after auction days. Finally, this chapter includes three 
dummy variables, where the QE intervention periods are split into three separate dummies, each 
being value 1 during certain phases of QE, and 0 otherwise. These are designated QE1, QE2 
and QE3.5 QE1 occurs between 2009 and 2010, QE2 between 2011 and early summer 2012, 
and finally QE3 is valued 1 between late summer 2012 and January 2013. The inclusion of 
these dummies to determine the mean and volatility effects of the entire intervention periods by 
the Bank of England, analysing significant systematic rather than event effects. 
In all univariate specifications this chapter includes dummy variables that account for 
day of the week effects. For example, the dummy for Tuesday is valued at 1 on all Tuesdays 
over the sample, and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of these variables was intended to separate the 
effects of the different weekdays on returns and volatility, from the effects of the QE auctions 
that sometimes occurred on those days. Finally, this chapter includes a dummy variable 
indicating the presence of the financial crisis. Like Steeley and Matyushkin (2015) this chapter 
specifies the financial crisis to have begun at the collapse of Northern Rock on the 14th of 
September, 2007. This dummy is valued at 1 for all days between this date and the start of the 
asset purchase programme and is included in the equations for assets with samples that run 
before this date to control for the significant general increase in volatility that the financial crisis 
entailed. 
4.3.3 Financial Stress Indicators 
 In addition to the volatility of returns, this chapter examines alternate measures of 
financial risk and stress, and determines the effect of QE announcements, auctions, and overall 
intervention periods upon them. This chapter examines the individual stress indicators as well 
as the aggregated stress indices discussed in the previous chapter, using the same univariate 
GARCH methodology to model these financial stress indicators and following the same steps 
in model specification and testing. The same QE dummy variables are also used, with the 
                                               
5 This chapter splits the purchases between 2011 and 2013 into QE1 and QE2, whereas chapter 1 kept all purchases 
after 2011 designated QE2. This choice was made in order to facilitate comparison with Steeley and Matyushkin’s 
(2015) results, who include the QE2 and QE3 distinction. 
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omission of the day-of-the-week and financial crisis effects. The financial stress indicators 
replace 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 in equations 1 and 2 but in all other ways are treated with the same procedure. 
 
4.3.4 Multivariate GARCH models 
The univariate GARCH specification by nature does not allow for spill-over effects from the 
variance of UK gilts onto equities or corporate bonds.  To determine the existence of such spill-
over effects, this chapter conducts a multivariate GARCH analysis using Engle and Kroner’s 
(1995) Multivariate Simultaneous Generalized ARCH model (henceforth BEKK), and Engle’s 
(2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation model (DCC) specifications, in both cases using a 
VAR to model the mean spill-over effects between the assets. Given the complication of 
unrestricted multivariate GARCH estimation, this chapter restricts the analysis to a tri-variate 
specification, in each case with a corporate bond or equity return modelled against an individual 
UK gilt as well as UK gilt index. The use of more additional variables was decided against as 
it would dramatically increase the complication of the estimation, while offering little further 
evidence or interpretation in addition to the variables used, which are described in the next 
section. This chapter also does not include the dummy variables from the univariate analysis in 
the multivariate estimation for the same reason. While the inclusion of the dummy variables 
would not be problematic in the DCC specification, inclusion in the BEKK framework would 
require a prohibitively large amount of parameters to be estimated. A tri-variate VAR(1) was 
selected after using model specification tests and the use of information criterion. In the cases 
where more than 1 lag was selected by the criteria, the mean equations followed a VAR with 2 
or 3 lags, with the majority of assets following the VAR(1) specification. The general 
specification of a VAR(k) is as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∅1𝑌𝑡−1 + ∅2𝑌𝑡−2 + ∅𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡     (7) 
Where the ∅𝑖 are (n*n) coefficient matrices. As this chapter is examining daily data with 
attention paid towards the variance effects of QE, the results of this VAR are estimated simply 
for use in the multivariate models and will not be discussed.  The BEKK(1,1) model, which is 
the most common version of the model, was used after further model specification tests 
determined it to be the most appropriate. This BEKK specification is defined as follows: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐶
′𝐶 + 𝐴′𝜀𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
′ 𝐴 + 𝐵′𝐻𝑡−1     (8) 
Where C is a lower triangular matrix (𝑛 × 𝑛) for constants and A and B (𝑛 × 𝑛) parameter 
matrices. In the tables below the elements of A and B are shown. 𝑎11, 𝑎22 and 𝑎33 are the 
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diagonal elements of the A parameter matrix and demonstrate the effect of an assets innovations 
on its own volatility, while the off-diagonal elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 represent the effect of asset i’s shock 
on asset j’s volatility. For the B matrix the diagonal elements represent the assets own past 
volatility effect on its conditional variance, while the off-diagonal elements again exhibit the 
volatility effects of one asset on another’s conditional variance.  
The DCC model is estimated using the two-step method following the same VAR(1) 
mean equation estimation. The first step is estimated using univariate GARCH parameters, then 
in the second step the correlations between these parameters are then estimated. For the 
purposes of this chapter, The DCC framework is briefly described as follows.6 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡      (9) 
Where 𝐻𝑡 is the 3x3 conditional covariance matrix, 𝑅𝑡 is the conditional correlation matrix and 
𝐷𝑡  is a diagonal matrix with standard deviations on the diagonal elements. 𝐷𝑡  and 𝑅𝑡 is 
described as follows: 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 (ℎ11𝑡
1
2 , … , ℎ33𝑡
1
2 )     (10) 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑞11𝑡
−
1
2 , … 𝑞33𝑡
−
1
2 )𝑄𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑞11𝑡
−
1
2 , … 𝑞33𝑡
−
1
2 )    (11) 
𝑄𝑡 is a symmetric positive definite matrix. 
𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝜃1 − 𝜃2)𝑄 + 𝜃1𝜉𝑡−1𝜉𝑡−1
′ + 𝜃2𝑄𝑡−1    (12) 
𝑄 is the 3x3 unconditional correlation matrix of the standardised residuals 𝜉𝑖𝑡.  𝜃1 and 𝜃2 are 
non-negative parameters which sum to less than one. The conditional correlation is given by 
𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
√𝑞𝑖,𝑖,𝑡𝑞𝑗,𝑗,𝑡
     (13) 
And shows the conditional correlation between assets 𝑖 and 𝑗 at time 𝑡, which is one of the key 
elements of interest for this chapter. For all of the assets, comparison of log-likelihood values 
showed that the standard lag order DCC(1,1) framework was the most effective, with standard 
univariate GARCH (1,1) models capturing the conditional variances. Furthermore, inclusion of 
asymmetric GARCH terms did not improve the models so were omitted in the final analysis.  
                                               
6  For a more extensive description of the model, see the original Engle (2002) article. 
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4.3.5 Data Selection  
This chapter uses daily data for a selection of UK gilts, bonds and equities that are traded 
on London exchanges. Indexes were selected where possible to give a proxy for the aggregate 
reaction to QE announcements and intervention. For all of the data, Bloomberg and DataStream 
were used to collect closing/last prices. These prices were then used to calculate returns as the 
log daily change in price. For sample size this chapter selected the period between January 1st 
2000, and March 16th 2016, with a resulting sample size of 4091 observations. The 2000 sample 
start date was chosen for several reasons. Apart from the obvious intention to have a sufficient 
sample size from which to draw satisfactory inference, the intention was to capture the entire 
duration of the long-term government gilts that were involved in QE. Second, the sample range 
chosen facilitates the comparison of results with Steely and Matyushkin (2015) who use a 
similar sample range in their analysis of UK gilt volatility. However, many of the assets 
analysed did not exist, or did not have price data for the entire sample period. This is especially 
true for many of the corporate bond indexes, some of which are available only from 2010 
onwards, in which case the sample includes the most observations possible. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
below summarise the sample sizes for the gilts and corporate bond indexes used in this chapter.  
For the multivariate analysis both the BEKK and DCC models were estimated between 
26/09/2007 and 04/09/2015, which is the longest sample period where data was available for 
all of the assets involved. However, in both BEKK and DCC frameworks, the Bloomberg bonds 
use a shorter sample of between 05/01/2010 and 04/09/2015 due to these bonds only being sold 
after January 2010. The sample size for the equities and the non-Bloomberg bonds come to 
2008 observations, while the Bloomberg bond analysis contains 1433 observations. this chapter 
does not believe that the shorter sample will dramatically alter the results found, however it 
should be noted that the Bloomberg indexes assets were not sold during QE1, but many of their 
underlying corporate bonds were, meaning that high volatility for these indexes is expected at 
the start of the sample. 
Gilts 
For gilts, this chapter chose the individual assets that were directly intervened with, as 
well as three UK gilt indexes. This selection was made for two reasons, first of all these gilts 
should exhibit the greatest volatility reactions to QE announcements and auctions compared to 
gilts that were not purchased. Secondly, the market condition of these gilts should have 
provided the most information for investors of equities and corporate bonds about the QE, so 
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the volatility relationships between these gilts and other assets are of particular importance. As 
an additional reason, the study conducted by Steeley and Matyushkin (2015) already provides 
a robust and comprehensive analysis of the gilt market effects of QE, the intention of this 
chapter is to observe the volatility linkages as a result of QE, and the assets purchased by the 
QE programme are the most relevant to achieving this objective. As mentioned above, not all 
gilts existed or had price data over the entire sample. Table 4.1 below summarises the different 
sample sizes. Several of the gilts were only purchased in the latter stages of the programme, i.e. 
in QE3, these have been omitted from the table but were included in the univariate analysis.  
The gilt chosen for the tri-variate estimations was the asset denominated 
GB0033280339, which was one of the most purchased assets with over £15,000 million worth 
being bought by the BoE and having being purchased in both QE1 and QE2 phases. This chapter 
therefore views this asset a useful proxy for volatility transmission from individual gilts to other 
assets. The FTSE Actuaries All Stocks index was also selected as it the best proxy for the overall 
purchases effect, as the index contains a weighted portfolio of UK gilts of various maturities. 
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Table 4.1 Gilt Returns Summary 
Gilt ISIN/Name Sample 
Start 
Sample 
Finish 
 Gilt ISIN/Name Sample 
Start 
Sample 
Finish 
GB00B29WRG55  
28/02/2008 
 
07/03/2013 
 
 
GB00B16NNR78  
30/08/2006 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB0008921883  
05/01/2000 
 
27/09/2013 
 
 
GB0002404191  
05/01/2000 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB00B3KJDW09  
11/03/2009 
 
06/03/2014 
 
 
GB00B24FF097  
26/09/2007 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB0031829509  
18/07/2002 
 
08/09/2014 
 
 
GB0004893086  
17/05/2000 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB00B4LFZR36  
28/10/2009 
 
22/01/2015 
 
 
GB00B52WS153  
17/06/2009 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB0033280339  
17/09/2003 
 
04/09/2015 
 
 
GB0032452392  
20/02/2003 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB0008881541  
05/01/2000 
 
07/12/2015 
 
 
GB00B00NY175  
15/04/2004 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB00B0V3WX43  
22/02/2006 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 
GB00B3KJDS62  
25/02/2009 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB0008931148  
05/01/2000 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 
GB00B1VWPJ53  
30/05/2007 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB00B1VWPC84  
17/05/2007 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 
GB00B128DP45  
03/05/2006 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB00B39R3F84  
18/09/2008 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 
GB00B39R3707  
28/08/2008 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB00B4YRFP41  
01/07/2009 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 
GB00B06YGN05  
18/05/2005 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB00B058DQ55  
16/03/2005 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 
GB00B54QLM75  
22/10/2009 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB0009997999  
05/01/2000 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Gilt 5-15-year 
Index 
05/01/2000 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB00B3KJDQ49  
18/02/2009 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Gilt All Stocks 
Index 
05/01/2000 
 
14/03/2016 
 
GB0030880693  
19/09/2001 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Gilt Over 15 
years Index 
05/01/2000 
 
14/03/2016 
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Corporate Bonds 
This chapter uses corporate bond indexes as a proxy for corporate bond markets rather than 
using individual bonds. The reason for this decision was an attempt to avoid capturing industry-
specific problems or shocks in the analysis, which would have potentially occurred if this 
chapter had selected an array of individual bonds from different UK companies. Bond indexes 
containing underlying assets from a variety of companies should not suffer from this issue. The 
indexes used for this chapter were selected based on several criteria. First of all, this chapter 
attempted to find bond funds that contained assets from mainly UK-based companies, rather 
than international indexes or those that contained some European company securities. Indexes 
where 80% or above of the underlying securities were from UK based companies were selected 
for this reason. This decision was made to limit the effect that international shocks had on the 
analysis. This is especially important given that the Fed and the ECB were both conducting 
their own QE programmes over the sample period, and that indexes that contained large 
amounts of non-UK assets would be likely to be influenced by non-UK QE announcements. As 
a large a sample size as possible was another concern, as well as the selection of bond funds 
that traded frequently enough that QE announcements would be reflected in prices on a daily 
basis. Table 4.2 below summarises the sample sizes for the UK corporate bond indexes used in 
this chapter. 
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Table 4.2 Corporate Bond Returns Summary 
Bond Name Sample 
Start 
Sample 
Finish 
 Bond Name Sample 
Start 
Sample 
Finish 
SPDR Barclays 
Capital Sterling 
Corporate Bond 
ETF  
05/01/2000 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Bloomberg GBP 
Investment Grade 
Corporate Bond 
Index 
05/01/2010 
 
14/03/2016 
Barclays Sterling 
Corporate Bond 
Fund 
02/06/2006 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Bloomberg GBP 
Investment Grade 
European 
Corporate Bond 
Index 1 to 5 Year 
05/01/2010 
 
14/03/2016 
iShares Core 
GBP Corporate 
Bond 
30/03/2004 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Bloomberg 
Investment Grade 
Corporate 10+ 
Bond Index 
05/01/2010 
 
14/03/2016 
CF Bentley 
Investment 
Funds 
06/01/2005 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Bloomberg 
Investment Grade 
Corporate 5-10 
years Bond Index 
05/01/2010 
 
14/03/2016 
JPMorgan Fund 
03/12/2001 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Bloomberg 
Investment Grade 
Corporate 1-10 
years Bond Index 
05/01/2010 
 
14/03/2016 
Bloomberg GBP 
High Yield 
Corporate Bond 
Index 
05/01/2010 
 
14/03/2016 
 
 Bloomberg 
Investment Grade 
Corporate 1-3 years 
Bond Index 
05/01/2010 
 
14/03/2016 
 
Equities 
 For Equities, the selection process was much simpler compared to corporate bond 
indexes. There is a comparatively large literature that uses the FTSE stock indexes for proxies 
of UK financial markets. this chapter uses the same rationale, and therefore includes the 
FTSE100, 250, 350 and ALLSHARE indexes, with particular attention paid to the FTSE250, 
which has been argued to contain the most information of a UK-specific effect. As the FTSE 
indexes have been traded continuously since before 2000, data is available over the entire 
sample period. Also, as these indexes have the largest amount of trading days in a year, these 
trading days are the basis for the dating in the time series analysis. Where return data was 
unavailable for the other assets, but equity trading occurred, missing values were replaced by 
zeroes, to signify that no changes in prices occurred. There are less than ten missing values over 
the sample period for corporate bonds and gilts, so there should not be any distorting effects 
from this data manipulation.  
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Financial Stress Variables 
 Table 4.3 below shows the financial stress indicators used in this chapter. These 
variables were selected because of their frequent use in literature that discusses daily indicators 
of financial stress, principally elements of the literature that create financial stress indexes from 
such variables. In addition, stress indicators were selected that have links to the key areas of 
financial markets that QE was intended to affect. Stress indicators with links to equity, corporate 
bonds and gilt markets were selected, as well as an indicator capturing effects on sterling 
exchange rates. By examining these indicators, this chapter links the effects on the mean and 
variance of UK financial asset returns to UK financial stress. UK specific data is considered 
rather than international financial stress indicators, given this chapter’s purpose in examining 
the UK’s QE programme. The majority of the variables are discussed at length in Illing and Liu 
(2006), Oet et al (2011), Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Hollo et al (2012), but a brief summary 
of the type of financial stress is included in the table. As column two of the table shows the 
measures capture several different types of stress, including some measures that relate to the 
equities, gilts and corporate bond returns discussed above. For example, the AAA, AA, BBB 
and BBB-AAA spreads all capture risk in corporate debt markets, while the commercial bank 
bond spread captures the same but isolated to bank debt markets. In addition, the CMAX100, 
CMAXALL and FTSE100VIX measures capture the return volatility in UK equity markets. 
Finally, the yield curve measure captures the slope of the government gilt yield curve, which is 
strongly related to gilt market returns. Given the nature of these variables, most of them have 
data available as far back as the early 1980s, however corporate spread data of all credit qualities 
is only available from April 2002, the sample for the GARCH analysis of all these variables is 
therefore using the balanced sample period of 12/4/2002 to 14/3/2016. 
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Table 4.3a Financial Stress Indicator Summary 
Variable Aspect of 
Financial 
Stress 
represented 
Calculation Data 
Bank Beta 
(BETAFTAS) 
Strain on bank 
profitability and 
stability 
𝛽 =
cov(𝑟, 𝑚)
var(𝑚)
 
r=ALLSHARE financials return 
index 
m=ALLSHARE return index 
Datastream, 
Commercial Bank 
Bond Spread 
(BNKBDSPR) 
Risk in bank debt 
markets 
10-year Commercial bank yields 
minus 10-year government bond 
yields 
Datastream, 
Bank of England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank 
Liquidity Spread 
(LIBORTBILL) 
Liquidity and 
counterparty risk in 
interbank lending 
3-month LIBOR minus 3-month 
UK Treasury Bill rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Cost of 
Borrowing 
(LIBORBANK) 
Risk premium in 
interbank borrowing 
3-month LIBOR minus BoE Bank 
rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank 
Liquidity Spread 
(LIBORGOVT) 
Liquidity and 
counterparty risk in 
interbank lending 
3-month LIBOR minus 3-month 
UK government bond rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of England 
Interactive 
Database 
Weighted Sterling 
Crashes 
(CMAXEFFEX) 
Flight from sterling 
towards foreign 
currencies 
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 
𝑥𝑡=Sterling trade-weighted 
effective exchange rate  
Datastream, 
Bank of England 
Interactive 
Database 
Covered Interest 
Spread 
(CIPUKUS) 
Limited arbitrage and 
uncertainty in 
government bond 
markets 
(1 + 𝑟𝑡
∗) − (
𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝑡
∗)(1 + 𝑟𝑡) 
𝑟𝑡
∗=US govt 3-month Treasury 
yield 
𝐹𝑡=US to UK 3-month forward 
exchange rate 
𝑆𝑡
∗= US to UK 3-month spot 
exchange rate 
𝑟𝑡= UK govt 3-month Treasury 
yield 
Datastream, 
Bank of England 
Interactive 
Database 
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Table 4.3b Financial Stress Indicator Summary (continued) 
Variable Aspect of 
Financial 
Stress 
represented 
Calculation Data 
AAA-Corporate 
Bond Spread 
(AAACPSPR) 
Risk in corporate 
sector debt markets 
10-year AAA-rated Corporate 
bond yields minus 10-year 
government bond yields 
Datastream 
AA-Corporate 
Bond Spread 
(AACPSPR) 
Risk in corporate 
sector debt markets 
10-year AA-rated Corporate bond 
yields minus 10-year government 
bond yields 
Datastream 
BBB-AAA 
Corporate Bond 
Spread 
(BBB-
AAACPSPR) 
Risk in corporate 
sector debt markets 
10-year BBB-rated Corporate 
bond yields minus 10-year AAA-
rated corporate bond yields 
Datastream 
BBB Corporate 
Bond Spread 
(BBBCPSPR) 
Risk in corporate 
sector debt markets 
10-year BBB-rated Corporate 
bond yields minus 10-year 
government bond yields 
Datastream 
Yield Curve 
Spread 
(YLDCURVE10-
3) 
Long-term 
uncertainty and cost 
of short-term 
borrowing. 
10-year government bond yield 
minus 3-month government bond 
yield 
Bank of England 
Interactive 
Database 
Stock Market 
Crash Index 
(CMAX100) 
(CMAXALL) 
Uncertainty in equity 
valuation and 
expectations of future 
bank profitability  
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 
𝑥𝑡=FTSE100 price index 
Datastream 
 
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 
𝑥𝑡=FTSEALLSHARE price index 
Equity Option-
Implied Volatility 
(FTSE100VIX) 
Uncertainty in equity 
valuation and 
fundamentals 
Daily price level of FTSE100 VIX 
index 
Datastream 
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Dummy Variables 
Table 4.4 below summarises the announcement dates and offers a brief summary of the 
nature of the announcement. In general, announcements were included if they offered some 
information to investors about the current and future nature of QE purchases. Many of the 
announcement dates are included even though they turned out to contain no new information, 
they are included because there was still considerable uncertainty as to the course of future QE 
purchases before each of these announcements.  
Table 4.4 Announcement Dates Summary 
Announcement Date(s) Relevance to QE 
08/01/09 Bank of England reduces Bank rate by 0.5 
percentage points to 1.5% 
05/02/09 Bank of England reduces Bank rate by 0.5 
percentage points to 1.0% 
05/03/09, 09/04/09 Bank of England reduces Bank rate by 0.5 
percentage points to 0.5% and announces £75 
billion of gilt purchases. 
07/05/09, 04/06/09, 09/07/09 Bank of England announces further £50 billion 
of gilt purchases. Total at £125 billion 
06/08/09, 10/09/09, 08/10/09 Bank of England announces further £50 billion 
of gilt purchases. Total at £175 billion 
05/11/09, 10/12/09, 07/01/10, 04/02/10, 
04/03/10, 08/04/10, 10/05/10, 10/06/10, 
08/07/10, 05/08/10, 09/09/10, 07/10/10, 
04/11/10, 09/12/10, 13/01/11, 10/02/11, 
10/03/11, 07/04/11, 05/05/11, 09/06/11, 
07/07/11, 04/06/11, 08/09/11 
 
Bank of England announces further £25 billion 
of gilt purchases. Total at £200 billion 
06/10/11, 10/11/11, 08/12/11, 12/01/12 Bank of England announces further £75 billion 
of gilt purchases. Total at £275 billion 
09/02/12, 08/03/12, 05/04/12, 10/05/12, 
07/06/12 
Bank of England announces further £50 billion 
of gilt purchases. Total at £325 billion 
05/07/12, 02/08/12, 06/09/12, 04/10/12, 
08/11/12, 06/12/12, 10/01/13, 07/02/13, 
07/03/13, 04/04/13, 09/05/13, 06/06/13, 
04/07/13, 01/08/13, 05/09/13, 10/10/13, 
07/11/13, 05/12/13, 09/01/14, 06/02/14, 
06/03/14, 10/04/14, 08/05/14, 05/06/14, 
10/07/14, 07/08/14, 04/09/14, 06/11/14, 
04/12/14, 08/01/15, 05/02/15, 05/03/15, 
09/04/15, 11/05/15, 04/06/15, 09/07/15, 
06/08/15, 10/09/15, 05/11/15, 10/12/15, 
14/01/16, 04/02/16, 17/03/16 
Bank of England announces further £50 billion 
of gilt purchases. Total at £375 billion7 
  
                                               
7 Announcement dates taken from Bank of England news releases database. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Pages/digitalcontent/historicpubs/newsreleases.aspx 
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Summary Statistics  
All of the returns were tested for the presence of unit roots using ADF, PP and DFGLS tests. 
All of the assets were found to be stationary, with a rejection of the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity at the 1% significance level in all cases. As can be seen in the tables’ 4.5-8 below, 
all variables suffer from non-normality in the residuals, with excess kurtosis being most 
significant factor in the Jarque-Bera statistic. This result is to be expected given the nature of 
financial market data and provides evidence for time-varying variance structures. Further 
evidence is provided by tables’ 4.9-11 which show the autocorrelations of each variable up to 
six lags. The respective portmanteau Q-statistic p-values are also included in these tables. The 
significance of the autocorrelations of the equity and government gilt returns provide evidence 
for a conditional variance structure. As table 4.10 shows, corporate bonds seem to exhibit the 
least significant autocorrelations, however these assets exhibited autocorrelations at much 
higher lag orders which are not shown here. Because of this, these corporate bond returns are 
also considered to exhibit a time-varying variance structure. 
 
  
1
0
0
 
Table 4.5a Gilts Summary Statistics 
Gilt (Govt ISIN)  Mean Median  Max.  Min.  Std. 
Dev. 
 Skew.  Kurt. Jarque-
Bera 
 Prob.  Obs. 
GB0002404191 5.30E-05 0.000117 0.057799 -0.030185 0.005669 0.249427 7.562656 3590.991 0 4091 
GB0004893086 6.49E-05 0.000122 0.066164 -0.035012 0.006424 0.23972 7.614404 3587.994 0 4001 
GB0008881541 -6.53E-05 -0.000186 0.017761 -0.013164 0.002854 -0.053698 5.715838 1238.606 0 4024 
GB0008921883 -6.39E-05 -0.000181 0.01161 -0.012145 0.002547 -0.126668 5.42159 856.883 0 3469 
GB0008931148 -6.06E-05 -8.40E-05 0.022743 -0.016368 0.003221 -0.003776 5.653102 1199.858 0 4091 
GB0009997999 -8.35E-06 4.23E-05 0.023283 -0.019572 0.004057 -0.047935 4.514578 392.589 0 4091 
GB0030880693 6.79E-05 0.000167 0.051407 -0.026747 0.00514 0.273734 8.025438 3898.164 0 3661 
GB0031829509 -3.94E-08 -9.93E-05 0.011335 -0.013085 0.002543 -0.153538 5.959343 1131.95 0 3069 
GB0032452392 7.76E-05 0.000195 0.053985 -0.036675 0.006743 -0.010265 5.315299 737.5887 0 3302 
GB0033280339 -5.71E-07 -9.90E-05 0.016046 -0.013457 0.002542 0.023691 6.763037 1785.089 0 3025 
GB00B00NY175 0.000117 0.000245 0.050441 -0.035636 0.006888 -0.00662 5.152973 581.7511 0 3012 
GB00B058DQ55 5.20E-05 6.94E-05 0.023101 -0.019705 0.003745 0.051017 5.457147 700.3061 0 2779 
GB00B06YGN05 0.00015 0.000119 0.058503 -0.039606 0.009024 0.009717 4.765182 355.3817 0 2737 
GB00B128DP45 0.000125 0.000106 0.05512 -0.03674 0.008277 -0.000775 4.788367 332.4856 0 2495 
GB00B0V3WX43 9.70E-06 -9.65E-05 0.019561 -0.014079 0.002718 0.183351 8.444669 3154.081 0 2542 
GB00B16NNR78 9.99E-05 0.000121 0.061799 -0.031324 0.005933 0.541849 10.85968 6326.366 0 2412 
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Table 4.5b Gilt Summary Statistics (continued) 
Gilt (Govt ISIN)  Mean Median  Max.  Min.  Std. 
Dev. 
 Skew.  Kurt. Jarque-
Bera 
 Prob.  Obs. 
GB00B1VWPC84 4.21E-05 0 0.022427 -0.018982 0.003258 0.118099 7.800721 2148.552 0 2232 
GB00B1VWPJ53 0.000151 0.000179 0.052285 -0.03463 0.007954 -0.016619 4.736666 279.5859 0 2224 
GB00B24FF097 0.000145 0.000183 0.063122 -0.032975 0.006468 0.435032 9.774603 4159.826 0 2140 
GB00B29WRG55 2.38E-07 -9.97E-05 0.011535 -0.011565 0.001831 0.029005 10.58335 3040.867 0 1269 
GB00B39R3F84 5.93E-05 6.79E-05 0.023795 -0.019531 0.003487 0.24401 8.014713 2001.225 0 1892 
GB00B39R3707 0.000198 0.000177 0.05561 -0.036972 0.009157 0.001299 4.529177 185.8044 0 1907 
GB00B3KJDQ49 7.98E-05 0.000139 0.02513 -0.023146 0.00429 0.046439 5.427105 439.0186 0 1786 
GB00B3KJDS62 0.000162 0.000233 0.049784 -0.035489 0.007514 0.136015 5.165038 353.3348 0 1781 
GB00B3KJDW09 -1.68E-06 -4.98E-05 0.008073 -0.010513 0.001421 -0.30968 9.312387 2112.066 0 1260 
GB00B4LFZR36 4.48E-06 -5.00E-05 0.007128 -0.005976 0.001286 0.138387 6.27476 594.9363 0 1322 
GB00B4YRFP41 6.18E-05 8.77E-05 0.016406 -0.013782 0.003114 -0.01177 4.744549 214.983 0 1695 
GB00B54QLM75 0.000276 0.00027 0.031795 -0.039555 0.009621 -0.022088 3.744235 37.40317 0 1615 
GB00B52WS153 0.000188 0.00027 0.02436 -0.023893 0.006401 0.007269 3.642228 29.31661 0 1705 
GILTS_5_15_YEAR_INDEX 4.29E-05 0.000168 0.025964 -0.033701 0.003766 -0.599255 9.764879 8045.635 0 4091 
GILTS_ALL_STOCKS_INDEX 3.29E-05 0.000133 0.027146 -0.020589 0.003819 -0.277012 5.76487 1355.391 0 4091 
UK_GILTS_INDEX_OVER_15_
Y 
8.74E-05 0.000188 0.056778 -0.032824 0.006689 0.00346 6.070093 1606.658 0 4091 
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Table 4.6 Corporate Bond Summary Statistics 
Corporate Bond  Mean Median  Max.  Min.  Std. 
Dev. 
 Skew.  Kurt. Jarque-
Bera 
 Prob.  Obs. 
CB_BARCLAYS_STERLING -4.36E-05 0.000522 0.014389 -0.017061 0.003385 -0.563462 5.175908 618.9672 0 2474 
CB_BENTLEY_INVESTMENT 0.000169 0.000546 0.02709 -0.033281 0.005003 -0.716583 7.445053 2570.235 0 2828 
CB_BLOOMBERG10PLUS 0.000314 0.000391 0.018613 -0.01955 0.004959 -0.147722 3.748294 42.20492 0 1565 
CB_BLOOMBERG110 0.000221 0.000203 0.007642 -0.009239 0.001939 -0.24613 4.037235 85.95605 0 1565 
CB_BLOOMBERG13 0.000111 0.000108 0.002747 -0.003063 0.000591 -0.307051 4.983623 281.1707 0 1565 
CB_BLOOMBERG510 0.000276 0.000223 0.010975 -0.013269 0.002776 -0.254287 3.970064 78.22861 0 1565 
CB_BLOOMBERG_EUROPEAN 0.000155 0.000166 0.003744 -0.004788 0.001009 -0.326877 4.374936 151.1428 0 1565 
CB_BLOOMBERG_HIGH_YIEL
D 
0.000369 0.000532 0.016552 -0.023374 0.00259 -1.363377 14.51639 9133.235 0 1565 
CB_BLOOMBERG_INVESTME
NT 
0.000273 0.000312 0.013121 -0.014813 0.003559 -0.174975 3.780993 47.75959 0 1565 
CB_ISHARES_CORE_CORPOR
A 
-7.62E-06 0.000287 0.077156 -0.075115 0.005085 -0.350503 42.56613 197181.7 0 3022 
CB_JPMORGAN_FUND_ 0.000119 0.000167 0.028896 -0.017507 0.003277 -0.094947 5.949662 1313.397 0 3608 
CB_SPDR_BARCLAYS_CAPIT
AL 
0.000233 0.000283 0.040378 -0.038994 0.003281 -0.232565 14.78374 23706.12 0 4091 
 
Table 4.7 Equities Summary Statistics 
Equity  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. 
Dev. 
 Skew.  Kurt.  Jarque-
Bera 
 Prob.  Obs. 
FTSE100 -2.21E-05 0.000337 0.093843 -0.092656 0.01233 -0.149836 8.911069 5971.248 0 4091 
FTSE250 0.000229 0.000843 0.074621 -0.067348 0.010732 -0.333561 6.862563 2618.998 0 4091 
FTSE350 1.26E-05 0.000477 0.089529 -0.088193 0.011897 -0.187793 8.773777 5706.531 0 4091 
FTSEALLSHARE 1.49E-05 0.000476 0.088107 -0.087099 0.011706 -0.204955 8.814981 5792.519 0 4091 
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Table 4.8 Stress Indicator Summary Statistics 
Stress Indicator  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. 
Dev. 
 Skew.  Kurt.  Jarque-
Bera 
 Prob.  Obs. 
AAACORPSPREAD 0.5238 0.4620 1.6430 0.0960 0.2241 1.8266 7.4399 5002.9500 0 3632 
AACORPSPREAD 1.0577 0.8190 2.6940 0.2480 0.5224 0.7668 2.3550 418.8440 0 3632 
BBB_AAACORPSPREAD 1.3424 1.2810 3.5440 0.5260 0.5088 0.9966 4.3545 878.8581 0 3632 
BBBCORPSPREAD 1.8662 1.7420 4.5360 0.8650 0.6670 0.9723 3.7275 652.3845 0 3632 
BANKBDYIELDSPREAD 0.2468 0.2618 0.6904 -0.1689 0.1340 -0.0705 2.7711 10.9372 0.004217 3632 
BETAFTAS 1.2740 1.2231 2.1631 0.6240 0.3253 0.7433 3.3107 349.0880 0 3632 
CMAX100 0.9039 0.9139 1.0000 0.6280 0.0664 -0.8586 3.7993 542.9556 0 3632 
CMAXALL 0.8965 0.9054 1.0000 0.6217 0.0700 -0.7155 3.3883 332.7162 0 3632 
LCMAXEFFEX -0.0444 -0.0292 0.0000 -0.2857 0.0479 -2.0515 7.5645 5700.5680 0 3632 
FTSE_100VIX 19.9275 17.3030 75.5400 9.0990 9.0294 1.8855 7.8328 5686.5390 0 3632 
DCIPUKUS 0.0000 0.0001 0.0319 -0.0243 0.0037 0.0482 9.4904 6376.2720 0 3632 
LIBORBANK3 0.2590 0.1700 2.5613 -0.1595 0.3000 1.8165 7.1899 4653.9860 0 3632 
LIBOR3GOVT -0.8943 -0.9799 2.1030 -3.6356 1.2797 0.0262 2.2242 91.4922 0 3632 
LIBORTBILLSPREAD 0.2661 0.1464 2.2533 -0.0475 0.3270 3.0433 13.9581 23778.7300 0 3632 
DUKGOVTBUSGOVTB -0.0001 0.0000 0.5170 -0.3160 0.0551 0.1383 7.1505 2618.5750 0 3632 
DYIELDCURVE103 0.0000 -0.0010 0.5480 -0.3360 0.0530 0.4402 8.3427 4437.0370 0 3632            
VEFSISHORT 0.0357 -0.0824 2.0851 -0.8612 0.4945 1.5880 5.8410 2747.9880 0 3632 
PCFSISHORT 0.0625 -0.1399 3.0761 -1.1214 0.8452 0.9930 3.7030 671.7059 0 3632 
CDFFSISHORT 0.5002 0.4841 0.8510 0.1526 0.1390 0.2857 2.6139 71.9833 0 3632 
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Table 4.9a Gilt Autocorrelation Table 
Gilt  
(Govt ISIN) 
AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) AC(6) Q-Stat(1) Q-Stat(2) Q-Stat(3) Q-Stat(4) Q-Stat(5) Q-Stat(6) 
GB0002404191 0.044 -0.048 -0.044 0.015 -0.017 -0.031 7.892 17.363 25.43 26.303 27.538 31.509 
GB0004893086 0.051 -0.055 -0.04 0.015 -0.017 -0.024 10.372 22.506 28.964 29.84 30.984 33.313 
GB0008881541 0.046 -0.005 -0.036 0.019 -0.029 -0.035 8.3628 8.4516 13.752 15.236 18.738 23.567 
GB0008921883 0.043 0.006 -0.045 0.014 -0.03 -0.031 6.2959 6.4319 13.453 14.173 17.282 20.549 
GB0008931148 0.047 -0.02 -0.034 0.017 -0.026 -0.04 8.9167 10.52 15.313 16.484 19.349 25.749 
GB0009997999 0.031 -0.028 -0.041 0.012 -0.024 -0.032 3.9027 7.1199 14.036 14.635 17.02 21.093 
GB0030880693 -0.034 0.046 0.036 -0.02 0.017 0.022 4.1672 11.951 16.611 18.03 19.06 20.908 
GB0031829509 0.02 0.008 -0.024 0.031 -0.018 -0.038 1.2334 1.4476 3.1825 6.1834 7.1364 11.663 
GB0032452392 0.024 -0.058 -0.052 0.025 -0.006 -0.021 1.9568 13.082 22.03 24.105 24.234 25.737 
GB0033280339 0.043 -0.033 0.008 0.03 -0.025 -0.017 5.4759 8.6846 8.8843 11.531 13.433 14.298 
GB00B00NY175 0.04 -0.071 -0.063 0.029 -0.012 -0.019 4.9 19.929 32.03 34.564 34.969 36.048 
GB00B058DQ55 0.04 -0.037 -0.022 0.034 -0.022 -0.016 4.4803 8.3228 9.7157 12.898 14.203 14.913 
GB00B06YGN05 0.034 -0.08 -0.066 0.026 -0.018 -0.021 3.186 20.945 33.057 34.952 35.866 37.056 
GB00B128DP45 0.03 -0.069 -0.059 0.022 -0.02 -0.024 2.2462 14.231 22.989 24.244 25.243 26.702 
GB00B0V3WX43 0.05 -0.017 0.007 0.045 -0.024 -0.036 6.3391 7.0745 7.1849 12.251 13.663 17.036 
Notes. Q-stats were all found to be significant to at least the 5% level 
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Table 4.9b Gilt Autocorrelation Table (continued) 
Gilt 
(Govt ISIN) 
AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) AC(6) Q-Stat(1) Q-Stat(2) Q-Stat(3) Q-Stat(4) Q-Stat(5) Q-Stat(6) 
GB00B16NNR78 0.054 -0.067 -0.029 0.039 -0.013 -0.028 7.0018 17.928 19.926 23.628 24.053 25.961 
GB00B1VWPC84 0.053 -0.035 -0.007 0.041 -0.028 -0.042 6.3072 9.069 9.1673 12.969 14.786 18.827 
GB00B1VWPJ53 0.032 -0.073 -0.057 0.028 -0.018 -0.025 2.3331 14.18 21.311 23 23.711 25.105 
GB00B24FF097 0.062 -0.082 -0.031 0.043 -0.008 -0.033 8.277 22.573 24.697 28.649 28.804 31.186 
GB00B29WRG55 0.091 0.009 -0.007 0.005 -0.044 -0.053 10.45 10.558 10.613 10.646 13.095 16.736 
GB00B39R3F84 0.075 -0.066 0.011 0.048 -0.037 -0.061 10.553 18.813 19.034 23.476 26.123 33.21 
GB00B39R3707 0.046 -0.094 -0.05 0.035 -0.02 -0.032 3.9664 20.713 25.589 27.977 28.754 30.711 
GB00B3KJDQ49 0.011 -0.076 -0.022 0.027 -0.035 -0.019 0.645 0.005 0.009 0.012 0.01 0.016 
GB00B3KJDS62 0.02 -0.121 -0.043 0.039 -0.022 -0.021 0.6854 26.68 29.932 32.663 33.541 34.305 
GB00B3KJDW09 -0.023 -0.031 0.069 0.038 -0.091 -0.018 0.6969 1.914 7.8882 9.7265 20.172 20.58 
GB00B4LFZR36 0.031 -0.045 0.007 0.066 -0.08 -0.002 1.2336 3.9785 4.0429 9.7853 18.338 18.345 
GB00B4YRFP41 0.007 -0.06 -0.015 0.037 -0.043 0.016 0.0742 6.2552 6.6267 9.0063 12.172 12.585 
GB00B54QLM75 0.02 -0.099 -0.047 0.021 -0.027 -0.009 0.6209 16.479 20.066 20.787 22.005 22.145 
GB00B52WS153 0.019 -0.081 -0.03 0.023 -0.016 0.013 0.6442 11.928 13.494 14.397 14.85 15.161 
GILTS_5_15_ 
YEAR_INDEX 
-0.035 -0.069 0.004 0.004 -0.025 -0.017 4.9887 24.713 24.787 24.838 27.334 28.482 
GILTS_ALL_ 
STOCKS_INDEX 
0.01 -0.07 -0.042 0.019 -0.01 -0.025 0.3839 20.193 27.322 28.755 29.178 31.662 
UK_GILTS_INDEX 
_OVER_15_Y 
0.033 -0.079 -0.053 0.019 -0.006 -0.025 4.5185 30.13 41.684 43.175 43.34 45.997 
Notes. Q-stats were all found to be significant to at least the 5% level 
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Table 4.10 Corporate Bond Autocorrelation Table 
Corporate Bond AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) AC(6) Q-
Stat(1) 
Q-
Stat(2) 
Q-
Stat(3) 
Q-
Stat(4) 
Q-
Stat(5) 
Q-
Stat(6) 
CB_BARCLAYS 
_STERLING 
-0.012 -0.015 0.007 0.033 -0.015 -0.001 
0.3598 0.8961 1.0034 3.6814 4.2546 4.2566 
CB_BENTLEY 
_INVESTMENT 
0.147 -0.016 0 0.024 0.035 -0.034 
61.591 62.357 62.357 63.956 67.491 70.675 
CB_BLOOMBERG10PLUS 0.007 -0.073 -0.006 0.014 -0.027 0.025 0.0829 8.3752 8.4385 8.7395 9.8657 10.884 
CB_BLOOMBERG110 0.011 -0.021 0.03 0.012 -0.037 0.024 0.1766 0.8781 2.263 2.4931 4.6035 5.5012 
CB_BLOOMBERG13 -0.011 -0.039 0.036 0.045 -0.012 -0.012 0.1975 2.582 4.6567 7.8871 8.1057 8.3304 
CB_BLOOMBERG510 0.012 -0.028 0.031 0.008 -0.04 0.031 0.2364 1.5084 2.9895 3.0834 5.5762 7.0989 
CB_BLOOMBERG 
_EUROPEAN 
0.012 -0.006 0.033 0.024 -0.041 0.005 
0.2246 0.2875 1.9861 2.9219 5.5532 5.6004 
CB_BLOOMBERG 
_HIGH_YIELD 
0.385 0.295 0.128 0.088 0.107 0.106 
232.87 369.56 395.18 407.25 425.2 442.95 
CB_BLOOMBERG 
_INVESTMENT 
-0.001 -0.066 0.002 0.013 -0.03 0.026 
0.0023 6.7387 6.7431 7.0055 8.3831 9.4511 
CB_ISHARES_CORE 
_CORPORA 
-0.137 0.047 0 0.042 -0.016 0.02 
57.134 63.755 63.755 68.972 69.775 70.977 
CB_JPMORGAN_FUND_ -0.017 -0.021 0.033 -0.001 0.009 0.016 1.0734 2.6505 6.6737 6.6812 6.9722 7.8445 
CB_SPDR_BARCLAYS 
_CAPITAL 
0.021 -0.01 -0.007 0.048 0.007 0.022 
1.7695 2.2183 2.4279 11.973 12.147 14.194 
Notes. Q-stats were all found to be significant to at least the 5% level 
 
Table 4.11 Equity Autocorrelation Table 
 
Equity AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) AC(6) Q-
Stat(1) 
Q-
Stat(2) 
Q-
Stat(3) 
Q-
Stat(4) 
Q-
Stat(5) 
Q-
Stat(6) 
FTSE100 -0.048 -0.047 -0.057 0.052 -0.046 -0.035 9.3507 18.586 31.835 42.998 51.806 56.754 
FTSE250 0.094 0.006 -0.013 0.021 -0.014 -0.032 35.982 36.13 36.821 38.56 39.413 43.627 
FTSE350 -0.033 -0.043 -0.053 0.049 -0.045 -0.036 4.3563 11.809 23.164 32.964 41.118 46.295 
FTSEALLSHARE -0.028 -0.041 -0.052 0.049 -0.044 -0.035 3.2905 10.107 21.007 31.014 38.856 43.982 
Notes. Q-stats were all found to be significant to at least the 5% level 
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4.4 Results 
Using either the GARCH model described above or the one described in Section 3.1, this 
chapter estimates the conditional variance for a selection of gilts, bonds and equities over the 
period between 2000 and 2016. The results of these models are outlined in the tables below, 
with gilts, bonds and equities given their own tables for easy comparison. This chapter will now 
discuss the results of each asset type individually before comparing the results between them. 
4.4.1 Univariate Results 
Mean Equation 
The estimated coefficients for the mean equation are summarised below in tables 4.12, 
4.13 and 4.14 where either *, **, *** demonstrate that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively. For example, the value in row five, column twelve denotes the 
coefficient of the effect of the financial crisis dummy on the log daily return of Gilt 
GB0031829509, which was found to be significant at the 5% level. In this case the 
interpretation is that over the period between the collapse of Northern Rock and the start of QE, 
this gilt’s returns were higher than that found over the rest of the sample. In general, we can see 
that the QE announcements did not cause significant price reactions from the gilts over the 
entire sample period, with only one gilt showing a response significant at the 5% level. The 
strongest effect on the gilts and gilt indexes come from the dummy variable for auction days 
and likewise for the day after auction days. Most of the 32 assets examined showed significant 
return responses to auction days at the 5% level, with the vast majority of the responses being 
positive. In addition, QE1 and QE3 show several significant results, with the effects being 
negative on gilt returns. These results are largely in line with the results found by Steeley and 
Matyushkin (2015) and other results in the literature, where insignificant announcement effects 
and positive auctions effects are found. Steeley & Matyushkin (2015) find QE1 caused negative 
return effects, however their results are different in that they find more of the gilts to be 
significantly affected and also find QE3 to have insignificant (but similarly negative) effects. 
The insignificant announcement effects can somewhat be explained by fact that many of the 
announcements for which the dummy is valued 1 are convey relatively little new information, 
as can be seen by Table 4.4 in section 4.3 where many of the announcements are simply 
statements by the MPC that QE will continue in the same manner as previous announcements. 
Omitting these announcements from the dummy variable improves the significance of the 
coefficient, however not be enough to offer any different conclusions.  
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It seems that for most of the gilts there are no significant day-of-the-week effects, apart 
from in the cases of the gilt indexes, which exhibit significantly different returns on Thursdays 
and Fridays in comparison to Mondays. The Financial crisis variable is the final variable with 
a significant effect, albeit for only 8 of the gilts. In all of these cases, the financial crisis period 
caused daily returns to be higher, which is conducive with periods of high financial uncertainty. 
Corporate Bonds 
For corporate bonds the results are comparable but far less uniform. For example, QE 
announcements did not cause any kind of response for corporate bond returns except for in one 
case, and QE auctions appear to have caused higher returns in a manner similar to UK gilts. 
The coefficients for the auction variable seem to be smaller and less significant for corporate 
bonds. These results provide evidence that either the QE macro-news or portfolio-balance 
channels were in effect, where investors who purchased corporate bond indexes either took 
macroeconomic information from the situation in gilt markets when choosing their corporate 
bond portfolios, or that the changing quantity of available gilts caused investors to re-adjust 
their portfolios towards corporate bonds. The QE period dummies show insignificant results 
for the majority of the corporate bond indexes, with only two showing results significant to the 
5% level. These effects are positive, unlike the results for the gilt returns, and seem to be limited 
to the high yield corporate bonds as captured by the Bloomberg high yield index. Taken 
together, the positive auction results suggest that QE did have positive influence on corporate 
bond prices, however this effect appears to be short term in nature, with the overall period 
dummies showing mean prices were insignificantly different from the rest of the sample. 
In terms of the other results, it is apparent that corporate bond indexes exhibit day-of-
the-week effects like the UK gilt indexes, but there does not seem to be any interpretable pattern 
to these effects for the mean equation. Finally, the financial crisis variable was not included for 
many of the models given the sample restrictions, however it seems to have not caused any 
significant effects apart from in the case of the JPMorgan ETF and Bentley index, both having 
significant and negative returns during that period when compared to the rest of the sample. 
Equities 
Unlike corporate bonds and gilts, FTSE returns exhibit no significant reaction to any of the 
announcements or QE auction days. Although insignificant in size, it seems that returns were 
higher after QE announcements, whereas they were lower when the auctions occurred. This 
suggests that the portfolio balance and macro-news channels were not significant causes for 
equity prices over the short term. This result mirrors the event-study findings of Joyce et al. 
(2011) where they find equity returns were demonstrated little reaction to MPC announcements. 
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The other results suggest a significant day-of-the-week effect for the more prominent of the 
FTSE indexes, and the expected negative and significant effect of the financial crisis on equity 
returns. The QE1 period shows a significant positive effect on two of the four equity indexes, 
specifically the FTSE350 and ALLSHARE, which may suggest that equities related to smaller 
businesses were more strongly affected by QE, similar to the case of the high yield corporate 
bonds. Despite this, equities appear to be the least affected asset type by QE, with none of the 
QE events having a significant impact and only one of the three QE periods exhibiting higher 
returns. 
In summary of the conditional mean results, the strongest responses to QE come from the 
UK gilts, while the weakest are from the various FTSE indexes. This result is logical given that 
all of the UK gilts included in this analysis were directly intervened with at one point of the QE 
purchases, and largely reflects the findings in the rest of the literature. The failure of QE to 
illicit any significant price response from equities is of concern when judging the efficacy of 
the portfolio balance channel, especially when auctions caused large price increases for UK 
gilts. The suggestion by portfolio balance channel theory would be that falling gilt yields/rising 
gilt prices would cause or at least coincide with increasing equity prices (Joyce et al. 2011). 
According to the results shown below, if anything the reverse of this is actually the case, with 
QE auction days coinciding with small negative price reactions. The expected relationship can 
be observed for corporate bonds in most cases, with the indexes that contain the shortest-term 
bonds having the smallest price reactions. This result is again logical given that it can be 
expected that investors might trade out UK gilts for corporate bonds of a similar term, and that 
UK gilts of less than three years were not purchased at all by the Bank of England.  
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Table 4.12a Gilt Mean Equation 
Gilt (Govt ISIN) ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 TUES WED THURS FRI Fin Crisis QE1 QE2 QE3 
GB00B29WRG55  -0.1500 0.4900 -0.0599 0.0808 0.1850 -0.2840 0.1760 0.2300 0.1290 -0.0643 0.3920 -0.0218 -0.0692 -0.0951 
GB0008921883  -0.1590 0.5370 -0.3890 -0.0054 0.3050 -0.0990 -0.0806 0.0223 -0.0991 0.0596 0.2900 -0.1720 -0.2400 -0.3190 
GB00B3KJDW09  0.1280 -0.0148 -0.2100 0.0340 0.3090 -0.3740 -0.0079 -0.0576 0.1620 0.0689 
 
-0.0557 -0.0255 -0.1070 
GB0031829509  0.0761 0.1960 -0.3080* -0.0815 0.1710 0.0020 0.0558 -0.1220 -0.0167 0.1870 0.4360** -0.2750 -0.0649 -0.2570 
GB00B4LFZR36  0.0171 -0.1040 -0.0749 0.0982 0.0741 -0.0888 -0.0741 -0.0274 0.0831 -0.0881 
 
0.0686 -0.0289 -0.1510 
GB0033280339  0.1290 0.0977 -0.0471 -0.1600 0.3410* -0.3510* -0.0005 -0.1390 -0.0062 0.0271 0.4760** -0.1070 0.2030 0.0133 
GB0008881541  0.0344 0.5570 -0.0947 0.0734 0.3830 -0.3280 -0.1390 -0.0618 -0.1540 -0.0133 0.3910 -0.3000 -0.0775 -0.2830 
GB00B0V3WX43  -0.0285 0.1530 -0.0384 -0.0388 0.4610** -0.4110* -0.0393 -0.0664 -0.0928 -0.0785 0.4960** -0.2420 0.0663 -0.0117 
GB0008931148  0.0068 0.2090 -0.2210 0.0300 0.8690*** -0.3900 -0.1280 -0.0319 -0.0576 0.0956 0.4110* -0.4650 -0.0914 -0.4860 
GB00B1VWPC84  0.0169 0.0691 -0.0482 0.0494 0.7480*** -0.3140 -0.1160 -0.2300 -0.0357 -0.0556 0.4370 -0.4920 -0.1520 -0.2680 
GB00B39R3F84  -0.3010 0.0229 0.0232 0.1060 0.7670*** -0.1840 -0.1960 -0.2330 0.0182 -0.0016 
 
-0.4470 -0.1760 -0.5440 
GB00B4YRFP41  -0.3550 -0.1530 -0.1990 0.2680 0.6230* 0.0462 -0.2580 -0.3380 0.0439 0.0621 
 
-0.5340 -0.2600 -0.6800* 
GB00B058DQ55  -0.4420 -0.0334 -0.0632 0.1950 0.9350*** -0.1800 -0.1600 -0.2160 0.0254 0.0435 0.2590 -0.5500 -0.2400 -0.7190 
GB0009997999  -0.4730 0.0287 -0.2180 0.1470 1.1390*** -0.2300 -0.1400 -0.1700 -0.0682 0.1880 0.2530 -0.6200* -0.3190 -0.8160* 
GB00B3KJDQ49  -0.4930 -0.3150 -0.3430 0.1040 1.4310*** -0.1060 -0.2600 -0.4740 0.0971 0.3390 
 
-0.7520* -0.5170 -1.0250** 
GB0030880693  -0.7250 0.0166 -0.1680 0.6300 1.3400*** -0.3170 -0.2620 -0.3030 -0.0907 0.2920 0.0912 -0.8560* -0.6920 -1.2720** 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Table 4.12b Gilt Mean Equation (continued) 
Gilt (Govt ISIN) ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 TUES WED THURS FRI Fin Crisis QE1 QE2 QE3 
GB00B16NNR78  -0.3450 -0.1190 0.0307 0.7110 1.8950*** -0.6230 -0.5420 -0.4860 0.0008 0.3120 0.2730 -1.1090** -0.9530 -1.2590* 
GB0002404191  -0.6600 0.0167 -0.2020 0.7380 1.6250*** -0.3230 -0.2480 -0.2660 -0.0604 0.4620* 0.0825 -0.9130* -0.8660 -1.5290** 
GB00B24FF097  -0.2980 -0.8180 -0.2140 0.6630 1.9650*** -0.5680 -0.4240 -0.6600 0.5260 0.6260 0.0713 -1.0290* -1.0330 -1.5440* 
GB0004893086  -0.7310 -0.1840 -0.1460 0.7940 1.8970*** -0.5490 -0.2470 -0.2110 0.0844 0.6730** -0.0064 -0.9750 -0.9720 -1.5550* 
GB00B52WS153  -0.2670 -1.2350 -0.7290 0.4750 2.0460*** -0.2680 -0.5870 -0.9990* 0.5440 0.8730 
 
-0.9720 -1.1430 -1.7420** 
GB0032452392  -0.4310 -0.5490 -0.2310 0.7800 2.2380*** -0.8270 -0.0455 -0.4350 0.3550 0.7910** -0.0592 -0.9990* -1.0780 -1.6680** 
GB00B00NY175  -0.5130 -0.7170 -0.1910 0.8550 2.0640*** -0.8390 -0.2240 -0.6050 0.2160 0.5200 -0.0594 -0.9580 -1.0720 -1.5710 
GB00B3KJDS62  -0.4710 -1.3380 -0.5640 0.4910 2.2560*** -0.8530 -0.5110 -0.9210 0.6310 1.0360* 
 
-0.8450 -0.9140 -1.5020* 
GB00B1VWPJ53  -0.4980 -1.2880 -0.4790 0.9130 2.4740*** -0.9210 -0.5030 -0.9100 0.6700 0.9050* -0.2590 -1.1980** -1.3780* -2.0060** 
GB00B128DP45  -0.4240 -0.7060 -0.1970 1.0860 2.4170*** -0.9290 -0.4860 -0.8640 0.3190 0.8570* -0.0872 -1.0750* -1.3200 -1.9300** 
GB00B39R3707  -0.5670 -1.6530* -0.3480 1.0550 2.4990*** -1.0920 -0.5600 -0.8880 0.8360 1.0560 
 
-1.0490 -1.2700 -1.9290 
GB00B06YGN05  -0.7720 -0.7180 -0.2490 1.1640 2.3710*** -1.1010 -0.2400 -0.6500 0.3370 0.8340 -0.1100 -1.0060 -1.2970 -1.8080* 
GB00B54QLM75  -1.1510 -2.6340** -1.0240 0.0487 2.9210*** 0.3530 -0.3990 -1.0000 1.2210 1.7630** 
 
-0.9410 -1.8500 -2.3880* 
GILTS_5_15 
_YEAR_INDEX -0.2890 0.5910 -0.1460 0.5210 0.9910*** -0.1200 -0.2610 -0.2140 -0.5150*** 0.4530** 0.2990 -0.7030** -0.5610 -0.9710** 
GILTS_ALL 
_STOCKS_INDEX -0.2810 0.3890 -0.2650 0.7810** 1.0340*** -0.1190 -0.2670 -0.2400 -0.3970** 0.4580*** 0.1780 -0.7140** -0.7620* -1.2280*** 
UK_GILTS_INDEX 
_OVER_15_Y -0.6100 0.3310 -0.0173 1.3920** 1.8730*** -0.6830 -0.3270 -0.2840 -0.3660 0.7980*** 0.0408 -1.0840* -1.2280 -1.7740* 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Table 4.13 Corporate Bond Mean Equation 
Corporate Bond ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 TUES WED THURS FRI Fin Crisis QE1 QE2 QE3 
SPDR Barclays Capital 
 Sterling Corporate Bond ETF  -0.5760 0.1310 0.0012 0.5360* 0.7170** -0.0229 -0.5170*** -0.4040*** -0.2940* 0.0007 -0.3410 0.3520 -0.2150 -0.2280 
Barclays Sterling  
Corporate Bond Fund  -0.1330 -0.3160 0.2160 -0.2690 0.8480** -0.0743 0.3230 0.0448 0.0296 0.1620 -0.3530 0.4370 -0.0603 0.2360 
iShares Core GBP  
Corporate Bond UCITS ETF  0.3760 -0.2140 -0.5360 0.5950 1.0580** -0.0646 -0.1470 -0.9850*** 0.2660 0.5730** -0.2580 0.1420 -0.5490 -0.5020 
CF Bentley Investment Funds  -0.0265 -0.2030 0.1990 -0.2610 0.7420 -1.1810** 0.1560 -0.2140 0.3360 0.1960 -0.9680** 0.9950* 0.6500 0.3150 
JPMorgan Fund ICVC   -0.2320 0.1560 0.4130 -0.5100* 0.9730*** -0.1680 -0.2370 -0.0473 -0.2870* 0.1900 -0.4390** 0.4240 0.1220 0.2780 
Bloomberg GBP  
High Yield Corporate 
 Bond Index  -0.0704 0.5650*** -0.1580 -0.1730 0.1670 -0.0722 -0.3700*** -0.3560*** -0.3320*** -0.1480   0.9630** 0.9280*** 
Bloomberg GBP  
Investment Grade 
 Corporate Bond Index  -0.5670 -0.4250 -0.0278 0.1210 1.1110*** 0.1210 -0.5900** -0.7360** -0.2410 0.0376   -0.2920 -0.4260 
Bloomberg GBP 
 Investment Grade  
European Corporate Bond 
 Index 1 to 5 Year -0.1170 0.0311 0.0040 0.0270 0.0930 -0.0020 -0.4070*** -0.4670*** -0.3150*** -0.2630***   0.1290 0.0804 
Bloomberg Investment  
Grade Corporate  
10+ Bond Index -0.7200 -0.6930 -0.0371 -0.0186 1.7050*** 0.0506 -0.6510* -0.8790** -0.1880 0.2150   -0.6550 -0.6620 
Bloomberg Investment 
 Grade Corporate  
5-10 years Bond Index -0.5470 -0.1110 -0.0496 -0.0757 0.7940** 0.0378 -0.5810*** -0.6670*** -0.4180* -0.1180   -0.0718 -0.0642 
Bloomberg Investment 
 Grade Corporate  
1-10 years Bond Index -0.3680 -0.0287 -0.0087 -0.0342 0.4880** 0.0133 -0.5000*** -0.5680*** -0.3730** -0.1830   0.0390 0.0104 
Bloomberg Investment 
 Grade Corporate  
1-3 years Bond Index -0.0447 0.0043 0.0213 0.0158 -0.0143 -0.0185 -0.3020*** -0.3980*** -0.2660*** -0.2470***   0.1470** 0.0847 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Table 4.14 Equity Mean Equation 
Equity ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 TUES WED THURS FRI Fin Crisis QE1 QE2 QE3 
FTSE100 
0.2440 1.2540 -0.6780 -0.5790 -0.9530 -1.2010 0.0407 -0.6890 -0.3780 0.3000 -0.9720 1.8710* 1.7180* 0.4870 
FTSE250 
0.2810 1.6980 -0.6870 -0.3780 -1.7210* -0.8400 0.0110 0.1010 0.3830 1.5560*** -1.4620 1.6610 2.1340 1.6330 
FTSE350 
-0.0978 1.2180 -0.9100 -0.9670 -0.7710 -0.9220 0.0345 -0.1770 0.0322 0.7780* -1.0220** 2.1550*** 1.6980* 1.6250* 
FTSEALLSHARE 
-0.0992 1.2160 -0.9120 -0.9590 -0.7710 -0.9180 0.0386 -0.1600 0.0442 0.7950* -1.0410** 2.1470*** 1.6960* 1.6200* 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Table 4.15a Gilt Conditional Variance Terms 
Gilt (Govt ISIN) Constant 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒕−𝟏
𝟐  𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯𝒕−𝟏 Negative News 
GB00B29WRG55  2.98E-
062.98E-06 
0.1499990.149999 0.5999820.599982 
 
GB0008921883  5.77E-
065.77E-06 
0.1499470.149947 0.5998030.599803 
 
GB00B3KJDW09  9.51E-
079.51E-07 
0.1534560.153456 0.6019740.601974 
 
GB0031829509  3.22E-
063.22E-06 
0.1597870.159787 0.6064140.606414 
 
GB00B4LFZR36  6.14E-
086.14E-08 
0.1865520.186552 0.6243130.624313 
 
GB0033280339  3.00E-
063.00E-06 
0.1557590.155759 0.6031770.603177 
 
GB0008881541  2.38E-
062.38E-06 
0.1761850.176185 6.20E-016.20E-01 
 
GB00B0V3WX43  4.91E-
064.91E-06 
0.1763130.176313 0.6130430.613043 
 
GB0008931148  7.06E-06-
1.09E-07 0.1523270.081564 0.6011570.937704 
-0.036004 
GB00B1VWPC84  5.43E-06-
5.96E-07 0.1552870.072577 0.602620.931735 
-0.024447 
GB00B39R3F84  8.33E-06-
6.48E-07 0.2669740.022929 0.6059450.980289 
-0.012792 
GB00B4YRFP41  5.93E-06-
8.76E-07 0.1834110.014117 0.5698721.001226 
 
GB00B058DQ55  4.24E-06-
1.03E-06 0.1280290.019781 0.6689390.984111 
-0.013709 
GB0009997999  1.22E-05-
1.39E-06 0.1136630.024036 0.5798730.979641 
-0.013977 
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GB00B3KJDQ49  6.03E-08-
1.62E-06 0.019640.052623 0.9756551.000362 
-0.013363 
GB0030880693  1.86E-06-
2.02E-06 0.0253750.033243 0.9681860.966048 
-0.013571 
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Table 4.15b Gilt Conditional Variance Terms (continued) 
Gilt (Govt ISIN) Constant 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒕−𝟏
𝟐  𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯𝒕−𝟏 Negative News 
GB00B16NNR78  1.68E-05-
2.49E-06 0.099740.043999 0.769030.930565 
 
GB0002404191  2.57E-07-
3.37E-06 0.0316320.034707 0.9602360.964686 
-0.016626 
GB00B24FF097  1.90E-06-
2.82E-06 0.0419570.055828 0.9429880.920173 
 
GB0004893086  3.51E-06-
3.82E-06 0.0288710.037475 0.9644280.965588 
-0.019331 
GB00B52WS153  1.59E-06-
5.83E-07 0.0280340.011609 0.9629451.001283 
-0.028401 
GB0032452392  3.52E-06-
4.04E-06 0.0279590.033775 0.9649410.970546 
-0.02115 
GB00B00NY175  3.26E-07-
5.53E-06 0.0321020.049848 0.9603150.955842 
-0.032709 
GB00B3KJDS62  8.98E-08-
1.52E-06 0.048340.029467 0.9282350.984091 
-0.030619 
GB00B1VWPJ53  2.21E-06-
2.14E-06 0.0377570.047699 0.9547540.964908 
-0.033866 
GB00B128DP45  2.98E-06-
4.30E-06 0.0422050.054356 0.9501890.95333 
-0.030552 
GB00B39R3707  1.38E-06-
9.61E-07 0.0672840.049235 0.9129960.96093 
-0.035285 
GB00B06YGN05  5.60E-06-
5.49E-06 0.041380.058955 0.9516450.950413 
-0.035167 
GB00B54QLM75  1.11E-06-
1.90E-06 0.0391510.076984 0.9555110.941091 
-0.055263 
GILTS_5_15_YEAR_INDEX 2.71E-06-
2.92E-06 0.0598410.084285 
0.8503760.883997 -0.058158 
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GILTS_ALL_STOCKS_INDEX 7.56E-07-
1.19E-06 0.0100950.035593 0.9860680.979511 
-0.03874 
UK_GILTS_INDEX_OVER_15_Y 4.41E-06-
4.61E-06 0.0312820.045983 0.9563020.966362 
-0.039201 
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Table 4.16 Corporate Bond Conditional Variance Terms 
Corporate Bond Constant 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒕−𝟏
𝟐  𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯𝒕−𝟏 Negative News 
SPDR Barclays Capital 
 Sterling Corporate Bond ETF  
-2.51E-06 0.07664 0.815628 
 
Barclays Sterling  
Corporate Bond Fund  
2.93E-06 0.032396 0.96677 -0.023362 
iShares Core GBP  
Corporate Bond UCITS ETF  
-8.07E-07 0.109922 0.713917 -0.036357 
CF Bentley Investment Funds  5.93E-07 0.136639 0.832507 
 
JPMorgan Fund ICVC   -4.73E-07 0.037327 0.941891 
 
Bloomberg GBP  
High Yield Corporate Bond Index  
-3.33E-07 0.121322 0.881099 
 
Bloomberg GBP  
Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index  
-2.16E-06 0.073088 0.849226 
 
Bloomberg GBP Investment Grade  
European Corporate Bond Index 1 to 5 Year 
-1.10E-07 0.077447 0.769015 
 
Bloomberg Investment Grade  
Corporate 10+ Bond Index 
-4.05E-06 0.068972 0.875831 
 
Bloomberg Investment Grade 
 Corporate 5-10 years Bond Index 
-1.41E-06 0.074004 0.755349 
 
Bloomberg Investment Grade  
Corporate 1-10 years Bond Index 
-6.25E-07 0.072925 0.772931 
 
Bloomberg Investment Grade 
 Corporate 1-3 years Bond Index 
-3.57E-08 0.049814 0.899767 
 
 
Table 4.17 Equity Conditional Variance Terms 
Equity Constant 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒕−𝟏
𝟐  𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯𝒕−𝟏 
FTSE100 2.07E-06 0.112177 0.87052 
FTSE250 1.98E-06 0.116682 0.846246 
FTSE350 1.69E-06 0.11377 0.866255 
FTSEALLSHARE 1.75E-06 0.114524 0.865197 
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Table 4.18a Gilt Variance Equation 
Gilt (Gilt ISIN) ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 TUES WED THURS FRI Fin Crisis QE1 QE2 QE3 
GB00B29WRG55  -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 
GB0008921883  -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0024** -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0025* -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0010 
GB00B3KJDW09  -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 
 
0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003 
GB0031829509  -0.0008*** 0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007** -0.0004 -0.0036*** -0.0039*** -0.0033*** -0.0049*** 0.0017*** 0.0010*** -0.0005 -0.0004 
GB00B4LFZR36  -0.0001* 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0010*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** 
 
0.0010** 0.0001** 0.0001 
GB0033280339  -0.0013*** -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0048*** -0.0037*** -0.0040*** -0.0042*** 0.0036*** 0.0024*** 0.0002 0.0000 
GB0008881541  -0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0031** -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0036** -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0009* -0.0012*** 
GB00B0V3WX43  -0.0008*** 0.0008 -0.0009** -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0053*** -0.0052*** -0.0045*** -0.0052*** 0.0051*** 0.0034*** 0.0003 0.0002 
GB0008931148  -0.0039*** -0.0007 -0.0012** -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0076*** -0.0049*** -0.0047*** -0.0057*** 0.0039*** 0.0032*** 0.0012*** 0.0003 
GB00B1VWPC84  -0.0017*** 0.0011* 0.0004 -0.0014*** -0.0011 0.0009 -0.0059*** -0.0036*** -0.0056*** -0.0047*** 0.0059*** 0.0047*** 0.0021*** 0.0009*** 
GB00B39R3F84  -0.0016*** 0.0008 0.0011* -0.0003 -0.0012 0.0015* 0.0009** 0.0022*** 0.0000 0.0012**   0.0000 0.0000 
GB00B4YRFP41  -0.0021*** 0.0013 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0011 0.0013 0.0006* 0.0016*** 0.0003 0.0000  -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** 
GB00B058DQ55  -0.0025*** 0.0012 0.0015** -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0008 0.0020*** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001 
GB0009997999  -0.0039*** 0.0030* 0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0005 0.0015 0.0017** 0.0032*** 0.0003 0.0017** 0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
GB00B3KJDQ49  -0.0054*** 0.0051** 0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0001 0.0018 0.0014 0.0039*** -0.0005 0.0000*  -0.0003*** -0.0001* -0.0001 
GB0030880693  -0.0085*** 0.0117*** -0.0025 -0.0042 0.0005 0.0035 0.0020 0.0058*** -0.0011 0.0030* 0.0003*** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Table 4.18b Gilt Variance Equation (continued) 
Gilt (Govt ISIN) ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 TUES WED THURS FRI Fin Crisis QE1 QE2 QE3 
GB00B16NNR78  
-0.0124*** 0.0120** 0.0015 -0.0098*** -0.0018 0.0083** -0.0229*** -0.0076** -0.0185*** -0.0145*** 0.0039*** 0.0035** 0.0049*** 0.0028** 
GB0002404191  
-0.0095*** 0.0157*** -0.0047 -0.0055 0.0007 0.0046 0.0042*** 0.0071*** 0.0000 0.0054*** 0.0004*** -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
GB00B24FF097  
-0.0114*** 0.0197*** -0.0064 -0.0048 -0.0025 0.0072 0.0023 0.0090*** -0.0050* 0.0051 0.0007** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
GB0004893086  
-0.0091*** 0.0172** -0.0067 -0.0051 -0.0014 0.0066 0.0038* 0.0083*** -0.0003 0.0066** 0.0004*** -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 
GB00B52WS153  
-0.0160*** 0.0218*** -0.0068 -0.0043 -0.0043 0.0084 0.0004 0.0132*** -0.0096** 0.0059  0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
GB0032452392  
-0.0098*** 0.0170** -0.0049 -0.0073 0.0009 0.0065 0.0033 0.0095*** -0.0018 0.0073** 0.0005** -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 
GB00B00NY175  
-0.0096** 0.0177** -0.0053 -0.0073 0.0001 0.0074 0.0053** 0.0102*** -0.0009 0.0087*** 0.0005** -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 
GB00B3KJDS62  
-0.0164*** 0.0202** -0.0055 -0.0106 -0.0017 0.0124* -0.0015 0.0126** -0.0092** 0.0066  0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 
GB00B1VWPJ53  
-0.0132** 0.0258** -0.0107 -0.0080 -0.0013 0.0095 0.0022 0.0112** -0.0089* 0.0083* 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 
GB00B128DP45  
-0.0073 0.0221* -0.0106 -0.0130 0.0024 0.0114 0.0034 0.0056 -0.0012 0.0086* 0.0005* -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005 
GB00B39R3707  
-0.0199*** 0.0247* -0.0132 -0.0151*** -0.0037 0.0191*** -0.0010 0.0120* -0.0072 0.0128*  0.0000 0.0006 0.0006 
GB00B06YGN05  
-0.0088 0.0306** -0.0169 -0.0144 0.0024 0.0131 0.0075 0.0097* 0.0002 0.0121** 0.0005* -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0007 
GB00B54QLM75  
-0.0191** 0.0299* -0.0187 -0.0004 -0.0278 0.0292*** -0.0027 0.0191** -0.0161*** 0.0098  -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0008 
GILTS_5_15 
_YEAR_INDEX -0.0031* 0.0013 0.0035 -0.0053*** 0.0063** -0.0018 0.0047*** 0.0060*** 0.0058*** 0.0027*** 0.0014*** 0.0007* 0.0012*** 0.0006 
GILTS_ALL 
_STOCKS 
_INDEX -0.0052*** 0.0067** -0.0010 -0.0029 0.0010 0.0018 0.0024*** 0.0011** 0.0014*** -0.0011* 0.0002*** -0.0002* 0.0000 -0.0001 
UK_GILTS_INDEX 
_OVER_15_Y -0.0101** 0.0245** -0.0092 -0.0094* 0.0023 0.0071 0.0069*** 0.0073*** 0.0044** 0.0050** 0.0007*** -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Table 4.19 Corporate Bond Variance Equation 
Corporate Bond ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 TUES WED THURS FRI Fin Crisis QE1 QE2 QE3 
SPDR Barclays Capital 
 Sterling Corporate 
 Bond ETF  0.0020 -0.0013 0.0018 -0.0029** 0.0037** -0.0019 0.0038*** 0.0042*** 0.0055*** 0.0037*** 0.0007*** 0.0006* 0.0010** 0.0007 
Barclays Sterling  
Corporate Bond Fund  0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0011 0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0067*** -0.0015** -0.0022*** -0.0038*** 0.0001*** 
-
0.0002*** -0.0003** 
-
0.0004*** 
iShares Core GBP  
Corporate Bond 
 UCITS ETF  -0.0014 0.0023 0.0045 -0.0017 0.0000 -0.0046** 0.0039*** 0.0157*** 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.0408*** 0.0150*** 0.0120*** 0.0026 
CF Bentley Investment 
 Funds  -0.0087** -0.0089* -0.0075* -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0090* -0.0091* -0.0093* -0.0087 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0028 
JPMorgan Fund ICVC   
0.0021* -0.0036** 0.0026** 0.0001 -0.0037** 0.0035*** -0.0005 0.0018*** -0.0001 0.0018** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 
Bloomberg GBP  
High Yield Corporate 
 Bond Index  0.0013** -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0005* -0.0008** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003** -0.0001   0.0003** 0.0001** 
Bloomberg GBP  
Investment Grade 
 Corporate Bond Index  -0.0036** 0.0001 0.0035** 0.0008 -0.0056** 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0051*** 0.0020 0.0035**   0.0001 0.0000 
Bloomberg GBP 
 Investment Grade  
European Corporate 
 Bond Index 1 to 5 Year -0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0002* 0.0003*   0.0001 0.0000 
Bloomberg Investment  
Grade Corporate  
10+ Bond Index -0.0084*** 0.0017 0.0050 -0.0005 -0.0083 0.0089** 0.0084*** 0.0085*** 0.0037 0.0070**   0.0002 0.0003 
Bloomberg Investment 
 Grade Corporate  
5-10 years Bond Index -0.0017 0.0004 0.0018 -0.0003 -0.0016 0.0003 0.0045*** 0.0047*** 0.0021** 0.0035***   0.0010** 0.0003 
Bloomberg Investment 
 Grade Corporate  
1-10 years Bond Index -0.0008 0.0004 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0003 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0009** 0.0015***   0.0005** 0.0001 
Bloomberg Investment 
 Grade Corporate  
1-3 years Bond Index -0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Table 4.20 Equity Variance Equation 
Equity ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 TUES WED THURS FRI Fin Crisis QE1 QE2 QE3 
FTSE100 0.0165 0.0035 -0.0133 -0.0212*** -0.0006 0.0127* -0.0591*** -0.0494*** -0.0454*** -0.0532*** 0.0194*** 0.0110** 0.0025 0.0013 
FTSE250 0.0152** 0.0129 -0.0153 -0.0143 0.0111 -0.0013 0.0036 0.0030 0.0037 -0.0084** 0.0131*** 0.0070** 0.0076** 0.0034 
FTSE350 0.0011 0.0168 -0.0165 -0.0211*** 0.0205 -0.0047 0.0031 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0024 0.0078*** 0.0047** 0.0042* 0.0038* 
FTSEALLSHARE 0.0014 0.0163 -0.0159 -0.0207*** 0.0199 -0.0046 0.0027 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0027 0.0077*** 0.0047** 0.0042* 0.0039* 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Variance Equation 
Table 4.15-17 summarise the results of the ARCH and GARCH terms from the variance 
equation of each respective GARCH equation, as well as the negative news variable where 
appropriate, while Tables 4.18-20 show the results of the dummy variables in the equation. All 
terms in Tables 4.15-17 are significant to at least the 5% level. As before this chapter will go 
through the asset types individually before drawing comparisons between the volatilities of 
gilts, bond and equities. The innovation and conditional volatility terms for gilts are discussed 
in table 4.15, bonds in table 4.16 and equities in 4.17. 
Gilts 
 The estimated parameters for the lagged residuals and the past conditional variances 
indicate that the variance processes are mostly stable, with 21 of the models being improved by 
allowing negative volatility shocks to differ in value to positive. Using Zivot’s formula (p.8, 
2009) to calculate, this chapter found that the half-life of volatility shocks for short term gilts 
were around 2/3 days while for longer term gilts the shocks took 30+ days to decay. It appears 
that there is a link between the time to maturity of the gilt in question, and the degree of 
persistence in the ARCH and GARCH terms. The longer time-to-maturity gilts tend to have a 
higher persistence of volatility shocks than the shorter term gilts. A good example of this is 
with the gilt indexes, where the index containing shorter maturity assets has weaker persistence 
in volatility shocks than those of the longer index. The final 3 columns of table 4.15b shows 
these results. This link between time to maturity and volatility persistence is not much discussed 
in the literature, however similar results are found in Steeley and Matyushkin (2015). In 
addition, this link is not determined statistically, but only through observation of the results and 
should therefore not be considered binding. As can be seen in Table 4.15, positive news denoted 
by the coefficient standard lagged residual term has a larger effect on gilt volatility than 
negative news in almost all cases. 
  Table 4.18 shows the coefficients for the rest of the parameters in the model. 
Comparing these to the results of the mean equation, in general the parameters were much more 
significant in affecting the volatility of returns rather than the mean. Of particular interest is the 
results for the announcement indicators, which are shown to be significant for most of the gilts 
included in the analysis. For almost all of the gilts, the day before announcements are observed 
to be much calmer than the standard sample volatility, which can be observed in the significant 
and negative coefficient on the indicator variable. This provides evidence for significant ‘Calm-
before-the-storm’ effects, where gilt investors held off on transactions until they received new 
information from MPC meeting announcements. Further evidence for this effect is given by the 
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fact that the coefficient on the actual announcement is significant and positive, i.e. that volatility 
increased for most gilt returns on days where the MPC announced its decisions and therefore 
new economic information was given to market participants. Fewer gilts saw significant 
reactions to the day after announcement days than the before or during, however the majority 
of the gilts saw reduced volatility the day after announcements, whether significant or not. This 
suggests a slight calming effect on gilt markets from QE announcements, which is evidence for 
QE intervention being viewed as positive economic news. Given that one of QE’s objectives 
was to restore pre-crisis financial market conditions, QE announcements causing reduced 
volatility could be considered a successful outcome. However, the overall combined volatility 
effect of the announcements is positive for many of the gilts, meaning that QE announcements 
made these markets more volatile overall. The auction variable coefficients appear to be far less 
significant for the variance equations in comparison to the results of the corresponding mean 
equations. For the vast majority of the gilts, volatility on auction days was positively affected 
but not significantly different to the rest of the sample, with a similar result being found for the 
days preceding and following.  
Almost all of the gilts show significant and positive coefficients for the financial crisis 
dummy variable, which shows that the financial crisis period saw a significant increase in 
general gilt volatility up to the onset of QE. Examining the scale of the coefficients, it is clear 
that the QE2 and QE3 periods following the financial crisis period however show gilt 
volatility to be insignificantly different from the pre-crisis levels for the majority of gilts. It can 
be inferred from this that these periods saw a general decline in volatility after the financial 
crisis period. The QE1 period shows significantly higher volatility than over the rest of the 
sample, however when comparing the variance to the financial crisis indicator, the QE1 period 
exhibited lower gilt volatility than the financial crisis period preceding it. Coupling these results 
with the findings for the QE events, it can be reasonably asserted that QE periods oversaw 
reduced gilt volatility, but that these effects were over the longer term and not as a reaction 
specifically to auctions. 
Aside from these results almost all of the gilts exhibit different levels of volatility 
depending on the weekday, however these follow no observable pattern. As can be seen in table 
4.18 the first several gilts exhibit stronger volatility on Mondays, with almost all of the other 
day indicators showing negative coefficients. However, the remaining gilts largely exhibit 
positive coefficients for these indicators, including the gilt indexes, demonstrating that 
Mondays were exhibited less volatility than the other weekdays. 
 125 
 
Corporate Bonds 
 Like with the gilts, the estimated lagged residuals and GARCH terms are all stable, but 
only two of the models were improved by allowing for asymmetrical news shocks.  Using the 
same formula, shock half-lives are between 2 and 33 days depending on the index, however 
unlike the gilts there is no observed pattern between the half-life of the shocks and the maturities 
of the bonds included in each index. For most of the indexes, volatility shocks will have decayed 
within half a month. For the two indexes that included the negative news indicator, it seems 
that positive news has a stronger effect on volatility than negative, this is similar to the findings 
for gilts. 
 Table 4.19 shows the effects of the other variables included in the model. Only 4 of the 
12 indexes showed any change in volatility in days preceding QE announcements, and the 
effects are not uniform in sign. Therefore, there is little evidence of the ‘calm-before-the-storm’ 
effects that are apparent in the gilt results. Bond volatility on announcements days and the day 
following is not significantly different from the rest of the sample, suggesting that QE 
announcements contained relatively little information for bond investors to trade by. Those 
indexes that were affected by the announcements reacted in a non-uniform way, with indexes 
showing increased volatility, while others the opposite. Therefore, if any information was taken 
from QE announcements, it was not a consistent message amongst corporate bond investors. In 
this way, there is little evidence to suggest that QE announcements reduced volatility in these 
markets. 
 For the APF auction variables the results are similarly inconsistent. The day before 
auctions saw volatility levels consistent with the rest of the sample for all but two of the indexes, 
which saw slightly reduced volatility. On the actual auction days, four of the indexes had 
significantly different volatility when compared to the rest of the sample, however once again 
the signs on the respective coefficients do not show an observable pattern. For the majority of 
the bond indexes, auction day’s coefficients were negative, however they are also insignificant. 
The day after auction days caused increased volatility in 8 of the 12 indexes, however only 4 of 
these results are significant to the 5% level. This does suggest a possible time lagged effect 
from QE auctions on corporate bonds, where information taken by investors from QE 
intervention caused changes to trading patterns for corporate bonds the next day.  
All but one of the corporate bond indexes which had samples long enough to include 
the financial crisis dummy variable show highly significant and positive coefficients, 
suggesting that the period between the fall of Northern Rock and QE1 caused general volatility 
to increase by a large degree. However, unlike the gilt variance results, corporate bond volatility 
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did not reduce over the following QE periods. This is shown by the significant and positive 
coefficients on several of the QE period dummies, showing that corporate bond volatility was 
still distinctly different from pre-crisis levels after the onset of QE. While the coefficient values 
are lower for the QE periods than the financial crisis indicator, the most evidenced interpretation 
is that corporate bonds were not as significantly affected by QE than UK gilts. Overall, there is 
insufficient evidence to conclude that QE auctions or announcements significantly affected 
corporate bond volatility, with the results showing no pattern in terms of the sign of coefficients 
or indeed the significance levels of results. 
 As for day of the week effects, most of the corporate bond indexes exhibited higher 
volatility on other weekdays when compared to Monday, especially on Tuesdays and Fridays. 
These results are consistent to those found in the literature and are comparable to the results 
found for some of the gilts, especially the gilt indexes.  
Equities 
Table 4.17 shows that the 4 equity indexes have stable and significant ARCH and 
GARCH processes, with comparatively stronger ARCH effects than is the case for gilts and 
corporate bonds. None of the equity models were improved by allowing for asymmetrical news 
effects so in all 4 cases these items were dropped from the model. The half-life of past volatility 
shocks appears to be longer for equities than for corporate bonds and gilts, with all but the 
FTSE250 taking around 30+ days to decay. The FTSE250 index shocks decayed at a quicker 
rate of about 18 days. The FTSE100 shocks had the longest decay time at 39 days. 
As can be seen by Table 4.20 QE announcements did not significantly alter the volatility 
of any of the equity indexes. There are no observable calm-before-the-storm effects, with the 
day before QE announcements having no significant decrease in equity volatility. The 
FTSE250, which is the only asset to respond to any aspect of the announcements, saw a small 
but significant increase in volatility on days before QE announcements, however as this effect 
is not captured in any of the other indexes it is unlikely to be an interpretable result. Given that 
QE announcements were intended to support equity returns and reduce equity volatility, these 
results provide evidence that these effects did not take place. These results are in line with the 
results in the literature, like Joyce et al (2011) where QE announcements were met with mixed 
and small reactions from equity markets. QE auction days exhibit much stronger effects on 
equity volatility however. It seems that the day before QE auctions equity volatility was 
reduced, possibly due to investors holding off on trades until new market information arrives 
the next day. Higher volatility is often connected to higher information flow in the literature 
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and these results suggest that QE auctions provided significant market information for equity 
investors.  
The QE period results suggest some QE effects over the longer-term for equities. All of 
the index volatilities were significantly increased by the period after the fall of Northern Rock, 
as can be seen by the positive coefficients that are significant at the 1% level. QE1 and QE2 
also show volatility significantly higher than the pre-crisis sample, albeit slightly lower than 
the financial crisis period. QE1 in particular appears to have had little impact on reducing equity 
volatility. By QE2 and QE3 the FTSE100 and 250 are back to pre-crisis levels, however the 
350 and ALLSHARE, which contain riskier assets, still shows volatility greater than pre-crisis 
levels. It seems that after the financial crisis period, over the ensuing QE periods the higher 
volatility than sample reduces to insignificance as intervention continued but took a relatively 
long time when compared to the results for gilts. While it could be argued that over the longer-
term QE oversaw reduced equity volatility, these results give little direct evidence that it was 
QE itself that caused this effect, especially when considering the non-effect of the auctions and 
announcements. What is more likely is that it was simply time and reduced uncertainty that 
lowered equity variance back to its pre-crisis levels.  
Comparisons 
Comparing the results of the other two asset types to those found for gilts, it can be seen 
that corporate bond index and equity volatility had much smaller reactions to QE 
announcements and intervention. Whereas there were significant volatility effects on days 
preceding and during MPC announcements for gilts, these effects can only be observed in a 
couple of the corporate bond indexes, and none of the equity indexes. This is evidence towards 
the conclusion that equity investors did not use QE announcements either as information for 
the general outlook of the UK economy, or more specifically as information for future relative 
rates of return between these asset classes. Corporate bond investors appear to have taken more 
information from QE announcements, however this information does not appear to be uniform 
in nature, especially when the mean equation shows that there wasn’t significant positive or 
negative return changes during announcement days. For the auctions indicators, there appears 
to be little to compare between the asset types except the general comparison that most assets 
were unaffected by the auctions in terms of volatility. 
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Table 4.21a BEKK Model Results 
Variance 
Term 
FTSE100 FTSE250 FTSE350 FTSEALLSHARE CFBentley iShares JPMorgan SPDR 
𝒂𝟏,𝟏 0.1763*** 0.0253 -0.0610*** 0.0373*** 0.1314*** 0.1153*** -0.0176 -0.0088*** 
𝒂𝟏,𝟐 -0.0682*** -0.1133*** 0.1704*** 0.0619*** -0.0310* 0.0515*** 0.0695*** 0.0858*** 
𝒂𝟏,𝟑 0.0777*** -0.2216*** 0.1409*** -0.0727*** -0.1567*** -0.0155*** -0.0607*** -0.0890*** 
𝒂𝟐,𝟏 -0.0668** -0.1936 -0.0587 -0.1587 0.0921 -0.0622*** 0.0166 -0.0642** 
𝒂𝟐,𝟐 -0.2841*** 0.0754** 0.0233 -0.0672*** 0.0746** -0.0410*** 0.0239 0.0297*** 
𝒂𝟐,𝟑 0.0204 0.1192* 0.0788 0.0304 -0.0402 0.0096*** -0.0006 -0.0882*** 
𝒂𝟑,𝟏 -0.0255 0.0232 -0.0972 -0.0604 0.0089 0.0265*** 0.0831*** 0.0329*** 
𝒂𝟑,𝟐 -0.0099 -0.0199* 0.1282*** -0.1088*** 0.0319** 0.0339*** -0.0490** 0.0801*** 
𝒂𝟑,𝟑 0.0286 0.0227 0.0547 0.0750*** 0.1999*** -0.0443*** 0.0048 0.0022*** 
𝒃𝟏,𝟏 0.8422*** 0.9809*** 0.9177*** 0.9364*** 0.9388*** 0.9391*** 0.9820*** 0.9793*** 
𝒃𝟏,𝟐 -0.0928*** -0.0054*** -0.0018** -0.0171*** -0.0117*** -0.0273*** -0.0518*** -0.0162*** 
𝒃𝟏,𝟑 -0.1026*** -0.0094*** -0.0012 0.0368*** -0.0245*** -0.0601*** 0.0380*** -0.0172*** 
𝒃𝟐,𝟏 0.0218*** 0.0439 -0.0431* -0.0007 0.0662*** -0.0180*** 0.0311*** -0.0012*** 
𝒃𝟐,𝟐 0.9518*** 0.8935*** 0.9459*** 0.9838*** 0.9716*** 0.9055*** 0.9006*** 0.9723*** 
𝒃𝟐,𝟑 0.0074*** 0.1531*** 0.0003 -0.0513*** 0.0038** 0.0249*** 0.0524*** 0.0055*** 
𝒃𝟑,𝟏 0.0775*** 0.0121** 0.0321*** 0.0632*** -0.0668*** -0.0903*** 0.0226*** 0.0086*** 
𝒃𝟑,𝟐 0.0439*** -0.0299*** -0.0016 0.0529*** 0.0307*** -0.2620*** -0.0471*** -0.0152*** 
𝒃𝟑,𝟑 0.9890*** 0.9963*** 0.9456*** 0.9452*** 0.9813*** 0.9297*** 0.9999*** 0.9616*** 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term 
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Table 4.21b BEKK Model Results (continued) 
Variance 
Term 
10plus 1-10 years 1-3 years 5-10 years European High Yield Investment 
𝒂𝟏,𝟏 0.0414* 0.0100* 0.0627*** 0.2384*** 0.0558 0.0187 -0.0234*** 
𝒂𝟏,𝟐 0.0235*** -0.0697*** 0.1494*** -0.0014 0.0670 0.0831 -0.1871*** 
𝒂𝟏,𝟑 -0.0214*** 0.0778*** 0.0132 0.1543*** 0.1206 -0.0226 0.2505*** 
𝒂𝟐,𝟏 -0.0422 0.0540*** -0.0589 0.1308*** -0.0330 0.0290 0.0747*** 
𝒂𝟐,𝟐 -0.0110 0.0594*** 0.0226 0.1121*** -0.0701 -0.0697 -0.0367*** 
𝒂𝟐,𝟑 -0.0163 0.0453** 0.0582 -0.0750*** -0.0539 -0.0212 -0.1801*** 
𝒂𝟑,𝟏 0.0634*** 0.2285*** 0.0545 -0.1240*** -0.1463*** 0.1003* -0.0752*** 
𝒂𝟑,𝟐 0.1528*** 0.0839*** -0.1244 -0.0094*** -0.1264*** 0.0883 -0.0408*** 
𝒂𝟑,𝟑 -0.0128*** -0.0413*** -0.0506 0.0126** 0.0079 0.0301 -0.1111*** 
𝒃𝟏,𝟏 0.9286*** 0.8667*** 0.8840*** 0.9720*** 0.8799*** 1.0000*** 0.9518*** 
𝒃𝟏,𝟐 -0.0380*** -0.0360*** -0.0688*** 0.0153*** -0.0781*** -0.1054*** 0.0513*** 
𝒃𝟏,𝟑 -0.0268*** -0.0854*** 0.0166*** 0.1248*** -0.0554 -0.0052** -0.0493*** 
𝒃𝟐,𝟏 0.0216*** -0.0060 0.0455** -0.2304*** 0.0460*** 0.0284*** 0.0710*** 
𝒃𝟐,𝟐 0.9872*** 0.9824*** 0.9999*** 0.9679*** 0.9999*** 0.9211*** 0.9534*** 
𝒃𝟐,𝟑 0.0173*** 0.0693*** -0.0018 0.0115*** 0.0415 -0.0032** -0.0593*** 
𝒃𝟑,𝟏 0.0224*** 0.1099*** -0.1093*** 0.0179*** 0.0801*** -0.0098*** 0.1393*** 
𝒃𝟑,𝟐 0.0072*** 0.0180*** -0.0756*** 0.0023*** 0.0554*** -0.0305*** -0.0496*** 
𝒃𝟑,𝟑 0.9878*** 0.9996*** 0.9848*** 0.9672*** 0.9309*** 0.9632*** 0.9702*** 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term 
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4.4.2 Multivariate Results 
BEKK 
Having found results suggesting that gilt volatility was the strongest effected by QE of all 
the asset types, this chapter will now discuss the results from the full BEKK estimation, 
followed by a comparison from the DCC model. These multivariate results presenting evidence 
on how these QE effects spill-over from gilt to bond and equity volatility. Table 4.21 above 
shows the conditional variance coefficients, for example element 𝑎12 in the second column 
represents the effect of the FTSE100’s innovations on GB0033280339’s volatility. *, ** and 
*** show the significance levels of Wald tests at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.  For 
the purposes of this chapter, the most interesting elements of the above table are 𝑎21 and 𝑏21, 
as well as   𝑎31 and 𝑏31 as these show the volatility spill-over effects from both individual gilt 
and the gilt index respectively onto the assets denoted in the first row of the table. Of secondary 
interest is the elements 𝑎23 and 𝑏23 which demonstrate the effect of the individual gilts volatility 
upon the larger index. As can be seen, most of these terms are found to be significant to at least 
the 5% level, however element 𝑎21 is found to be insignificantly different to zero for all but 
three of the assets. In all but two of the models, the effect of innovations from the individual 
gilt to the index is also insignificant suggesting negligible ARCH spill-over effects. However 
almost all of the equivalent GARCH spill-over effects are significant to the 1% level and Wald 
tests with the restriction that 𝑎21 = 𝑏21 = 0  and 𝑎23 = 𝑏23 = 0 reject the null hypothesis at 
the 5% level, suggesting there is overall a spill-over effect from the gilt to the other assets over 
the entire sample period. The 𝑎 elements denoting the spill-over effect from the gilt index to 
the other assets are found to be insignificant in five out of eight cases, with all of the equity 
indexes not exhibiting a spill-over effect. Once again, the GARCH spill-over, element 𝑏31 in 
this case, is significant however and the overall results of Wald tests found the cumulative effect 
of both terms to be significantly different from zero in all cases. 
The results of the Bloomberg bonds, found in table 4.21b largely reflect those found for the 
other equities and corporate bonds. These results have been compiled separately because the 
sample size is different, with data on the Bloomberg assets only being available from January 
2010. Once again, the 𝑎21  and 𝑎23 parameters are found to be insignificant for most of the 
bonds, further suggesting that individual gilt shocks had little effect on the other assets own 
variances. Volatility spill-overs from both the individual gilt and the index seem to have 
occurred however, as both the 𝑏21 and 𝑏31 parameters are found to be significant, with most of 
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the coefficients having a positive sign, suggesting that gilt volatility increased the conditional 
variance of Bloomberg bonds over the entire sample period 
Overall these results suggest that over the entirety of the sample there were significant 
volatility spill-over effects from UK gilts and gilt indexes towards corporate bonds and equities. 
The shock elements i.e. the elements in the A matrix, appear to be much weaker and less 
significant, suggesting that shocks to gilts had smaller spill-over effects than changes in their 
respective volatilities. Given that the results of the univariate equations show that gilts reacted 
the strongest to the QE dummies, with most of the gilts seeing reduced volatility on days before 
announcements and auctions, these QE effects may well have had significant spill-over effects 
onto equities and corporate bonds through the volatility linkages that are exhibited in the 
multivariate BEKK results. 
However, while these significant relationships may hold over the sample in its entirety, this 
chapter conducts a sub-sample analysis to determine whether during the two major QE periods, 
QE1 and QE2, these significant spill-over effects still held. Using the start and end dates of the 
QE periods, the two samples were estimated using the same BEKK specification. As can be 
seen by tables 4.22 the results of the QE1 and QE2 periods largely reflect those found over the 
entire sample. For equities however, both QE periods exhibited much weaker spill-over effects, 
with the FTSE100, 250 and ALLSHARE showing insignificant spill-overs during QE1, and the 
FTSE100, 350 and ALLSHARE index showing insignificant spill-overs during QE2. Corporate 
bonds show results consistent with the full sample estimation, with the exception of the SPDR 
Barclays and Barclays Sterling indexes. The implication of these results is that the spill-over 
effects, while still significant for corporate bonds, appears to be much weaker during the period 
of ongoing QE auctions.  
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Table 4.22a BEKK Wald Test Results 
Test 
Specification 
FTSE100 FTSE250 FTSE350 FTSEALLSHARE CFBentley iShares JPMorgan SPDR Barclays Sterling 
𝒂𝟐,𝟏=𝒃𝟐,𝟏=0 0.0000 0.2881 0.0008 0.3470 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 N/a 
𝒂𝟑,𝟏=𝒃𝟑,𝟏=0 0.0000 0.0376 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 N/a 
𝒂𝟐,𝟑=𝒃𝟐,𝟑=0 0.0000 0.0000 0.4041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 N/a 
QE1 FTSE100 FTSE250 FTSE350 FTSEALLSHARE CFBentley iShares JPMorgan SPDR Barclays Sterling 
𝒂𝟐,𝟏=𝒃𝟐,𝟏=0 0.0000 0.7489 0.0000 0.9043 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9678 0.0000 
𝒂𝟑,𝟏=𝒃𝟑,𝟏=0 0.3267 0.8620 0.0000 0.6943 0.0000 0.0137 0.0000 0.9891 0.0000 
𝒂𝟐,𝟑=𝒃𝟐,𝟑=0 0.0000 0.4649 0.0921 0.9923 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9475 0.0000 
QE2 FTSE100 FTSE250 FTSE350 FTSEALLSHARE CFBentley iShares JPMorgan SPDR Barclays Sterling 
𝒂𝟐,𝟏=𝒃𝟐,𝟏=0 0.2370 0.0000 0.9160 0.8466 0.0489 0.0000 0.0000 0.9892 0.9990 
𝒂𝟑,𝟏=𝒃𝟑,𝟏=0 0.9158 0.0000 0.7138 0.0446 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9966 0.9997 
𝒂𝟐,𝟑=𝒃𝟐,𝟑=0 0.0000 0.0000 0.9171 0.0575 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7947 0.9920 
 
Table 4.22b BEKK Wald Test Results (continued) 
Test 
Specification 
10plus 1-10 years 1-3 years 5-10 years European High Yield Investment 
𝒂𝟐,𝟏=𝒃𝟐,𝟏=0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
𝒂𝟑,𝟏=𝒃𝟑,𝟏=0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
𝒂𝟐,𝟑=𝒃𝟐,𝟑=0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0171 0.0032 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
QE2 10plus 1-10 years 1-3 years 5-10 years European High Yield Investment 
𝒂𝟐,𝟏=𝒃𝟐,𝟏=0 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.8656 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
𝒂𝟑,𝟏=𝒃𝟑,𝟏=0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1323 0.0000 0.4421 1.0000 
𝒂𝟐,𝟑=𝒃𝟐,𝟑=0 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.9987 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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DCC Results 
Table 4.23 shows the estimation results from the DCC model. Elements with sub-script 
1 denote the asset labelled in the first row of the tables, while those with sub-scripts 2 and 3 
show the results of the gilt and gilt index respectively. 𝑅12, 𝑅13 and 𝑅23 respectively refer to 
the constant correlation coefficient between the three assets, while 𝑎 and 𝑏 are adjustment 
coefficients. As expected, we can see that the significance of the 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are for the most part 
the same as those found in the results of the univariate specifications. This is no surprise given 
that the DCC models estimate these terms in the same univariate specification. As in most cases 
these values sum closely to 1, we can see that there is high persistence in the conditional 
variances. In all but two cases in the first table we can see that the correlation between the asset 
in question and the gilt is significantly different from zero, as denoted by the *, ** and *** in 
the same manner as earlier sections. All of the equity indexes exhibit a negative correlation with 
both the individual gilt and the gilt indexes, with periods of high volatility for the gilts 
corresponding with low volatility for equities. This result matches well with the findings in the 
univariate analysis, where it was found that gilts tended to have significant negative volatility 
reactions to QE announcements, while equities responded with weak and positive variance 
responses. Overall the results of the DCC specification corroborate with the BEKK model in 
finding strong spill-overs between gilt variance and equity variance.  
Corporate bonds shown in table 4.23 exhibited significant positive correlations of 
between 35 and 80 percent, providing evidence that there was significant spill-over in volatility 
from gilts to bonds over the sample period. The correlation between the gilt index and the 
corporate bonds is found to be significant in seven of the models, however significant 
correlation between the corporate bonds and the individual gilt is only found in four of the 
twelve cases, wherein all but one of the Bloomberg indexes found the correlation to 
insignificantly different to zero. A possible explanation for this weak correlation between the 
bonds and the individual gilt is the pull-to-par effects GB0033280339 experienced towards the 
end of the sample as it approached maturity. As the gilt approached redemption, its pricing and 
therefore for its volatility of returns may have become more disconnected from the returns of 
other bonds and equities and more correlated with its underlying fundamentals. This may offer 
an explanation as to why the insignificance is particularly apparent for the Bloomberg bonds, 
as this sample begins only in 2010 rather than 2007. Further evidence can be seen in figure 4.1 
where the conditional correlation between the gilt and the gilt index, equities and corporate 
bonds all begins to move towards zero after around 2013. A sub-sample analysis ending in 2013 
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showed that the correlation between the individual gilt and the other assets was much more 
significant when compared to the entire sample.  
As 𝑎 and 𝑏 are significant and sum to almost 1, this presents strong evidence that the 
correlation between these asset variances was not constant over time. This chapter therefore 
looks at the conditional correlations plotted over time to discuss spill-over effects and possible 
connections to QE. Figures 4.1 through 4.33 show these correlations, with the vertical lines 
representing the beginning and ends of distinct QE periods. The orange and yellow lines denote 
the start and end of QE1 respectively, while the purple, green, blue and red represent the QE2 
and QE3 periods in the same manner. The first figure shows the conditional correlation between 
the asset and the individual gilt GB0033280339, while the second figure shows the correlations 
between the asset and the gilt index.  As the correlations between the gilt and gilt index are 
roughly of the same nature in each model, only one figure, figure 4.3 shows the correlation 
between the individual gilt and the index it is part of. As we can see, the correlation between 
the gilt and the index are largely stable over time, with decreases in the correlation coefficient 
during the QE1 and QE2 periods and a significant decrease in correlation towards the end of 
the sample. 
For the equities, the shape and nature of the correlations are largely similar, and so it is 
easier to discuss them all collectively. Figures 4.1-9 show that the start of the QE1 period is 
characterised by a strengthening of correlation between the gilt variance and the equity indexes, 
which then reverts over the course of the QE1 period. This lends some evidence that the initial 
QE purchases of the gilt had strong spill-over effects, which became less significant over the 
following months. This behaviour also exists in the correlation between the equities and the gilt 
index, suggesting that it was not just the individual gilt GB0033280339 which had a 
strengthening spill-over effect at the start of QE1. For the most part however during QE1 and 
QE2 periods the correlation gets weaker between the equities and both the individual gilt and 
gilt indexes. This is especially apparent during QE2, where the correlation drops from around -
0.6 to -0.25. When compared to the decrease in correlation between the individual gilt and the 
gilt index, during QE1 and QE2 there was weaker correlations in general for both gilts and 
equities. 
For corporate bonds the conditional correlations are a lot less uniform in nature. Figures 
4.10-19 show that the QE1 period saw an initial reduction in the correlation between most of 
the bond indices and the both the individual gilt and the index, followed by an upwards trend 
over the rest of the QE1 period to close to its original level. Intuitively, the onset of QE1 saw 
weaker correlation between the gilts and these bonds, which steadily increased in the following 
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months, a result which is in line with the conditional correlations of the equities, albeit without 
the initial strengthening of correlations which occurred for equities at the start of QE1. 
However, while the conditional correlations of equities continued to decrease over the QE1 
period, for most of the corporate bonds the trends tend upwards again, strengthening over the 
period. 
The QE2 period also caused non-uniform reactions from the bonds, however it seems 
the effects were less pronounced when compared to QE1. For most of the bonds, the conditional 
correlations for both gilt and the index seem to change relatively little over the QE2 period, 
however for the Bloomberg assets five of the seven conditional correlation plots show drops in 
correlation in the weeks before QE2 began, which is then restored over QE2 and QE3. This 
may suggest that this QE period restored more normal market function after a negative shock 
to correlation. For the Barclays Sterling corporate bond index, the results are different as Fig. 
4.19 shows. The correlation between both the individual gilt and the index drop dramatically 
from the onset of QE1 from around 0.7 to around 0 by the end of QE1. After this point the 
correlation does not recover, and Barclays Sterling shows little relationship to either the gilt or 
the gilt index after this point. The CF Bentley fund also exhibits little correlation with either the 
gilt or the gilt index, and this lack of correlation does not seem to be dramatically altered during 
any of the QE periods. This chapter can offer little explanation for this sharp decline in 
correlation, as the Barclays sterling index especially contains many of the same individual 
corporate bonds as other indexes analysed in this chapter, however the behaviour of its 
conditional correlation with the gilt index and the individual gilt is unique. 
Taken in summary, the results suggest once more that equities had relatively weak and 
negative volatility links to UK gilts during the periods of QE purchases, supporting the findings 
of the univariate analysis where gilt volatility was swiftly reduced over QE1, while equities 
showed significant volatility for a much longer time. Corporate bond volatility shows a much 
stronger and consistent correlation with gilt volatility; however, it appears once again to be at 
its weakest during QE periods. Apart from this, there are no patterns common for all of the 
corporate bond indexes, suggesting that the transferral of volatility to corporate bonds had 
mixed effects. 
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Table 4.23a DCC Results 
Variance 
Term 
FTSE100 FTSE250 FTSE350 FTSE 
ALLSHARE 
CF 
Bentley 
iShares JP 
Morgan 
SPDR Barclays 
Sterling 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝟏   0.0186** 0.0164** 0.0182** 0.0178** 0.0042*** 0.0031* 0.0043* 0.0069* 0.0002 
𝜶𝟏,𝟏  0.1049*** 0.0816*** 0.1016*** 0.1016*** 0.1195*** 0.0499*** 0.1065*** 0.0845*** 0.0129*** 
𝜷𝟏,𝟏  0.8866*** 0.9076*** 0.8890*** 0.8890*** 0.8676*** 0.9448*** 0.8569*** 0.8555*** 0.9841*** 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝟐  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜶𝟐,𝟐  0.0308*** 0.0310*** 0.0308*** 0.0308*** 0.0299*** 0.0317*** 0.0308*** 0.0315*** 0.0329*** 
𝜷𝟐,𝟐  0.9676*** 0.9674*** 0.9677*** 0.9676*** 0.9685*** 0.9668*** 0.9676*** 0.9670*** 0.9656*** 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝟑  0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0028 0.0027 0.0027 0.0026 
𝜶𝟑,𝟑  0.0408*** 0.0410*** 0.0408*** 0.0408*** 0.0399*** 0.0427*** 0.0416*** 0.0417*** 0.0405*** 
𝜷𝟑,𝟑  0.9459*** 0.9455*** 0.9459*** 0.9459*** 0.9469*** 0.9431*** 0.9445*** 0.9443*** 0.9462*** 
𝑹𝟏𝟐  -0.3188*** -0.2934*** -0.3198*** -0.3200*** 0.0361 0.6687*** 0.3749*** 0.7551*** 0.0483 
𝑹𝟏𝟑  -0.3015*** -0.2949*** -0.3038*** -0.3038*** 0.0491 0.7049*** 0.4127*** 0.8214*** 0.0082 
𝑹𝟐𝟑  0.7371*** 0.7331*** 0.7370*** 0.7369*** 0.7077*** 0.6149*** 0.7306*** 0.7563*** 0.6772*** 
𝒂𝟏  0.0279** 0.0321*** 0.0288** 0.0287** 0.0140 0.0127 0.0166 0.0643*** 0.0137** 
𝒃𝟏  0.9611*** 0.9554*** 0.9599*** 0.9600*** 0.9814*** 0.9847*** 0.9770*** 0.9022*** 0.9825*** 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term 
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Table 4.23b DCC Results (continued) 
Variance 
Term 
High-Yield Investment European 10 plus 5-10 years 1-10 years 1-3 years 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝟏   0.0072 0.0088 0.0066* 0.0115* 0.0178 0.0135 0.0013 
𝜶𝟏,𝟏  0.1524*** 0.0422*** 0.0578*** 0.0457*** 0.0493** 0.0535** 0.0499*** 
𝜷𝟏,𝟏  0.8474*** 0.9418*** 0.8874*** 0.9409*** 0.8960*** 0.8875*** 0.9383*** 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝟐  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜶𝟐,𝟐  0.0254 0.0267 0.0269 0.0266 0.0267 0.0269 0.0266 
𝜷𝟐,𝟐  0.9744*** 0.9731*** 0.9729** 0.9732*** 0.9731*** 0.9729*** 0.9732*** 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝟑  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
𝜶𝟑,𝟑  0.0408** 0.0423*** 0.0413*** 0.0433*** 0.0404*** 0.0405*** 0.0419*** 
𝜷𝟑,𝟑  0.9511*** 0.9485*** 0.9504*** 0.9468*** 0.9513*** 0.9514*** 0.9496*** 
𝑹𝟏𝟐  0.1839 0.3933 0.7319 -0.7207** 0.6800 0.7152* 0.6536 
𝑹𝟏𝟑  0.1595 0.8755*** 0.6587 0.9073*** 0.8015*** 0.7834*** 0.5346 
𝑹𝟐𝟑  0.5207 0.3134 0.5181 -0.8654** 0.5455 0.5528 0.4973 
𝒂𝟏  0.0213 0.0072 0.0332 0.0049*** 0.0219** 0.0269*** 0.0263* 
𝒃𝟏  0.9707*** 0.9914*** 0.9552*** 0.9947*** 0.9706*** 0.9632*** 0.9647*** 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term 
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Figure 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 FTSE100 Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.4 and 4.5 FTSE250 Correlation Time Plots 
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Figure 4.10 and 4.11 SPDR Barclays Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.8 and 4.9 FTSEALLSHARE Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.6 and 4.7 FTSE350 Correlation Time Plots 
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Figure 4.12 and 4.13 JP Morgan Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.16 and 4.17 CF Bentley Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.14 and 4.15 iShares Correlation Time Plots 
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Figure 4.22 and 4.231 Bloomberg Investment Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.20 and 4.21 Bloomberg High Yield Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.18 and 4.19 Barclays Sterling Correlation Time Plots 
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Figure 4.28 and 4.292 Bloomberg 1-10 years Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.26 and 4.27 Bloomberg 5-10 years Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.24 and 4.25 Bloomberg European Correlation Time Plots 
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Figure 4.32 and 4.33 Bloomberg 10+ years Correlation Time Plots 
Figure 4.30 and 4.31 Bloomberg 1-3 years Correlation Time Plots 
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4.4.3 Financial Stress measures and QE 
The results so far suggest a limited impact of QE on financial asset volatility, focused 
mainly on UK gilts, weaker effects on corporate bonds, and unsubstantial effects on equities. If 
asset volatility is interpreted as an indication of market risk, stress and uncertainty, many of the 
results suggest that QE did not universally restore individual market’s function to pre-crisis 
levels. As discussed before, this chapter examines a variety of alternative measures of financial 
stress and risk to complement the findings of the previous sections. This chapter uses individual 
indicators as well as an overall stress index to provide these alternative measures of financial 
stress. Tables 4.24 and 4.25 show the effects of the same QE dummies on the alternative 
financial risk/stress measures discussed earlier. The first table displays the results from the 
mean equation. The values in this table can be interpreted as the effect of the QE events on the 
level of financial stress as captured by these indicators, compared to their respective sample 
means. The second table contains the results from the conditional variance equations, with the 
significant values being interpreted as the QE events causing higher/lower variance than the 
sample unconditional variance. 
Mean Equations 
For most of the variables, positive coefficients are interpreted as increased stress, while 
for the CMAX variables, the FTSE VIX and the Yield curve measure positive values 
correspond to reduced stress. Looking at the overall FSIs, all three aggregation methods show 
significant impacts from QE announcement days. Announcements appear to have a negative 
effect on the level of the FSIs, indicating that market stress was lower on these days. By looking 
at the individual indicators it can be seen that this effect is driven by the CMAXEFFEX, 
FTSE100 VIX and the BBB yield spread, all of which show coefficients that indicate reduced 
stress. The BBB spread also shows reduced stress on days following announcements, 
suggesting a potentially slower incorporation of information in lower-quality debt markets. The 
same is true for the UK-US bond spread indicator, where both announcement days and the days 
following show reduced stress compared to the overall mean stress level. The other individual 
measures do not show significantly effects from the announcement variables. These results 
suggest that market perceptions of risk were reduced by QE announcements, especially when 
considering that the FTSE100 VIX measure is often considered a measure of expected volatility 
(Hakkio and Keeton, 2009). In addition, the fact that this effect seems to be partly driven by the 
exchange rate and interest-parity measures suggest that the QE announcement had effects on 
an international investor outlooks. 
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Auction days, on the other hand, indicate significantly higher stress for the overall FSI, 
and many of the individual indicators mentioned above. The result for the yield curve measure 
is consistent with the mean equation results for the longer-term gilts i.e. that gilt prices were 
increased on auction days, lowering long-term yields and flattening the yield curve, as shown 
by the negative coefficient on the yield curve measure. In this case the yield curve measure is 
here not capturing market stress, but rather the sought-after effects of the asset purchases. 
Several of the corporate spreads show large risk spreads on auction days, however this again 
matches with the intended QE effects, so cannot be considered in this case to be capturing 
financial stress alone. Finally, the LIBOR-gilt spread indicates higher financial stress, but this 
is again mostly likely driven by the effect of the auctions on the 3-month gilt yield rather than 
any effect on the LIBOR, as evidenced by the small and insignificant effect on the other LIBOR 
related measures. The effects of the auctions on the FTSEVIX, however, indicates greater 
financial stress in terms of the market perceptions of equity risk, where the price of FTSE100 
options were significantly higher when auctions were on-going. Given the results of the equity 
GARCH models in section 4.4.1.1 and 4.4.1.2., where QE auctions and announcements had 
very little effect on actual equity pricing or volatility, this effect on the FTSEVIX could be 
interpreted as an effect purely on market-risk perceptions. For both the announcements and 
auctions, there appears to be no calm-before-the-storm effects on the overall FSIs, as the days 
prior to announcements and auctions are insignificantly different from the unconditional mean.  
None of the QE-period dummies show significant effects on the overall FSI, suggesting 
that QE periods of asset purchases did little to change the level of financial stress in the UK 
financial system. Looking at the individual components of the FSI, none of the indicators that 
capture equity or exchange rate effects show significant results for these periods. For the 
individual components QE3 appears to have the largest effects, mainly on the corporate risk 
spread indicators. Corporate risk spreads were significantly smaller during the QE3 purchase 
period, but not significantly different from their mean levels during the other two intervention 
periods. The largest effects on the CMAX100, CMAXALL and FTSE100VIX occur during 
QE1, however none of these are significant at even the 10% level. In addition, the exchange 
rate measure, CMAXEFFEX was insignificantly different from its mean level during the three 
QE periods. Two of the LIBOR measures show significantly reduced stress because of the one 
or more of the QE periods, however these results do not corroborate with one another. Finally, 
the yield curve measure indicates a widening of the yield curve during the first and third phases 
of QE, significant to the 10% level. These results match with those found in Steeley & 
Matyushkin (2015) amongst others, who find that the QE1 phase lowered yields on short and 
 146 
 
medium-term bonds, widening the yield spread between the 3-month and 10-year gilt yields. 
The effects on the yield curve and LIBOR indicators are only marginally significant, and not 
strong enough for the overall FSI to register a significant response. The overall conclusion from 
the mean equation results is that QE events caused significant temporary impacts on financial 
stress in UK financial markets, however the periods of QE intervention had little impact on the 
long-term level of financial stress. These results have negative implications on QE, suggesting 
that QE did not systematically reduce financial stress over the course of the intervention phases. 
Peaks and troughs of financial stress appear only to relate to QE events, rather than a systematic 
process. 
Variance Equation 
Table 4.24 shows the conditional volatility equation for the individual indicators and 
the overall FSI. Looking at the overall FSI results, the conditional variance was not significantly 
different on any of the QE periods, or indeed on most of the QE events. Only the days preceding 
QE announcements show significantly greater volatility than the standard variance. The only 
other QE event that shows a result significant at the 5% level is the days following QE auctions, 
where volatility was lower. While there are several individual indicators that show significant 
results, there is no clear discernible pattern, meaning that these results are likely to result from 
idiosyncrasies in the individual indicator data. The overall result is therefore that QE did little 
to affect the variance of financial stress during the period. 
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Table 4.24 Financial Stress Indicators Mean Equation 
Indicator ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 QE1 QE2 QE3 
AAACPSPR -0.0036** -0.0009 0.0017 -0.0030** 0.0012 -0.0011 0.0280 0.0036 -0.0435*** 
AACPSPR -0.0058*** -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0040 0.0080*** -0.0002 0.0037 -0.0254 -0.0814*** 
BBB-AAACPSPR -0.0016 -0.0034 -0.0010 0.0010 0.0029 0.0011 -0.0074 -0.0462* -0.0286 
BBBCPSPR -0.0055** -0.0071** 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0087*** 0.0058** 0.0290 -0.0233 -0.0774*** 
BNKBDSPR -0.0078* -0.0035 -0.0036 0.0024 0.0048 0.0002 0.0574** -0.0388 -0.0110 
BETAFTAS 0.0716 -0.0170 0.0150 0.0311 -0.0143 0.0305 0.3570 -0.1640 -1.5480* 
CMAX100 -0.2150 0.3370 -0.9470 0.6630 0.2690 -0.1800 -19.7160 -3.4410 8.7650 
CMAXALL -0.3760 0.1020 -1.0410 0.6410 0.2330 -0.0685 -19.4200 -3.5880 7.3640 
CMAXEFFEX 0.5630 0.9100** 0.0708 0.0967 -0.0895 0.3670 -3.7210 -0.6600 -1.9570 
FTSE100VIX 0.0832 -0.2825*** -0.3074*** 0.0301 0.2621*** 0.1014 -0.9150 -0.5038 0.3048 
CIPUKUS -0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
LIBORBNK 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0063** 0.0001 
LIBORGOVT -0.0083 0.0058 0.0001 0.0068 0.0149*** -0.0072 -0.0152** -0.0049 -0.0164** 
LIBORTBILL -0.0002 0.0007 0.0030*** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0000 
UKB-USB 0.0074* -0.0096* -0.0106** -0.0015 -0.0051 0.0006 0.0026 0.0027 0.0032 
YLDCURVE10-3 0.0081 -0.0014 0.0038 -0.0060 -0.0130*** 0.0056 0.0079* 0.0058 0.0108*        
   
VEFSI -0.0049 -0.0085* -0.0049 -0.0004 0.0124*** 0.0032 0.0360 -0.0385 -0.0498 
PCFSI -0.0053 -0.0083** -0.0070** 0.0020 0.0094*** 0.0018 -0.0360 -0.0323 -0.0151 
CDFFSI -0.0005 -0.0051** -0.0005 -0.0027* 0.0010 -0.0011 0.0221 0.0032 0.0027 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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Table 4.25 Financial Stress Indicator Variance Equation 
Indicator ANN-1 ANN ANN+1 AUC-1 AUC AUC+1 QE1 QE2 QE3 
AAACPSPR -0.2990 0.8770*** -0.2749 0.1809 -0.0459 -0.0201 -0.0297 -0.0455 -0.1424* 
AACPSPR -0.3581* 0.2444 0.6623*** 0.0871 0.0126 -0.1081 0.0951* 0.0784 0.0139 
BBB-AAACPSPR 0.1835 -0.1606 0.1233 0.0499 -0.0408 -0.0462 0.0579** 0.0590* 0.0173 
BBBCPSPR -0.1702 0.0273 0.3451 -0.0610 0.2569 -0.1801 0.0466 0.0236 0.0038 
BNKBDSPR 0.0187 0.5095* -0.4678** -0.1288 0.1812 -0.0439 -0.0055 -0.0144 -0.0094 
BETAFTAS 0.3814** -0.3341 -0.0175 0.0049 0.2374 -0.0563 -0.0823* -0.1212** -0.0881 
CMAX100 0.1019 0.0962 -0.2633 -0.0288 0.1209 -0.0860 0.0384 0.0115 0.0495 
CMAXALL 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 
CMAXEFFEX 0.5081*** -0.2698 -0.1552 -0.1168 0.2152 -0.1462 0.0212 0.0151 0.0050 
FTSE100VIX -0.2030 0.5773** -0.2595 -0.3481** 0.5526** -0.2056 -0.0243 0.0048 -0.0020 
CIPUKUS 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LIBORBANK -0.6718*** 0.6180*** -0.6402*** -0.2036* 0.3922** -0.2398** 0.0338*** 0.0117 0.0219 
LIBORGOVT 
     
   
LIBORTBILL -0.7428*** 0.6064*** 0.1925** 0.2077** 0.0884 -0.2346* -0.0839*** -0.2096*** -0.1390*** 
UKB-USB -0.0149 0.2064 -0.2368 -0.0798 0.1141 -0.0403 0.0022 -0.0031 -0.0033 
YLDCURVE10-3 -0.0476 0.2005 -0.1133 -0.2462* 0.2154 0.0314 -0.0073 -0.0061 -0.0072        
   
VEFSI 0.3496* -0.0952 -0.1993 -0.1849 0.3881* -0.2121 0.0080 0.0036 -0.0031 
PCFSI -0.0235 0.0937 0.0012 -0.0825 0.3213 -0.3009** 0.0207 0.0277 0.0340 
CDFFSI 0.4570*** -0.2183 0.1951 -0.1191 0.1649 0.0129 -0.0355* -0.0239 -0.0366 
Notes. *, ** and *** denote the level of significance of each term. ANN and AUC refer to QE announcement and auctions days, respectively. 
-1 or +1 refer to the days preceding or following auctions or announcements. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the volatility of gilts, bond and equities during the timeframe of the 
UK financial crisis and the Bank of England’s Quantitative Easing policy. It also examines 
alternative measures of financial stress, risk and uncertainty and analyses QE’s impact upon 
these indicators. Using both univariate and multivariate GARCH analyses, this chapter 
examines these impacts, as well as observing the relationships between the different assets 
themselves. The purpose of this is to see which assets were the most strongly affected by the 
Bank of England’s monetary policy strategy, and whether the effects were as widespread as 
anticipated by the theory surrounding Quantitative Easing, the ultimate objective being to 
ascertain the implication of QE on the UK’s financial markets and thenceforth onto the wider 
economy. As stated before, asset volatility plays a key role in financial regulation, bank lending 
behaviour and derivatives pricing, meaning that any impact from QE will likely have a 
widespread economic effect, both over the short and long-term.  
Using univariate GARCH modelling, this chapter finds there is indeed a strong positive 
reaction from QE gilt auctions, albeit only on UK gilts, whereas sterling-based corporate bond 
indexes had mixed reactions and UK equities were almost entirely unaffected. For asset 
volatility, which was the main emphasis of this chapter, this chapter finds that days preceding 
QE announcements and auctions significantly reduced gilt volatility, however for equities 
volatility spiked on auction days while for bonds the effects were mixed and weak. The overall 
conclusion to draw from these results was that QE announcements and auctions had only a very 
narrow effect on UK financial markets, with only gilt markets being consistently and 
systematically affected. 
Finding that only gilts were shown to have been significantly affected by QE, this chapter 
examines the volatility relationships between gilts, equities and bonds in order to determine 
whether QE could have had an effect on these assets through a consistent and significant spill-
over between these asset types. This chapter’s results point towards significant spill-over effects 
over the entire sample, however the results of the sub-sample analyses focussing on the QE1 
and QE2 periods were far less consistent. For equities in particular these results show 
insignificant variance relationships between gilts and the FTSE indices during both QE1 and 
QE2. While corporate bonds in general exhibited stronger spill-overs, these effects were again 
less significant during QE2 in particular.  
Finally, this chapter examines alternative measures of financial stress, risk and uncertainty 
using indicators that are related to equity, bond and gilt markets. Using a Financial stress index 
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composed of these indicators, this chapter establishes that QE events had significant impacts 
on financial stress, however the evidence suggests that the effects of the announcements and 
auctions were contradictory in effect. This chapter also finds that over the longer-term QE 
intervention appears to not have systematically reduced financial stress in any significant 
manner. 
The overall conclusions of this chapter are that QE had its strongest effects on the volatility 
of gilt markets, a result that is reflected frequently in the literature. However, for bonds and 
equities the results are far less convincing, with bonds showing erratic and inconsistent 
reactions to QE announcements and auctions while exhibiting weakened variance relationships 
during QE periods. For equities the conclusion of this chapter is that QE did not significantly 
reduce return volatility, and there may be have instead caused volatility in equity markets to 
increase by purchasing UK gilts. The lack of effect on volatility, coupled with the limited effect 
on price levels, is fairly damning of QE. For financial markets a successful QE policy would 
have decreased volatility across a range of assets and reduced financial stress in general, 
allowing more relaxed trading conditions and improving lending channels. The negative 
conclusions of this chapter have strong implications for the holders of equities in particular, 
especially banks, as it suggests that banks would be required to hold ever-greater amounts in 
reserve due the increased volatility impact of QE. At the very least, QE cannot be considered 
an overwhelming success in improving financial conditions and may in fact have contributed 
to the constrained bank-lending behaviour that has been recorded since the financial crisis 
(Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010), (De Haas & Van Horen, 2012). The wider economy is also 
likely to have been negatively affected by this failure to calm financial markets, with the limited 
bank-lending stifling real investment. 
However, it is important not to over-estimate the impact of these results. The analysis in 
this chapter conducts does not prove that QE had no effect on financial market conditions, only 
that the effect was not immediately captured on auction days and announcements, and that any 
long-term effects took place beyond the three phases of QE. Furthermore, this chapters 
modelling of volatility spill-overs is simplistic by necessity, and future analysis could provide 
stronger conclusions on how gilt volatility reductions translated into other financial markets. 
Further research could also explore the negative relationship between equities and gilt 
volatilities to determine whether it is a UK specific effect or indeed connected to Quantitative 
Easing rather than conventional monetary policy intervention. It could also be useful in future 
research to analyse whether weakening variance relationships were a result of QE, or merely a 
symptom of the financial market duress that QE was attempting to remedy, a question that is 
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unfortunately beyond the scope of this chapter. As it stands, the conclusions of this chapter are 
that QE unfortunately did not consistently reduce asset volatility, and so did not substantially 
improve financial conditions in terms of market risk, bank lending and through these, economic 
growth.
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Chapter.5 
Financial Stress and Forecasting UK Equity Risk Premiums 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The issue of US equity premium prediction using both economic and technical 
indicators is the subject of extensive study and has been since the early 1970s. Recent studies 
have found that for the US stock predictability has not existed during the last 30 years, and that 
the ability of investors to exploit information from predictive economic variables has been 
almost entirely crowded-out. It has also been established by articles like Guidolin & 
Timmermann’s (2005) and Lee & Kim (1993) that financial and economic uncertainty have a 
significant impact on market efficiency and therefore the predictability of equity returns. With 
the upheaval of the 2008 financial crisis, an examination of the impact of financial and 
economic stress on return prediction is particularly relevant, especially in connection to the 
unconventional monetary policy strategies used by the FED, ECB and BoE. This chapter asks 
and answers the question whether for the UK, financial and economic cycles have a significant 
impact on stock predictability and thereby UK market efficiency, examining in addition 
whether UK equity premiums follow the same patterns and characteristics as their US 
counterparts. The focus of the study is the examination of spreads, valuation ratios and other 
economic variables and if they can be used to predict the equity premium on the two largest 
UK equity indexes. Following the recent addition to US literature by Neely et al (2014), which 
finds that equity premiums can be predicted as successfully with technical trading rules as 
economic variables, this chapter also analyses technical indicators in UK financial markets.  
This chapter produces results that are commensurate with much of the recent literature 
on US equity premium forecasting using economic variables, however results are found that 
are at odds with the favourable use of technical indicators exhibited in Neely et al. (2014). For 
economic variables this chapter find that only a select few predictors can provide consistent 
forecasting ability both in and out of sample, these variables being the most frequently cited in 
the US literature. For technical indicators the majority of trend-following trading rules cannot 
predict equity premium, with only the indicators that utilise both trade volumes and pricing 
trends having any success, and even these results are borderline economically insignificant. 
Furthermore, unlike Neely et al (2014) this chapter finds that the combination of the information 
from these indicators into principal components does not consistently yield superior predictive 
performance, with the in and out-of-sample performance resting heavily on the model selection 
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used in the principal component procedure. There is a strong degree in variability in the 
performance of forecasting variables over time, with the variability having strong links to both 
the business and financial cycles. This chapter finds that there is substantial component of 
predictability related to the business cycle, however that the business cycle alone is insufficient 
in explaining the time-varying nature of equity prediction. This chapter finds results showing 
that periods of high financial stress, such as the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis, significantly 
increase the predictive performance of both types of indicators when compared to periods of 
relaxed financial circumstances, an effect that is even more pronounced than the results found 
for the business cycle. 
To investigate these predictors individually, this chapter employs the standard 
predictive regression frameworks, as well as using principal component analysis to incorporate 
information from all of the indicators combined. Monthly data spanning 1975 to 2017 is used, 
maximising the sample size to compensate for the relatively short period of data availability for 
the UK compared to the US. A battery of tests and statistics are used to compare the 
performance of these predictors against benchmarks popular in the literature, including the use 
of out-of-sample analysis to ensure robustness.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the existing 
literature on equity premium predictability, briefly discussing the methods and results used as 
well as the changing consensus of the literature. Section 3 then discusses the empirical approach 
and data used in the chapter. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings of both in-sample and 
out-of-sample predictability, before discussing the use of financial stress indicators to analyse 
time-varying predictability. Section 5 then offers some concluding remarks opportunities for 
expansion. 
5.2 Literature Review 
For the purposes of this chapter, the important elements of this extensive literature are 
the articles that discuss stock return predictability with regards to financial conditions, policy 
regimes and the business cycle, as well as stability of prediction over time, and breakpoints in 
the predictability of returns. The following section of this chapter will therefore summarise 
these distinct areas relevant to stock return prediction, starting with articles that examine the 
relationship between financial variables and macroeconomic indicators such as GDP and 
inflation. Next, the direct issue of the predictability of stock returns, and the significance of 
individual indicators will be discussed.  
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The academic study of stock return predictability has been ongoing for over a century, 
with new methods and innovations in statistical analysis allowing for the revision of initially 
favourable results on equity premium prediction. The 1970s and 80s saw the publication of 
several articles cynical of whether stock returns could be predicted at all, with the conventional 
view being that a simple random walk process was the most effective for the prediction of stock 
returns. This, some have argued, was because stock markets were subject to the market 
efficiency elements of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in that readily available economic 
information could not be used systematically for the prediction of excess returns. More recently 
however, several studies have debated this issue, finding that stock returns could indeed be 
systematically predicted, and additional theoretical articles have argued that these findings are 
still consistent with EMH. Once stock return predictability had been established, recent studies 
have focussed on which variables provide the most explanatory power, and whether these 
relationships are stable over time and monetary regime changes.  
For a substantial period of time stock returns were thought to be best characterised by a 
simple random-walk process. More recently however, several articles have been produced that 
find evidence that stock returns can be predicted by other financial variables, macroeconomic 
indicators, and as will be discussed later in this section, by monetary policy indicators. The 
most frequently used variables for predicting stock returns include proxies that relate to equity 
risk premium. Rozeff (1984) for example, uses stock dividend yields as a proxy, while 
Campbell (1987) use the default premium on bonds as a proxy and Fama & French (1989) use 
past volatility in stock returns. Industrial output is also used in the aforementioned Pesaran & 
Timmermann (1995) article, Chen et al (1986) and Balvers et al (1990). In Pesaran & 
Timmermann (1995) they use a variety of financial indicators including dividend yield, 
earnings/price ratio, the 1 and 12-month T-bill rates, the inflation rate, growth in narrow money 
stock and the rate of industrial growth. In all of these cases the growth of industrial output is 
found to contain predictive power for future stock returns. There are several studies like Fama 
and French (1989) that link bond market factors and the term structure of interest rates to the 
predictability of stock returns. Campbell (1987) finds that the risk premia on stock tends to 
move closely with risk premia of 20-years to maturity bonds, using a model that captures both 
conditional means and variances. Pesaran and Timmermann (1994), who focus on stock return 
predictability at varying time horizons, also use a variety of interest rates of different maturities, 
finding most of them to have strong predictive power for S&P 500 stock return. Technical 
indicators and market trading rules have also been used to predict the stock return, with varying 
results. Neely et al (2014) and Baetje and Menkhoff (2016) examine the success of technical 
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indicators in predicting US equity premiums, with Neely et al (2014) finding that technical 
indicators outperform economic predictors.  
In terms of empirical techniques, the majority of earlier studies use linear models. As 
Granger (1992) comments, during the early seventies the consensus existed that stock returns 
could not be predicted by the simplest linear models. However, after this time ARIMA models 
and Vector Autoregressive models (VAR) have been used in several articles to demonstrate 
stock return predictability, such as Campbell’s variance decomposition for stock returns (1990) 
and Thorbecke (1997). More recently many commentators have discussed how forecasting over 
long time horizons potentially causes large errors and have pointed out regime changes break 
down the forecast ability of many predictors. For the forecasting of GDP Giacomini & Rossi 
(2006) find that there is a breakdown in the usefulness of financial variables including yield 
curves over the 1970s and 80s. Inoue & Rossi (2011) find that changing monetary policy 
regimes are a reason for breakdowns in forecasting of economic variables and note that 
structural break tests are often ineffective for determining when parameters have changed. 
Because of this literature many articles on stock predictability have attempted to incorporate 
regime-switching models to accommodate for this variability. Granger (1992) surveys this 
literature and compares the predictions of a random-walk process, ARIMA processes as wells 
as regime changing models such as Switching Threshold Auto Regressive (STAR) models. 
They also consider cointegration models for use in stock return prediction. After this survey 
they recommend the continued use of models that incorporate causal variables but also include 
regime switching features. Pesaran and Timmermann (1995, 2000) present one of the most 
frequently used models for predicting stock returns in an economically exploitable way. In a 
series of publications, they develop a system of recursive modelling to represent an invented 
investor who only holds ex-ante information and attempts to earn excess returns. In Pesaran & 
Timmermann (2000) they account for the changing usefulness of indicators by allowing 
variables to be incorporated only when they add significant predictive power to the model, 
rather than being continuously included. Furthermore, the points at which new potentially 
relevant variables are included is designated within the model rather than being imposed by the 
authors, avoiding potential issues associated with choosing breakpoints using hindsight rather 
than ex-ante information. Multiple techniques are often employed in the more recent studies of 
equity premium forecasting. For example, Rapach et al. (2010) use the standard OLS predictive 
framework, but then create a combined forecast approach from using a weighted average of 
multiple individual economics indicators. 
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Since the early 2000s, where there has been a revival of studies questioning stock return 
predictability, empirical focus has been on in improving the accuracy of the linear and recursive 
modelling. Goyal and Welch (2008) uses the standard bivariate analysis, however they use 
bootstrapping in order to improve the accuracy of t-statistics used in significance testing. This 
approach is also used in Neely et al (2014), Amihud and Hurvich (2004) and Lewellen (2004) 
amongst others. Others have sought to improve the accuracy of stock prediction analysis by 
imposing economic constraints on stock returns, such as Phan and Sharma (2015), where they 
use non-negative parameter restrictions, and Pettenuzzo et al (2014) where they constrain the 
equity premium to be non-negative and enforce limitations on the Sharpe ratio. These 
modifications, they argue, increase the performance of stock return predictors, while 
maintaining realistic restrictions. 
The overall consensus in results of the earlier literature on stock returns is that they can 
be forecasted, albeit with varying degrees of success based on the time-periods and countries 
in question. However since 2004 there has been a re-visiting of these results, most famously by 
Goyal & Welch (2008) where they question whether predictability ever existed. Using historical 
average equity premiums as benchmarks, they analyse predictability both in-sample and out-
of-sample and find that most economic indicators cannot outperform this simple benchmark 
over the long run consistently. Since publication this paper is arguably considered one 
of the benchmarks for methodology and data selection, and much of the predictability literature 
produced after 2008 utilises the data or methodology of this paper. Rapach et al. (2010) 
for example revisit Goyal & Welch’s paper, and argue the case for the combination of multiple 
economic indicators as significantly outperforming historical averages as a means of equity 
premium prediction, meaning that combined economic indicators have forecasting success 
where the examination of individual indicators show less optimistic results. They also argue 
that these findings are robust to the impact of economic cycles, and in fact that equity premium 
prediction is at its most effective during periods of economic uncertainty.  
 With the more recent consensus being that long-term stock predictability is non-
existent, there has been a shift in focus from the traditional study of economic variables to the 
analysis of other aspects of stock predictability. As an example, Neely et al.’s (2014) 
examination of technical indicators uses elements of Goyal and Welch’s (2008) economic 
predictor dataset in their comparative study, seeking to determine whether technical trading 
rules suffer from the same lack of long-run forecasting ability as economic predictors. They 
find that economic variables contain complementary information to technical indicators, and 
that these technical indicators often outperform economic predictors both in and out of sample. 
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In a recent paper, Baetje and Menkhoff (2016) examines both economic and technical 
indicators, drawing methodology and data from both aforementioned papers, but focusses on 
the instability of these predictors since the 1970s. They find several breakpoints in terms of 
predictive relationships, presenting evidence that economic variables in particular suffer from 
structural breaks in terms of predictability. They also argue that technical indicators are much 
more consistent, containing economically exploitable relationships with stock returns over the 
long term.  
 Other studies have noted the strong time-varying nature of stock predictability. There 
is a sizeable literature that discusses how monetary policy regimes and business cycles affect 
forecasting. In terms of stock volatility Hamilton & Lin (1996) and Schwert (1989, 1999) find 
identifying economic turning points are highly important to forecasting and find that 60% of 
the variance of stock returns are accounted for by economic recessions. Additionally, Clare and 
Psaradakis (1995) find evidence of a January and September effect robust across stock sizes in 
UK stock markets. The usage of macroeconomic variables to observe patterns in stock market 
characteristics is also to be found in Schwert (1989) as well as Fama and French (1989). The 
latter of these two articles uses business cycle indicators and find that excess stock returns vary 
inversely with business conditions, i.e. that the greatest stock returns are found in periods of 
recession. They also find that there are strong linkages between bond and stock markets, 
especially during recessions. Using a variety of tests, they show that factors that track bond 
returns also work effectively in predicting stock returns, and to some extent vice-versa. In a 
more recent paper, Henkel et al. (2011) find a strong counter-cyclical factor to stock return 
predictability in most of the G7 countries, arguing that many of the frequently cited economic 
indicators, such as term spreads and dividend yields, only give important information during 
economic downturns. 
While the relationship between the economic cycle and stock predictability has been 
frequently discussed, there exists less studies that relate financial circumstances to stock 
predictability. A few examples include Guidolin & Timmermann’s (2005) study of the 
importance of different ‘regime states’ for UK stock returns. They characterise ‘Bear’ states as 
having high volatility and negative returns, while ‘Bull’ states contain periods of high returns 
and low volatility. They argue that different business cycle conditions have implications for the 
optimal portfolio of stocks, bonds and bills through effects on financial conditions. Lee and 
Kim (1993) find that the October 1987 crash in the US strengthened the co-movements amongst 
stock markets, and that higher volatility periods coincide with stronger price co-movements. 
Their key finding is that stock returns are economically predictable and exploitable however 
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note that there is very variable indicator effectiveness over time, some of which is accounted 
for by periods of financial stress. Monetary policy is also linked to stock return prediction 
through its interaction with the business cycle and financial conditions. Patelis (1997), finds 
that monetary policy indicators such as the yield spread predict initially lower expected returns 
and then higher thereafter. They find evidence that expected real returns are unaffected by 
monetary policy, however expected dividend growth and expected excess returns are strongly 
affected. Ewing (2001) also finds that monetary policy is a significant indicator for stock returns 
using a similar VAR model. Thorbecke (1997) finds a relationship between negative shocks to 
the Federal Funds rate and stock returns and positive shocks to unborrowed reserves and stock 
returns. In this way Thorbecke finds a link between monetary policy similar in nature to 
Quantitative Easing and the level of stock returns. These findings are corroborated in Jensen & 
Johnson (1995) who find in the period 1962-1991 expected stock returns are significantly 
higher in expansive monetary policy periods. In a further paper they examine whether business 
conditions alone account for this effect, or whether the monetary sector has a separate and 
distinguishable effect. In this chapter they use the Federal Reserve’s discount rate as a proxy 
for monetary policy stance and find that dividend yields and default spreads have significantly 
different effects on stock returns depending on the Fed’s monetary stance. They find that only 
in expansive periods do these variables player a significant part in explaining expected stock 
returns, while during restrictive periods the effects are far less significant (Jensen & Johnson, 
1996). 
The overall extent of the relevant literature for this chapter covers three distinct subject 
areas, firstly whether stock returns can be predicted by economic or financial indicators. As has 
been shown above, the majority of the evidence for this revolves around US stock returns, 
however the Pesaran and Timmermann (2000) articles have focussed on UK stock returns in 
their extensive studies. The second area focusses on the stability of the predictions across time, 
sampling horizons and altering business cycles/economic conditions, where the general 
consensus is that predictability alters by large amounts across different sample horizons and is 
strongly impacted by the business cycle and economic crises. Finally, the literature above 
debates whether financial conditions and monetary policy has a significant impact on asset 
prices, especially the prediction of future returns, and finds for the most part that monetary 
policy regimes do indeed alter forecasting. This chapter aims to tie these strands of literature 
together by questioning whether UK stock returns can be predicted by financial and economic 
indicators, whether further predictive ability can occur during periods of financial stress as well 
as during the business cycle and different monetary policy regimes. 
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5.3 Methodology 
As initial analysis, this chapter follows the conventional framework for analysing equity 
risk premium forecasting, which is a simple bivariate regression model: 
𝑟𝑡+1 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1      (1) 
Where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the equity risk premium i.e. the return on a stock index minus of the risk-free rate 
between periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1. 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a economic variable as a predictor variable and 𝜀𝑡+1 is a 
zero-mean disturbance term. Economic variables/indicators are defined in this chapter as time 
series variables that contain economic information relevant to the present and future levels of 
stock returns. As an example, credit spreads contain information about the relative riskiness of 
UK financial markets, which contains information relevant to UK equities through its measure 
of default probabilities and risk at during that time period. While there exists a great body of 
literature linking stock returns to a spectrum of different variables, this chapter limits the 
analysis to the most frequently cited and successful indicators. Technical indicators are defined 
in this chapter as trend-following measures that capture price movements and trading activity 
associated with the equity indexes in question. In this case, the technical indicators in all cases 
capture recent price movements and trading volumes, both of which theoretically yield 
important information for future FTSE price levels and therefore returns. In this case the equity 
risk premium is the difference between the continuously compounded return on the FTSE100 
and ALLSHARE indexes including dividends, and the log return on a risk-free bill. To examine 
whether stock returns are predictable via other economic or technical indicators, the value of 𝛽𝑖 
must be determined to be significantly greater than zero. 
Data Selection 
This chapter approximates the data used in Goyal and Welch (2008) in order to keep results 
comparable with previous studies. Given that the focus of this chapter is UK stock return 
predictability however, some of the variables used in Goyal and Welch have been omitted 
because they have no UK equivalents, or that the UK equivalent has been recorded for a much 
shorter time period and if it were to be included it would a prohibitively short sample period. 
As it stands, this chapter estimates predictive regressions using monthly data starting in January 
1975 for the FTSE ALLSHARE index and December 1983 for the FTSE100. For the economic 
variables, this chapter used the following to predict equity risk premium: 
1) Dividend yield (DY) of the equity index, the total dividend amount for the index, 
expressed as a percentage of the total market value for the constituents of that index. 
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𝐷𝑌𝑡 =
∑ (𝐷𝑡∗𝑁𝑡)
𝑛
1
∑ (𝑃𝑡∗𝑁𝑡)
𝑛
𝑛
∗ 100     (2) 
2) Price/Earnings Ratio (PE) of the equity index, derived by dividing the total market value 
of an index by the total earnings. 
𝑃𝐸𝑡 =
∑ (𝑃𝑡∗𝑁𝑡)
𝑛
1  
∑ (𝐸𝑡∗𝑁𝑡)
𝑛
1
∗ 100    (3) 
Where: 
𝐷𝑌𝑡 = aggregate dividend yield on day 𝑡 
𝑃𝐸𝑡 = price earnings ratio at day 𝑡 
𝐷𝑡  = dividend per share on day 𝑡  
𝑁𝑡 = number of shares in issue on day 𝑡 
𝐸𝑡 = earnings per share on day 𝑡 (Negative earnings per share are treated as zero) 
𝑃𝑡 = unadjusted share price on day 𝑡 
𝑛 = number of constituents in index 
3) Treasury Bill rate (TBL): interest rate on a three-month Treasury bill. 
4) Long-term yield (LTY): long-term government bond yield. (Included maturities are 5, 
10, 15 and 20 years). 
5) Term spread (TMS): the long-term yield minus the Treasury bill rate. (Included are the 
spreads between the 3-month rate and the 5, 10 and 15 years to maturity yields). 
6) Default Yield Spread (DYS): The difference between the yields of Moody’s Baa rated 
bonds and Moody’s Aaa rated bonds. 
7) Default return spread (DRS): the difference between the yields of corporate bonds and 
government gilts of the same maturity. 
8) Inflation (INF): calculated as a percentage change in the RPI index for all products. 
Following Neely (2014) an extra lag is included to account for delays in RPI releases. 
9) Industrial Production (PROD) (MAN): the percentage change in the Index of Industrial 
production for production and manufacturing respectively. 
10) Stock Variance (SVAR): Measured as the sum of squared daily returns on the FTSE100 
and FTSEALLSHARE. 
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics for these economic variables used, including the 
number of observations for each individual. Note that the sample sizes of most of the 
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regressions are constrained by the FTSE100 data, which only begins in 1984. It can be seen that 
the average monthly equity premium for the FTSE100 is 1.09E-03, which is smaller than the 
FTSEALLSHARE mean of 1.30E-03. Additionally, almost all of the economic variables are 
non-normal barring the longer-term term spreads and the FTSE100 dividend yield. 
 In addition to these macroeconomic variables, this chapter follows the methodology of 
Neely et al (2014) in including 14 technical price indicators following three popular technical 
strategies. These indicators are calculated in the exact same method as seen in Neely et al 
(2014). The first moving-average (MA) rule generates a buy or sell signal (𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 1 for buy, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡= 
0 for sell) by comparing two pricing moving averages. These are shown below: 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡  ≥ 𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡
 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡  <  𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡
     (4) 
Where 
𝑀𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = (
1
𝑗
) ∑ 𝑃𝑡−𝑖
𝑗−1
𝑖=0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑠, 𝑙;     (5) 
𝑃𝑡 is the level of the FTSE100 or the FTSEALLSHARE, and 𝑠 and 𝑙 is the length of the short 
and long moving-average. This chapter values 𝑠 at either 1, 2 or 3 periods while 𝑙 is valued at 
either 9 or 12 periods. As described in Neely et al (2014) the MA rule generates a buy signal 
when the short moving average is greater than the long moving average. The intuition behind 
this is that when prices are trending upward the short MA tends to increase faster than the long 
MA, generating a buy signal. The reverse is also true for the sell signal. 
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics Economic Variables 
Economic Indicators  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Jarque-Bera  Prob.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev.  Obs. 
FTSE100  1.09E-03 2.88E-03 5.41E-02 -0.13 0.02 -1.24 8.60 622.36 0.00 0.44 0.15 398 
FTSE100DY 3.65 3.59 5.76 1.98 0.78 -0.01 2.74 1.05 0.59 1367.74 224.71 375 
FTSE100PE 17.21 15.77 39.63 7.70 6.01 1.23 4.44 96.02 0.00 4905.82 10246.00 285 
FTSEALLSHARE 1.30E-03 3.63E-03 8.92E-02 -0.14 0.02 -0.79 7.78 533.71 0.00 0.66 0.22 505 
FTSEALLDY 4.07 3.83 8.03 2.06 1.15 0.60 2.81 30.99 0.00 2058.15 673.62 506 
FTSEALLPE 17.58 16.90 33.68 8.03 5.01 0.70 3.28 24.71 0.00 5079.82 7227.15 289 
TBL 6.70 5.86 16.18 0.05 4.38 0.15 2.08 19.52 0.00 3390.26 9670.07 506 
LTY(5) 7.15 7.04 15.54 0.22 3.89 -0.03 1.87 26.86 0.00 3620.12 7659.92 506 
LTY(10) 7.50 7.59 15.44 0.66 3.79 0.11 1.77 33.09 0.00 3794.41 7236.08 506 
LTY(15) 7.57 7.77 15.69 1.04 3.73 0.32 1.95 31.60 0.00 3830.64 7036.20 506 
TMS(3-5) 0.45 0.55 4.80 -3.94 1.42 -0.26 3.53 11.38 0.00 229.85 1023.17 506 
TMS(3-10) 0.80 0.99 5.98 -4.55 1.83 -0.19 3.07 3.23 0.20 404.15 1699.17 506 
TMS(3-15) 0.87 0.94 7.13 -5.20 2.21 -0.01 3.08 0.16 0.92 440.38 2463.15 506 
DRS(5) 0.36 0.32 1.02 -0.10 0.23 0.81 3.09 34.29 0.00 112.94 15.98 316 
DRS(10) 0.30 0.29 1.31 -0.28 0.29 0.92 4.07 59.55 0.00 95.27 26.89 316 
DRS(15) 0.24 0.26 1.59 -0.42 0.42 0.91 3.62 36.30 0.00 56.88 42.25 236 
INF 5.64 3.70 26.90 -1.60 5.28 1.94 6.56 581.42 0.00 2849.70 14062.72 505 
PROD 0.06 0.10 7.50 -7.00 1.20 -0.07 9.72 951.51 0.00 31.00 731.28 505 
MAN 0.04 0.10 9.50 -9.60 1.34 -0.32 14.05 2578.62 0.00 19.40 901.71 505 
DYS 1.11 0.97 3.38 0.55 0.46 1.71 6.73 540.49 0.00 561.21 108.31 506 
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The second strategy used is based on pricing momentum and is a relatively simple 
calculation. The buy signal is generated when 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑡−𝑚
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡−𝑚
     (6) 
I.e. when the current stock price is higher than its level 𝑚 periods ago, where in this case 𝑚 
takes the value of either 9 or 12 periods. The interpretation of this momentum rule is that if 
prices are higher/lower than they were several months ago, this indicates a positive/negative 
momentum which may continue into the future, generating capital gains/loss should the investor 
purchase the stock now. 
Finally, this chapter uses the ‘on-balance’ volume used by Neely et al (2014) but originally 
from Granville (1963). This is defined as follows: 
𝑂𝐵𝑉𝑡 = ∑ 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑘𝐷𝑘
𝑡
𝑘=1      (7) 
Where 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑘 is a measure of the trading volume during period 𝑘 and 𝐷𝑘 is a binary variable 
that is valued 1 if 𝑃𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘−1 ≥ 0 and -1 otherwise. The same buying signal is then generated 
from 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝑡  
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡
𝑂𝐵𝑉  ≥ 𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡
𝑂𝐵𝑉
 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡
𝑂𝐵𝑉  <  𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡
𝑂𝐵𝑉     (8) 
Where 
𝑀𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝑂𝐵𝑉 = (
1
𝑗
) ∑ 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝑡−𝑖
𝑗−1
𝑖=0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑠, 𝑙;    (9) 
This technical indicator combines the information from the MA signal with information from 
relatively high recent trade volumes, generating a buy signal when there is a strong positive 
upward price trend coupled with high trading activity. Once again 𝑠 is valued at 1,2 and 3 and 
𝑙 9 and 12. The buy signals from these three indicator types discussed above are denoted MA, 
MOM and OBV respectively. For more information on the rationale of such indicators, see 
Neely et al (2014) however they are designed to capture trends in equity prices. Tables 2 and 3 
contain the summary statistics of these technical indicators for both the FTSE100 and 
ALLSHARE. As can be seen in both tables, the indicators show buy signals between 60% and 
72% of the time for the FTSE100 and between 63% and 74% of the time for the ALL SHARE 
index. These statistics resemble the same trends as found in the American data of Neely et al 
(2014). However it should be noted that this chapter achieves a much smaller sample range, 
with 228 observations being the smallest sample size. This is due to the limited data set for 
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trade volumes for both the FTSE indices, which only become available on DATASTREAM 
from 1993 onwards.  
For these technical indicators the variables take the place of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 in Equation (1) changing it to 
𝑟𝑡+1 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1     (10) 
Where 𝑆𝑖.𝑡 denotes technical indicator 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The main hypothesis to test is that 𝛽𝑖  = 0 in 
both the economic and technical indicator regressions. Table 5.2 summarises all the included 
technical indicators. 
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics Technical Indicators FTSE100 
FTSE100   Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Prob.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev.  Obs. 
MA Buy (1>9) 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 -0.76 1.58 70.62 0.00 265.00 85.40 391 
MA Buy (1>12) 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 -0.79 1.62 70.85 0.00 265.00 84.01 388 
MA Buy (2>9) 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 -0.76 1.58 70.62 0.00 265.00 85.40 391 
MA Buy (2>12) 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 -0.85 1.73 73.17 0.00 270.00 82.11 388 
MA Buy (3>9) 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 -0.80 1.64 71.79 0.00 268.00 84.31 391 
MA Buy (3>12) 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 -0.91 1.82 75.53 0.00 274.00 80.51 388 
MOM (9) 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 -0.94 1.89 77.73 0.00 278.00 79.84 390 
MOM (12) 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 -0.97 1.94 78.83 0.00 278.00 78.30 387 
OBV Buy (1>9) 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 -0.54 1.30 48.03 0.00 178.00 65.65 282 
OBV Buy (1>12) 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 -0.51 1.26 47.29 0.00 174.00 65.48 279 
OBV Buy (2>9) 0.61 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 -0.47 1.22 47.55 0.00 173.00 66.87 282 
OBV Buy (2>12) 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 -0.36 1.13 46.69 0.00 164.00 67.60 279 
OBV Buy (3>9) 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 -0.48 1.23 47.63 0.00 174.00 66.64 282 
OBV Buy (3>12) 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 -0.40 1.16 46.80 0.00 167.00 67.04 279 
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Table 5.3 Summary Statistic Technical Indicators FTSEALLSHARE 
FTSEALL   Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Prob.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev.  Obs. 
MA Buy (1>9) 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 -0.93 1.86 98.13 0.00 353.00 102.28 497 
MA Buy (1>12) 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 -1.09 2.18 111.13 0.00 365.00 95.31 494 
MA Buy (2>9) 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 -0.88 1.78 95.50 0.00 349.00 103.93 497 
MA Buy (2>12) 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 -1.11 2.24 113.77 0.00 367.00 94.35 494 
MA Buy (3>9) 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 -0.98 1.96 102.07 0.00 358.00 100.12 497 
MA Buy (3>12) 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 -1.04 2.08 106.46 0.00 361.00 97.19 494 
MOM (9) 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 -1.12 2.26 115.53 0.00 370.00 94.55 497 
MOM (12) 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.43 -1.20 2.44 124.87 0.00 374.00 90.85 494 
OBV Buy (1>9) 0.66 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 -0.67 1.44 40.40 0.00 152.00 51.98 231 
OBV Buy (1>12) 0.64 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 -0.60 1.37 39.27 0.00 147.00 52.22 228 
OBV Buy (2>9) 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 -0.55 1.30 39.37 0.00 146.00 53.72 231 
OBV Buy (2>12) 0.64 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 -0.57 1.32 38.97 0.00 145.00 52.79 228 
OBV Buy (3>9) 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 -0.63 1.39 39.98 0.00 150.00 52.60 231 
OBV Buy (3>12) 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 -0.53 1.28 38.73 0.00 143.00 53.31 228 
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1 In-sample results 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the results of the bi-variate least squares regressions using 
Equations 1 and 10 for both the FTSE100 and FTSEALLSHARE. The coefficient on the 
economic and technical indicators is reported in the third column of each table, with the 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% the coefficient reported by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Additionally, the fourth column of each table reports the 𝑅2 statistic for each regression using 
the entire sample. For the FTSE100 it can be seen that only two of the regressors are found to 
be significant using data from their respective entire samples, with the longest term spread only 
being significant at the 10% level. The results of the FTSE ALLSHARE largely reflect those 
found for the FTSE100, however term spreads are found to have even less of an effect, and 
stock variance is a more significant factor for the ALLSHARE, which is likely due to the index 
containing relatively smaller and more risky stocks than the 100. Another point of interest is 
that none of the technical indicators are found to have significant predictive effects on either 
equity premium, even at the 10% significance level. This is in sharp contrast to the Neely et al. 
paper (2014), where almost all the technical indicators were found to have significant 
relationships with the equity premium on the S&P 500. Like Neely et al. (2014) buy signals 
predict mostly positive equity premiums for the FTSE100 but the MA indicators predict 
negative premiums for FTSEALLSHARE, all of which are insignificantly different from zero.  
P-value insignificance is not the only factor when considering economically significant 
predictive relationships. Although the 𝑅2 statistics are found to be very small for all of the 
predictors, economic and technical alike, this is to be expected due to the inherently 
unpredictable and volatile nature of stock returns, especially in a sample that includes financial 
crisis periods. Previous commentators have argued that an 𝑅2 statistic of 0.005 (0.5%) and 
above represents an economically significant degree of predictability (Kandel and Stambaugh 
1996, Xu 2004, Campbell and Thompson 2008, Neely et al. 2014) with Xu (2004) especially 
finding that profitable trading strategies can be generated from indicators that have low 
predictability. This chapter therefore uses 0.5% as a baseline to show economically important 
predictive relationships. As can be seen from Table 5.4, four of the indicators have 𝑅2’s that 
approach or surpass this level for the FTSE100, including one of the on-balance technical 
indicators. While the coefficients were found to be insignificant, the 5-year default return spread 
and the longest term-spread are shown to contain economically important information. For the 
FTSE ALLSHARE, five indicators of which two are technical indicators have also reported 𝑅2 
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above this threshold. None of the term-spreads are significant by this measure, while the default 
return spread does not quite reach the 0.005 threshold. For both equity indices it is only the on-
balance volume buy signal that seems to have a significant relationship with equity premiums. 
Apart from this, technical indicators perform very poorly over the entire sample. 
In addition to the standard 𝑅2 statistic this chapter is also interested in the performance 
of technical and economic indicators in periods of expansion or recession. Following the Neely 
et al. (2014) procedure, this chapter creates a pseudo 𝑅2 statistic for both the economic and 
technical variables during expansion and recession periods, with these periods being denoted 
by the OECD UK recession indicator from the St Louis Fed. When this dummy is valued 1 the 
UK was considered to be in recession by OECD indicators, and in expansion when the dummy 
was valued 0. The 𝑅2 was computed in the following manner: 
𝑅𝑐
2 = 1 −
∑ 𝐼𝑡
𝑐𝑇
𝑡=1 ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
2
∑ 𝐼𝑡
𝑐𝑇
𝑡=1 (𝑟𝑡−?̅?)
2  for 𝑐 =  EXP, REC;  (11) 
Where 𝐼𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑃 and 𝐼𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝐶  represent the aforementioned recession indicator dummy variables in 
period 𝑡. 𝜀?̂?,𝑡
2  is the fitted residual based on the full-sample estimates of each of the regression 
models for both technical and economic indicators. ?̅? is the sample mean of 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑇 is the 
number of usable observations. One important caveat to note is that the above equation can 
yield negative statistics, in such cases the interpretation is that the variable in question does not 
provide significant economic information during the denoted period.  
Starting with the FTSE100 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶
2  it can be seen that almost all of the economic indicators 
perform worse in recession periods compared to the entire sample 𝑅2 statistic, with the short 
default return spread and the default yield spreads being the exceptions. Both of these exhibit 
the economically significant 𝑅2 of above 0.005 during recession periods, most likely due to 
these indicators capturing corporate risk, which is of particular importance during periods of 
economic downturn. In comparison the technical indicators exhibit slightly larger statistics 
during recession periods, but still only on-balance volume indicators are found to be 
economically significant. For the FTSEALLSHARE, the results are somewhat different. While 
a few of the economic exhibit larger statistics for recession periods, most notably the short 
default return spread and the dividend yield, the technical indicators uniformly perform worse, 
with the on-balance volume signals losing their significance during these periods. 
The 𝑅𝐸𝑋𝑃
2  statistics for the FTSE100 show that almost all the economic predictors 
perform better in UK expansion periods than over the entire sample or indeed in recession 
periods. The exception to this is the technical indicators, which perform marginally better in 
 169 
 
recessions than expansions but not to an economically significant degree. In expansions 
periods, seven of the economic predictors show improved predictability over the 0.5% 
threshold, while none of the technical indicators achieve this. For the FTSEALLSHARE the 
results are mostly similar in nature. However, in contrast to the FTSE100 equity premium, the 
technical indicators almost uniformly perform better in expansion periods than over the entire 
sample or recession periods. In addition, only four of the economic indicators show 
economically significant statistics, while two of the technical indicators do so. Term spreads 
also perform much better in recession periods for the FTSEALLSHARE while performing 
worse for the FTSE100. If the conclusions of commentators like Bekaert et al (2009) and 
Henkel et al. (2011) are to be considered, where there is a predictable counter-cyclical factor to 
equity premiums, then it should be observed that the economic indicators with ties to the 
business cycle such as the term and default spreads should have stronger 𝑅2 statistics during 
these recession periods. As discussed above, this chapter’s results do not reflect this, however 
altering the sample to not include the financial crisis period, the 𝑅2 statistics are a lot more 
consistent with the conclusions of these other commentators, which suggests the financial crisis 
period has a significant effect on the outcomes of the sample predictive regressions. 
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Table 5.4 Bivariate Results FTSE100 
FTSE100  
Predictor Start Date Coefficient 𝑹𝟐 𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑪
𝟐  𝑹𝑬𝑿𝑷
𝟐  
TBL 1983M12 -0.0002 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0039 
LTY(5) 1983M12 -0.0002 0.0013 -0.0005 0.0026 
LTY(10) 1983M12 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0008 0.0019 
LTY(15) 1983M12 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0012 
TMS(3-5) 1983M12 0.0007 0.0026 0.0011 0.0037 
TMS(3-10) 1983M12 0.0007 0.0039 0.0024 0.0049 
TMS(3-15) 1983M12 0.0007* 0.0047 0.0030 0.0059 
DRS(5) 1990M12 -0.0059 0.0059 0.0103 0.0020 
DRS(10) 1990M12 -0.0031 0.0027 -0.0009 0.0060 
DRS(15) 1997M08 -0.0022 0.0027 -0.0019 0.0066 
INF(-1) 1983M12 -0.0005 0.0025 -0.0004 0.0045 
INF(-2) 1983M12 -0.0005 0.0028 0.0010 0.0041 
INDMAN 1983M12 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
INDPROD 1983M12 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 
DY 1986M01 0.0026** 0.0108 -0.0008 0.0191 
PE 1993M07 -0.0001 0.0014 -0.0029 0.0051 
MA(1,9) 1984M09 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 
MA(1,12) 1984M12 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 
MA(2,9) 1984M09 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 
MA(2,12) 1984M12 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0013 0.0013 
MA(3,9) 1984M09 -0.0013 0.0010 -0.0011 0.0025 
MA(3,12) 1984M12 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0002 
MOM(9) 1984M09 0.0022 0.0026 0.0038 0.0017 
MOM(12) 1984M12 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0002 
OBV(1,9) 1993M10 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0004 
OBV(1,12) 1994M01 -0.0011 0.0010 0.0014 0.0006 
OBV(2,9) 1993M10 0.0022 0.0038 0.0073 0.0009 
OBV(2,12) 1994M01 -0.0011 0.0010 0.0014 0.0006 
OBV(3,9) 1993M10 0.0018 0.0027 0.0043 0.0013 
OBV(3,12) 1994M01 0.0028 0.0063 0.0142 -0.0004 
DYS 1983M12 -0.0015 0.0010 0.0060 -0.0027 
SVAR 1984M02 0.0000 0.0021 -0.0043 0.0067 
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Table 5.5 Bivariate Results FTSEALLSHARE 
FTSEALLSHARE  
Predictor Start Date Coefficient 𝑹𝟐 𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑪
𝟐  𝑹𝑬𝑿𝑷
𝟐  
TBL 1975M02 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0009 
LTY(5) 1975M02 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0007 
LTY(10) 1975M02 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0003 
LTY(15) 1975M02 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0003 
TMS(3-5) 1975M02 0.0004 0.0007 0.0020 -0.0002 
TMS(3-10) 1975M02 0.0005 0.0017 0.0042 -0.0001 
TMS(3-15) 1975M02 0.0005 0.0028 0.0061 0.0005 
DRS(5) 1990M12 -0.0052 0.0046 0.0078 0.0016 
DRS(10) 1990M12 -0.0030 0.0025 -0.0016 0.0063 
DRS(15) 1997M08 -0.0021 0.0024 -0.0018 0.0062 
INF(-1) 1975M02 0.0001 0.0004 0.0008 0.0002 
INF(-2) 1975M02 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 -0.0012 
INDMAN 1975M02 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0018 
INDPROD 1975M02 0.0007 0.0017 0.0012 0.0021 
DY 1975M02 0.0019*** 0.0113 0.0130 0.0101 
PE 1993M03 -0.0002 0.0023 -0.0037 0.0074 
MA(1,9) 1975M11 -0.0011 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0015 
MA(1,12) 1976M02 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 
MA(2,9) 1975M11 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0013 0.0009 
MA(2,12) 1976M02 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0031 0.0024 
MA(3,9) 1975M11 -0.0014 0.0010 -0.0041 0.0040 
MA(3,12) 1976M02 -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0025 0.0023 
MOM(9) 1975M11 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 
MOM(12) 1976M02 -0.0018 0.0016 -0.0033 0.0044 
OBV(1,9) 1998M01 0.0015 0.0016 0.0000 0.0032 
OBV(1,12) 1998M04 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 
OBV(2,9) 1998M01 0.0039 0.0114 0.0064 0.0161 
OBV(2,12) 1998M04 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 
OBV(3,9) 1998M01 0.0015 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0034 
OBV(3,12) 1998M04 0.0031 0.0074 0.0011 0.0132 
DYS 1975M02 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0015 0.0022 
SVAR 1985M02 -0.0001*** 0.0174 0.0038 0.0269 
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5.4.2 Principal Component Analysis 
This chapter next uses principal component analysis to estimate the combined 
information from these economic and technical indicators. This method has the advantage over 
standard multivariate analysis as it incorporates information from these variables 
parsimoniously whilst filtering out noise or outliers from individual predictors and lessening 
the effects of sample overfitting. The principal component predictive regression for the 
economic variables is given by the following equation (𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁): 
𝑟𝑡+1 =  𝑎 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ?̂?𝑘,𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 + 𝜀𝑡+1    (12) 
 
Where the economic indicators 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥1,𝑡, … , 𝑥𝑁,𝑡)′ are included in a N-vector (N = 18) These 
are then incorporated to create a set of 𝐾 principal components. let ?̂?𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 =
 (?̂?1,𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁, … , ?̂?𝐾,𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁)′ denote the vector containing the principal components from the economic 
variables. These principal components are then regressed in the above equation in the same 
OLS manner as the previous regressions. 
 The same treatment was given to all the technical indicators with ?̂?𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 replacing 
?̂?𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 to create the 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻model: 
𝑟𝑡+1 =  𝑎 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ?̂?𝑘,𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝜀𝑡+1    (13) 
Where ?̂?𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 =  (?̂?1,𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 , … , ?̂?𝐾,𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻)′  is the vector containing the first 𝐾 principal components 
extracted from 𝑆𝑡 = (𝑆1,𝑡, … , 𝑆𝑁,𝑡)′, the 𝑁-Vector of the technical indicators. Finally, this 
chapter also parsimoniously includes information from the entire set of macroeconomic and 
technical indicators by estimating the following predictive regression, the 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿 model. 
𝑟𝑡+1 =  𝑎 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ?̂?𝑘,𝑡
𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝜀𝑡+1    (14) 
Here, all of the above variables are consolidated into a few principal components from the two 
vectors containing the macroeconomic and technical variables. Where ?̂?𝑡
𝐴𝐿𝐿 =
 (?̂?1,𝑡
𝐴𝐿𝐿 , … , ?̂?𝐾,𝑡
𝐴𝐿𝐿)′ is the 𝐾-vector containing the first 𝐾 principal components. 
 The selection method of the number of principal components to include follow Neely et 
al (2014). This chapter allowed 𝐾 = 𝑁 initially, creating the same number of principal 
components as there were variables. After this, only the principal components that added at 
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least 5% proportion explanatory power were taken. After this AIC and SIC criterion as well as 
adjusted 𝑅2 were used to select the appropriate value of 𝐾 to include in the regression. Tables 
5.6 and 5.7 show these statistics for the FTSE100 and FTSEALLSHARE indexes. For the 
FTSE100, three principal components were selected from amongst the technical indicators, four 
from the economic indicators, and two from a combination of these two variable sets, as shown 
by the highlighted areas of Table 5.6. For the ALLSHARE, one technical principal component 
was chosen, two economic principal components and model containing three principal 
components taken from both economic and technical indicators.  
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Table 5.6 PC Model Statistics FTSE100 
FTSE100 AIC SIC Adj-𝑹𝟐 
PC1 Tech  5.6159 5.6420 0.0000 
PC1 +PC2  5.6202 5.6593 -0.0007 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3** 5.6188 5.6710 0.0042 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 5.6256 5.6908 0.0009 
PC1 Econ 5.6645 5.6940 0.0268 
PC1 +PC2  5.6691 5.7133 0.0264 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 5.6759 5.7348 0.0239 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4** 5.6765 5.7501 0.0273 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 +PC5 5.6799 5.7682 0.0281 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 +PC5 
+PC6 
5.6857 5.7888 0.0264 
PC1 All 5.6919 5.7213 -0.0002 
PC1+PC2** 5.6679 5.7121 0.0276 
PC1+PC2+PC3 5.6748 5.7337 0.0249 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4 5.6833 5.7569 0.0207 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 +PC5 5.6851 5.7734 0.0230 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 +PC5 
+PC6 
5.6915 5.7945 0.0208 
 
Table 5.7 PC Model Statistics FTSEALLSHARE 
FTSEALL AIC SIC Adj-𝑹𝟐 
PC1 Tech** 5.6746 5.7048 0.0003 
PC1+PC2  5.6833 5.7286 -0.0040 
PC1+PC2+PC3 5.6920 5.7524 -0.0084 
PC1 Econ 5.6558 5.6853 0.0292 
PC1 +PC2**  5.6539 5.6980 0.0352 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 5.6584 5.7173 0.0349 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 5.6623 5.7360 0.0351 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4+PC5 5.6692 5.7575 0.0325 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 +PC5 
+PC6 
5.6768 5.7798 0.0291 
PC1 All 5.6784 5.7086 -0.0035 
PC1+PC2 5.6336 5.6788 0.0447 
PC1+PC2+PC3** 5.6317 5.6921 0.0506 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4 5.6402 5.7156 0.0467 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4+PC5 5.6402 5.7307 0.0507 
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Figures 5.1-5.11 show the principal component loadings as well as the plots of each 
principal component over the sample period. It can be seen by looking at Fig.5.1 and 5.7 that 
the first and second components of both the FTSE100 and ALLSHARE models are very similar 
in nature. The first component for both appears to switch from positive to negative during the 
financial crisis period, potentially indicating the movement of the UK economy from growth to 
recession in terms of economic cycles.  tTheis second components of both models spikes during 
periods that surround the financial crises in 2002 and 2007/8. This may explain why theseis 
components isare weighted heavily with the SVAR volatility measure and default yield spreads, 
as these are indicators are dramatically more variable during periods of financial instability. 
The third and fourth economic principal components of FTSE100, which are not present in the 
ALLSHARE model, show largely the same pattern as the second component, but with 
weightings that are more difficult to explain. In addition, observing Fig.5.1 it can be seen that 
the third component is valued mostly around zero, except during the interim period between 
QE1 and QE2, as well as the during the aforementioned 2002 financial crisis. It seems that the 
second, third and fourth components capture periods of economic instability where normal 
predictive relationships do not hold. 
Figures 5.2 and 5.7 show the time plots for the technical indicators. Due to the binary 
nature of the technical indicators, the component plots mainly take on two values, a positive or 
negative value depending on the time period. A positive value can be interpreted as a consensus 
buy-period for most of the technical indicators while negative values show consensus sell-
periods. It can be seen that sell signals occur at times corresponding once again to the 2002 and 
2008 financial crisis periods, as well as during most of the QE1 and QE2 periods. It seems that 
the second and third principal components for the FTSE100, which are once again not found in 
the ALLSHARE model, only become active during periods when the first ‘consensus’ 
component is in transition from buy to sell signals. These could therefore be interpreted as 
capturing periods where pricing conditions do not point to a clear trading strategy, i.e. ‘non-
consensus’ indicators. This could also represent a period of uncertainty and financial stress, 
similar to the second components of the economic indicators mentioned above. Figures 5.3 and 
5.8 show the time plots for the combined model 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿. Unsurprisingly, they appear to closely 
match the patterns show in figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.7 and 5.9, i.e. the economic and technical 
components.  
 
 Looking at figures 5.4 and 5.9 Ffor both of the indices it can be seen that the first 
economic principal component is loaded heavily with the spreads and interest rate elements of 
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the economic variables, while macroeconomic indicators like industrial production and RPI 
rates are given very little weight. The second principal component conversely incorporates 
these factors heavily, while also giving large weights to SVAR and DYS. The loadings of these 
components again suggest that both long-term business cycle elements as well as short term 
financial stress elements are captured in the components.It can be seen by looking at Fig.5.1 
that this component spikes during periods that surround the financial crises in 2002 and 2007/8. 
This may explain why this component is weighted heavily with the SVAR volatility measure 
and default yield spreads, as these are indicators are dramatically more variable during periods 
of financial instability. The third and fourth economic principal components of FTSE100, 
which are not present in the ALLSHARE model, show largely the same pattern as the second 
component, but with weightings that are more difficult to explain. In addition, observing Fig.5.1 
it can be seen that the third component is valued mostly around zero, except during the interim 
period between QE1 and QE2, as well as the during the aforementioned 2002 financial crisis. 
It seems that the second, third and fourth components capture periods of economic instability 
where normal predictive relationships do not hold. 
 
The first Technical principal component is largely similar for both indexes as shown by 
Figures 5.5 and 5.9 Similar to the proposition made by Neely et al. (2014), this component 
seems to be a consensus indicator amongst the buy signals generated from the technical 
strategies. It can be seen that the technical indicators are loaded almost equally into the 
component for both indexes, and the component is value positively when the buy signals are 
generated, and negatively when sell signals are generated. Figures 5.2 and 5.7 shows that sell 
signals occur at times corresponding once again to the 2002 and 2008 financial crisis periods, 
as well as during most of the QE1 and QE2 periods. It seems that the second and third principal 
components for the FTSE100, which are once again not found in the ALLSHARE model, only 
become active during periods when the first ‘consensus’ component is in transition from buy 
to sell signals. These could therefore be interpreted as capturing periods where pricing 
conditions do not point to a clear trading strategy, i.e. ‘non-consensus’ indicators. Finally, it 
can be seen in Figures 5.6 and 5.10 that for both of the 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿 models the first two principal 
components are split neatly into technical and economic indicators respectively. As Neely et al. 
(2014) argues, this indicates that the economic and technical indicators provide separate yet 
complementary information.  
As a final note, this chapter finds that both the in-sample and out-of-sample principal 
component regression results are significantly affected by the number of components included 
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in each respective predictive regression. For example, including only one technical principal 
component in the FTSE100 regression negatively impacts in-sample significance while slightly 
improving out-of-sample performance in comparison to the three components model. With no 
clear correct methodology on what information to include from the principal components, this 
chapter follows Neely et al (2014) in choosing models that perform the best according to 
information criterion and adjusted- 𝑅2 statistics, as this methodology is the most viable without 
using ex-post information.  
Table 5.8 shows the results of the 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻, 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 and 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿 models, including as 
before their respective performances during recessions/expansions. The 𝑅2 statistics for all 
models are greater than the 0.005 or 0.5% threshold. The technical models are found to be the 
least significant in predictive power, with only the third technical principal component for the 
FTSE100 being significant at the 10% level. The economic indicators perform better for both 
indexes, with significant coefficients and  𝑅2 statistics between 1 and 3%. The 
FTSEALLSHARE’s 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿 model understandably performs the best out of the three, as it 
parsimoniously incorporates relevant information from both the technical and economic 
indicators and is equal to more than the sum of the 𝑅2 statistics of the economic and technical 
models. This however is not the case for the FTSE100 where the model selection rule chose 
two principal components for 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿 for a parsimonious model, but these seems to have 
inhibited the explanatory power compared to the four principal-component economic model. 
The 𝑅2 statistic is still well over the 0.5% threshold however. 
The recession and expansion 𝑅2 statistics largely reflect the results found in the bi-
variate models discussed earlier. The 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 models for both indexes show that predictability 
is higher in recession than both the sample and the expansion periods and are greater than the 
0.5% economic significance threshold. For the 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁  and 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿 models, predictability for 
the most part is stronger in expansion periods rather than recessions, however the FTSE100 
𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿 equation exhibits stronger predictability during recessions, though not by a large degree. 
These results are found to be robust to the sample size. To check that 𝑅2 statistics were 
not affected by the relatively short samples of around 240 observations, this chapter re-did the 
principal component analysis, creating 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁, 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻  and 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿  models after removing 
the predictors that significantly shortened the sample size. The variables removed include all of 
the On-balance Volume buy signals, the 15-year default spread and the price-to-earnings ratio. 
Conducting the same regressions again yield results that are largely similar, with 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 
exhibiting much larger 𝑅2 statistics during expansions and the financial crisis period. 
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Table 5.8 PC In-Sample Results 
FTSE100      
Predictor Start Date Coefficient 𝑹𝟐 𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑪
𝟐  𝑹𝑬𝑿𝑷
𝟐  
PC1tech 1994M01 0.0004 0.0155 0.0418 -0.0072 
PC2tech  -0.0007 
   
PC3tech  -0.0019* 
   
PC1econ 1997M08 -0.0007** 0.0237 0.0140 0.0321 
PC2econ  -0.0011 
   
PC3econ  -0.0001 
   
PC4econ  0.0009 
   
PC1all 1997M08 0.0004 0.0172 0.0208 0.0147 
PC2all 
 
-0.0007* 
   
      
FTSEALLSHARE 
     
Predictor 
     
PC1tech 1998M04 0.0004 0.0055 0.0077 0.0035 
PC1econ 1997M08 -0.0007** 0.0310 0.0288 0.0331 
PC2econ 
 
-0.0015** 
   
PC1all 1998M04 0.0002 0.0405 0.0366 0.0440 
PC2all  -0.0010** 
   
PC3all  -0.0012* 
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Figure 5.1 Time-plots of FTSE100 Economic Principal Components 
  
1
8
0
 
 
  
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1993 1996 1998 2001 2003 2006 2008 2011 2013 2016
FTSE100 First Principal Component Technical 
Indicators
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1993 1996 1998 2001 2003 2006 2008 2011 2013 2016
FTSE100 Second Principal Component 
Technical Indicators
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1993 1996 1998 2001 2003 2006 2008 2011 2013 2016
FTSE100 Third Principal Component 
Technical Indicators
Figure 5.2 Time-plots of FTSE100 Technical Principal Components 
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Figure 5.3 Time-plots of FTSE100 All Principal Components 
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Figure 5.4 FTSE100 Economic Principal Components Loadings 
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Figure 5.5 FTSE100 Technical Principal Component Loadings 
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Figure 5.6 FTSE100 All Principal Component Loadings 
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Figure 5.7 Time-plots of FTSEALLSHARE Economic & Technical Principal Components 
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Figure 5.8 Time-plots of FTSEALLSHARE All Principal Components 
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Figure 5.9 FTSEALLSHARE Economic & Technical Principal Component Loadings 
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Figure 5.10 FTSEALLSHARE Technical All Component Loadings 
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Figure 5.11 FTSEALLSHARE Technical All Component Loadings 
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5.4.3 Out of Sample Analysis 
To check the validity of the previous sections’ results this chapter examines the out-of-
sample performance of these economic and technical predictors. The one step ahead equity 
premium forecast is given by the following equation. 
?̂?𝑡+1 = ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 + ?̂?𝑡,𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡     (15) 
Where ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 and ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 are the OLS estimates from an initial estimation period. These models were 
estimated using a 10-year sample to establish a reasonable in-sample period that accurately 
estimates the parameters. While this is a smaller initial estimation period than some 
commentators use, with Neely et al. (2014) using a 15-year initial sample and Goyal and Welch 
(2008) using 20 years, 10-years is used by Xu (2004) amongst others and is suitable for UK 
data as data availability precludes the use of longer estimation periods. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 
below show the start of the out-of-sample (OOS) start date in the second column for each 
predictor. In addition, this chapter like before also conducted an auxiliary regression which 
dropped several of the indicators where data is only available from relatively recently in order 
to lengthen the forecasting period. Furthermore, these forecasting models are all generated 
using the same time period, in order to improve comparison between the predictors.  This 
chapter also generates out-of-sample forecasts based on the same principal component analysis 
as before. 
?̂?𝑡+1
𝑗 = ?̂?𝑡 + ∑ ?̂?𝑡,𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ?̂?1:𝑡,𝑘,𝑡
𝑗
 for j = ECON, TECH, or ALL   (16) 
Where ?̂?1:𝑡,𝑘,𝑡
𝑗
is the 𝑘th principal component extracted from the macroeconomic, technical and 
a combination of the two, models. Once again, these predictors were estimated using OLS using 
a 10-year sample period. All of these forecasts are compared to the forecast given by an 
historical forecast of the equity premium, using the same respective initial estimation samples 
as each predictor. This historical average forecast is given by the simple equation: 
?̂?𝑡+1
𝐻𝐴 ∑ 𝑟𝑠
𝑡
𝑠=1      (17) 
Which is a benchmark used repeatedly in the literature surrounding out-of-sample forecasting, 
used most famously by Goyal and Welch (2008) and Campbell and Thompson (2008). This 
equation assumes a constant expected equity risk premium i.e. 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑡+1. Goyal and 
Welch (2008) find that most macroeconomic variables fail to outperform the historical average 
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for S&P 500 equity premium forecasting, with only the term spread and inflation being 
significantly superior in out-of-sample forecasting. 
 Tables 5.9 and 5.10 below show the results of these OOS forecasts, which have been 
summarised by a variety of means. First of all, this chapter uses the Campbell and Thompson 
(2008) out-of-sample 𝑅2 statistic (𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 ) as measure of predictor performance. This statistic 
measures the reduction in Mean Squared Forecast Error (MSFE) for the predictive regression 
forecast relative to the historical average discussed above. A positive value indicates that the 
predictor outperforms the historical average while a negative value indicates the opposite. The 
features of the 𝑅2 statistics mentioned above, where values over 0.005 are considered to be 
economically significant, still hold for this statistic. In addition to the overall 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistic, this 
chapter also includes 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 𝑅𝑒𝑐, 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 𝐸𝑥𝑝 statistics which measure the same MSFE, but only 
during periods denoted as recessions and expansions like the in-sample counterparts.  The 
fourth column shows the MSFE-Adjusted statistic, taken from Clark and West (2007). Which 
is given by regressing the value from the following equation on a constant and testing the 
resulting t-statistic for a zero coefficient. 
𝑓𝑡+1 = (𝑟𝑡+1 − ?̂?1𝑡,𝑡+1)
2 − [(𝑟𝑡+1 − ?̂?2𝑡,𝑡+1)
2
− (?̂?1𝑡,𝑡+1 − ?̂?2𝑡,𝑡+1)
2
]  (18) 
Where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the equity premium, ?̂?1𝑡,𝑡+1 is the returns forecasted from the historical average 
and ?̂?2𝑡,𝑡+1 is the returns forecasted from the predictive regressions. Regressing 𝑓𝑡+1 on a 
constant and using the ensuing t-statistic for a zero coefficient. Clark and West (2007) state that 
this hypothesis should be rejected if the t-stat is valued greater than +1.282 and +1.645 (for one 
sided 0.1 and 0.05 tests respectively). The MSFE-adjusted statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
the historical average MSFE is less than or equal to the predictive regression value. Table 5.9 
and 5.10 show the t-statistics from these regressions, accompanied by * and ** to denote 
rejection of the null hypothesis at corresponding significance levels.  
 Columns four and five of the table show the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and the 
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) respectively for the predictive regressions, with values closer to 
zero showing better predictive performance. 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐻𝐴 and 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝐻𝐴 show the errors of the 
corresponding historical average forecast. RMSE is used by Goyal and Welch (2008) amongst 
other commentators. 
 Looking at Table 5.9 it can be seen that for the economic indicators only the term and 
default return spreads outperform the historical average over the entire OOS period, with only 
the default return 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  stats being both positive and over the 0.005 threshold. The MSFE-
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adjusted statistic also shows that these predictors outperform the historical average forecast, 
with significance at least the 10% level. However, apart from these variables and four of the 
on-balance volume indicators, none of the other predictors outperform the historical average to 
a significant degree with respect to the 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  and MSFE-adjusted statistics. Only the OBV(2,12) 
and OBV(3,12) technical indicators significantly outperforms the historical average, surpassing 
the 0.005 threshold. These two variables are however outperformed by the historical average 
according to the MSFE, RMSE and MAE statistics, meaning that these variables cannot be 
considered to have economically exploitable out of sample performance. All of the principal 
components regressions are outperformed by the historical average over the entire sample, with 
the technical indicator principal component performing the best, with marginally significant 
MSFE statistics, and smaller RMSE and MAE statistics than the historical average.  
The results of the FTSE100 are however very different to those found in Table 5.10 for 
the ALLSHARE, where several more of the predictors outperform the historical average over 
the entire sample. Of the economic variables, the long-term yields, default return spreads, the 
inflation indexes and the industrial output indexes outperform the historical average in one or 
more of the measures, though the LTY(5) and the industrial output indexes do not outperform 
the historical to an economically significant degree according to the 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 . Statistic. An 
interesting point is that the out-of-sample R-squared statistic is negative for the 15-year default 
return spread yet the MSFE-adjusted statistic is statistically significant. These two statistics 
appear to be in contradiction to one another, which is a result of the MSFE-adjusted statistic 
accounting for additional estimation error in the alternative (historical average) model. In any 
case, all the other statistical results for DRS(15) show worse or the same performance as the 
HA, suggesting that DRS(15) provides little effective forecasting ability out-of-sample. The 
inflation measures perform well according to most of the measures, except the MAE.  Of the 
technical indicators, once again the on-balance volume buy signals outperform the historical 
average in more than one measure, but none of the other buy signals show better performance. 
The principal components also outperform the historical average, contrary to the case for the 
FTSE100, according to all of the statistical measures.  
 As can be seen in the two tables, there is a significant difference between the two 
indexes in terms of predictability, specifically with regards to economic indicators. One 
potential reason for this could be that the FTSE ALLSHARE covers stocks from smaller 
companies, whose markets may not be as efficient. Weaker market efficiency might come from 
less frequent trades, less well understand asset fundamentals or more constrained arbitrage. This 
may allow trading rules involving technical indicators or relying on economic predictors to be 
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more effective than in the relatively more efficient FTSE100 markets. Another reason for this 
discrepancy may be down to time-varying factors in return predictability. As can be seen in the 
second column of each table, the ALLSHARE uses longer OOS periods, many starting in the 
1980s. This may explain the differences in performance of the predictors. To test this, this 
chapter dropped several of the variables in the same manner as discussed above for the principal 
component technique, and then forecasted using the same estimation window and out-of-
sample period. These results, which are found in the appendix, show the degree of predictability 
is more consistent between the two equity indexes. In both cases only the longest-term yield 
spread is significant, along with the T-bill rate. The inflation predictor also marginally 
outperforms the historical average for both indexes, however none of these variables surpass 
the 0.005 benchmark.  
The out-of-sample results corroborate with the literature in that they find the majority 
of economic indicators cannot outperform the historical average benchmark. Goyal and Welch 
(2008) find that inflation and the term spread are the only significant economic predictors out 
of sample, finding the default return spread is strongly outperformed by the benchmark. Neely 
et al. (2014) find the long-term government yield is a significant indicator, as well as the 
dividend yield and their equivalent of this chapters SVAR variable. The long-term yield and 
SVAR measures are both found to be significant for the FTSE ALLSHARE, albeit not 
consistently. 
  Moving on to the other 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistics, tables 5.9 shows that recession periods 
show stronger predictability for almost all of the interest rate spreads for the FTSE100, but none 
of the other indicators. Of the technical indicators, only one of the on-balance volume buy 
signals has both a positive 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 Rec statistic and shows greater predictability in recession than 
in the overall sample. The other technical indicators are not only strongly outperformed by the 
historical benchmark, they also perform worse during recession than over the entire sample or 
during expansion periods. The FTSE ALLSHARE technical indicators also exhibit this 
performance, almost of the indicators are outperformed by the historical average, with the 
weakest performance during recession periods, and the relative strongest predictability 
occurring in periods of expansion. The economic indicators tend to perform best during 
recessions, compared to both expansions and the overall sample. The T-bill rate and the long-
term yields being the exception to this for the FTSE 100 but not the ALLSHARE. These results 
are at odds to those found by Neely et al (2014) who find that technical indicators perform 
better in recessions than expansions, behaving in the same manner as the economic predictors. 
This suggests either two conclusions, either that equity premium prediction using technical 
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indicators is more viable during economic expansion; a result at odds with theory that states 
market efficiency is greater during boom periods compared to downturns, or alternatively there 
is a factor not captured by the business cycle that explains the variability in premium forecasting 
accuracy.  
 Overall, these results present little evidence that equity premium prediction is 
economically viable out-of-sample, and there appears to be little difference between the 
performance of economic or technical indicators. Only four types of indicators show any degree 
of out-of-sample performance, three of which are economic and one technical. Using combined 
information from the individual indicators in the form of principal components improves 
performance for predicting the ALLSHARE equity premium, but not the FTSE100, a fact which 
suggests that there is a high-degree of differences in predictability between individual stock 
indexes, even within the same country.  
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FTSE100 OOS Start 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  MSFE 
-Adjusted 
RMSE MAE 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑬𝑯𝑨 𝑴𝑨𝑬𝑯𝑨 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 
TBL 1994m01 -0.0369 -0.3840 0.0175 0.0131 0.0172 0.0130 -0.0576 -0.0186 
LTY(5) 1994m01 -0.0306 -0.3978 0.0175 0.0130 0.0172 0.0130 -0.0509 -0.0126 
LTY(10) 1994m01 -0.0371 -0.5516 0.0175 0.0131 0.0172 0.0130 -0.0619 -0.0152 
LTY(15) 1994m01 -0.0409 -0.6752 0.0175 0.0131 0.0172 0.0130 -0.0678 -0.0171 
TMS(3-5) 1994m01 -0.0012 0.1262 0.0172 0.0131 0.0172 0.0130 0.0051 -0.0068 
TMS(3-10) 1994m01 0.0011 0.5445 0.0172 0.0131 0.0172 0.0130 0.0071 -0.0042 
TMS(3-15) 1994m01 0.0014 0.6565 0.0172 0.0130 0.0172 0.0130 0.0050 -0.0018 
DRS(5) 2001m01 0.0210 1.8202** 0.0175 0.0132 0.0177 0.0132 0.0561 -0.0099 
DRS(10) 2001m01 0.0110 1.3146* 0.0176 0.0132 0.0177 0.0132 0.0344 -0.0096 
DRS(15) 2007m09 -0.0016 0.5080 0.0182 0.0142 0.0182 0.0143 -0.0126 0.0097 
INF(-1) 1994m01 -0.0017 0.1085 0.0172 0.0130 0.0172 0.0130 -0.0014 -0.0020 
INF(-2) 1994m01 -0.0058 -0.1022 0.0172 0.0130 0.0172 0.0130 -0.0094 -0.0026 
INDMAN 1994m01 -0.1052 -0.5039 0.0181 0.0137 0.0172 0.0130 -0.0805 -0.1271 
INDPROD 1994m01 -0.0084 -0.2446 0.0173 0.0132 0.0172 0.0130 0.0108 -0.0254 
DY 1996m02 -0.3054 0.6975 0.0199 0.0163 0.0174 0.0133 -0.2843 -0.3237 
PE 2003m08 -0.1770 -0.4869 0.0174 0.0130 0.0160 0.0123 -0.2299 -0.1298 
DYS 1994m01 -0.0528 -0.7601 0.0176 0.0135 0.0172 0.0130 -0.0817 -0.0273 
SVAR 1994M03 -0.0443 -0.0334 0.0175 0.0135 0.0172 0.0131 -0.0557 -0.0344 
MA(1,9) 1994m10 -0.0863 -1.6897 0.0177 0.0135 0.0170 0.0129 -0.1019 -0.0722 
MA(1,12) 1995m01 -0.0373 -1.4903 0.0174 0.0134 0.0171 0.0131 -0.0543 -0.0221 
MA(2,9) 1994m10 -0.0753 -1.5843 0.0176 0.0133 0.0170 0.0129 -0.0956 -0.0570 
MA(2,12) 1995m01 -0.0851 -1.1711 0.0178 0.0137 0.0171 0.0131 -0.1288 -0.0460 
MA(3,9) 1994m10 -0.0786 -0.8909 0.0177 0.0134 0.0170 0.0129 -0.1055 -0.0543 
MA(3,12) 1995m01 -0.0964 -1.6335 0.0179 0.0137 0.0171 0.0131 -0.1289 -0.0674 
MOM(9) 1994m11 -0.0301 -2.7443 0.0173 0.0132 0.0170 0.0129 -0.0246 -0.0351 
MOM(12) 1995m02 -0.0592 -1.0120 0.0177 0.0135 0.0171 0.0131 -0.0957 -0.0273 
OBV(1,9) 2003m11 -0.0106 -0.8176 0.0162 0.0126 0.0161 0.0125 0.0004 -0.0205 
OBV(1,12) 2004m02 0.0001 0.2667 0.0163 0.0127 0.0163 0.0127 -0.0001 0.0003 
OBV(2,9) 2003m11 0.0013 0.4280 0.0161 0.0125 0.0161 0.0125 0.0157 -0.0115 
OBV(2,12) 2004m02 0.0062 0.9955 0.0163 0.0126 0.0163 0.0127 -0.0001 0.0116 
OBV(3,9) 2003m11 -0.0096 0.0377 0.0162 0.0125 0.0161 0.0125 -0.0016 -0.0167 
OBV(3,12) 2004m02 0.0068 1.0088 0.0163 0.0125 0.0163 0.0127 0.0066 0.0069 
          
PC Tech 2004M02 -0.0021 1.2752 0.0163 0.0126 0.0163 0.0127 0.0165 -0.0179 
PC Econ 2007M09 -0.0253 -0.8410 0.0184 0.0143 0.0182 0.0143 -0.0552 0.0051 
PC All 2007M09 -0.0681 -1.7806 0.0188 0.0150 0.0182 0.0143 -0.0312 -0.1056 
 
  
Table 5.9 FTSE100 Out-of-Sample Results 
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Table 5.10 FTSEALLSHARE Out-of-Sample Results 
FTSE 
ALLSHARE 
OOS Start 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  MSFE 
-Adjusted 
RMSE MAE 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑬𝑯𝑨 𝑴𝑨𝑬𝑯𝑨 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 
TBL 1985m03 -0.0048 1.3222* 0.0196 0.0144 0.0195 0.0141 0.0270 -0.0280 
LTY(5) 1985m03 0.0024 1.6470** 0.0195 0.0143 0.0195 0.0141 0.0324 -0.0194 
LTY(10) 1985m03 0.0052 1.8003** 0.0195 0.0143 0.0195 0.0141 0.0336 -0.0156 
LTY(15) 1985m03 -0.0101 1.9103** 0.0196 0.0146 0.0195 0.0141 0.0423 -0.0482 
TMS(3-5) 1985m03 -0.0076 -0.8881 0.0196 0.0141 0.0195 0.0141 -0.0105 -0.0055 
TMS(3-10) 1985m03 -0.0091 -1.2742 0.0196 0.0141 0.0195 0.0141 -0.0123 -0.0067 
TMS(3-15) 1985m03 -0.0013 -0.1319 0.0195 0.0141 0.0195 0.0141 0.0023 -0.0039 
DRS(5) 2001m01 0.0065 0.9883 0.0176 0.0133 0.0177 0.0131 0.0332 -0.0167 
DRS(10) 2001m01 0.0075 0.9994 0.0176 0.0133 0.0177 0.0131 0.0306 -0.0128 
DRS(15) 2007m09 -0.0025 3.3730** 0.0182 0.0140 0.0182 0.0141 -0.0145 0.0100 
INF(-1) 1985m03 0.0078 1.9049** 0.0194 0.0143 0.0195 0.0141 0.0342 -0.0115 
INF(-2) 1985m03 0.0095 2.0097** 0.0194 0.0142 0.0195 0.0141 0.0329 -0.0076 
INDMAN 1985m03 0.0037 1.1170 0.0195 0.0141 0.0195 0.0141 0.0118 -0.0022 
INDPROD 1985m03 0.0038 1.0875 0.0195 0.0141 0.0195 0.0141 0.0125 -0.0026 
DY 1985m03 -0.7183 -0.2681 0.0256 0.0218 0.0195 0.0141 -0.5611 -0.8328 
PE 2003m08 -0.0745 -0.1800 0.0167 0.0126 0.0162 0.0125 -0.1245 -0.0313 
DYS 1985m03 -0.0011 1.6415* 0.0195 0.0143 0.0195 0.0141 0.0113 -0.0102 
SVAR 1995M03 0.0142 1.3945* 0.0170 0.0132 0.0171 0.0131 0.0092 0.0187 
MA(1,9) 1985m12 -0.0124 -0.3869 0.0196 0.0142 0.0194 0.0141 -0.0273 -0.0015 
MA(1,12) 1986m03 -0.0292 0.1944 0.0198 0.0144 0.0195 0.0142 -0.0766 0.0056 
MA(2,9) 1985m12 -0.0055 -0.7444 0.0195 0.0142 0.0194 0.0141 0.0036 -0.0122 
MA(2,12) 1986m03 -0.0459 0.3089 0.0199 0.0145 0.0195 0.0142 -0.1147 0.0045 
MA(3,9) 1985m12 -0.0034 -0.5436 0.0195 0.0142 0.0194 0.0141 -0.0058 -0.0017 
MA(3,12) 1986m03 -0.0026 1.5138* 0.0195 0.0142 0.0195 0.0142 -0.0178 0.0086 
MOM(9) 1985m12 -0.0986 -0.9442 0.0204 0.0149 0.0194 0.0141 -0.1438 -0.0654 
MOM(12) 1986m03 -0.1140 0.2817 0.0206 0.0148 0.0195 0.0142 -0.2167 -0.0387 
OBV(1,9) 2008m02 0.0018 0.4076 0.0181 0.0142 0.0181 0.0141 0.0025 0.0011 
OBV(1,12) 2008m05 0.0160 1.8184** 0.0182 0.0143 0.0184 0.0144 0.0002 0.0291 
OBV(2,9) 2008m02 0.0116 1.1895 0.0180 0.0141 0.0181 0.0141 0.0057 0.0170 
OBV(2,12) 2008m05 0.0124 1.1410 0.0182 0.0143 0.0184 0.0144 -0.0074 0.0289 
OBV(3,9) 2008m02 0.0017 0.2832 0.0181 0.0141 0.0181 0.0141 0.0024 0.0010 
OBV(3,12) 2008m05 0.0204 1.5667* 0.0182 0.0142 0.0184 0.0144 0.0067 0.0319 
          
PC Tech 2008M05 0.0188 1.4557* 0.0182 0.0143 0.0184 0.0144 0.0107 0.0256 
PC Econ 2007M09 0.0400 2.2440** 0.0179 0.0137 0.0182 0.0141 0.0563 0.0231 
PC All 2008M05 0.0635 3.7476** 0.0178 0.0136 0.0184 0.0144 0.0120 0.1065 
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5.4.4 Financial Stress and predictability 
Both the in-sample and out-of-sample 𝑅2 statistics suggest there is a high degree of 
variability in predictability dependent on sample period and economic circumstances, which 
corroborates with much of the findings in the literature. However, the results of the previous 
section for technical indicators are in contradiction to the findings of the studies that have 
examined them, finding that expansion periods exhibit higher predictability than recession. 
Henkel et al (2011) found that recession periods are unambiguously better for stock 
predictability, and both Neely et al (2014) and Baetje and Menkhoff (2016) confirm this is the 
case for technical indicators. Either this contradiction in results could be from the differences 
between the US and UK economies, or alternatively there are other factors that affect 
predictability.  Noting that the data sample in this chapter includes several periods of financial 
duress, most noticeably the 2007-2009 financial crisis, an explanation for these results may be 
that the business cycle is not the only factor that affects predictability, and that financial market 
stress is a significant contributor to equity premium predictability. 
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 below exhibit the time-varying nature of premium predictability. 
Using rolling regression windows of ten years, 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 and 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻  models were estimated 
using OLS, recording the 𝑅2 statistic for each sample period which are plotted below. For 
example, the FTSE100 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 model was estimated with a sample period between 1994 month 
one and 1994 month two, and the 𝑅2 statistic was saved. Then the same model was estimated 
between 1994 month one and 1994 month three, again saving the 𝑅2 statistic. This process was 
repeated until 2004 month 1, after which rolling windows of 120 observations were used until 
the end of sample period at 2017m02. The OECD recession and expansion indicators are 
overlaid across these plots for ease of interpretation. As an additional note, the initial 𝑅2 
estimates are likely to be over-estimated until around 5 years or 60 observations when there are 
enough estimates to establish a realistic estimate. The 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿model was also estimated, however 
the results are, as can be expected, a middle-ground between the 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 and 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻models 
so are not shown here. 
Looking at Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.13 it can be seen that the technical indicators are fairly 
consistent in 𝑅2 values up until the financial crisis period. Of the two, the FTSE100 exhibits 
the most variability: the FTSE100 𝑅2 statistic stays largely between 0.02 and 0.04 between 
1997 and 2007 but appears to increase to around 0.07 during recession periods. The 2000 to 
2002 recession in particular is characterised by higher 𝑅2 statistics. The ALLSHARE is largely 
consistent between 2001 and 2008, staying between 0.005 and 0.02 over this period, however 
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there is a noticeable increase in the 𝑅2 stats towards 2007. The 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁also exhibit higher 𝑅2 
statistics during the 2000-2002 recession, followed by a similar period of low predictability 
between 2002 and 2008. The relationship between recessions and predictability during this 
period appears to be consistent with the both the findings of Neely et al. (2014), however the 
2003-2004 recession appears to solicit no significant change in 𝑅2 statistics, with little effect 
on either the 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 and 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 models. Furthermore, while the 2007-2009 recession does 
capture a period of high predictability for all of the PC models, an expansion period rather than 
recession between 2009 and 2012 is characterised by relatively high and volatile predictability. 
During this time period the UK was close to suffering from a ‘double-dip’ recession, which 
may explain this high predictability, however it remains as evidence that the business cycle 
alone does not account for variability in predictability. 
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Figure 5.12 FTSE100 Technical and Economic PC model performance over time 
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Figure 5.13 FTSEALLSHARE Technical and Economic PC model performance over time 
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With the previous results suggesting that the business cycle alone is insufficient for 
capturing the variability of predictability for the UK, and given the sample includes one of the 
larger financial crises in the last century, this chapter explores financial stress as a factor for 
predictability. As discussed before, the connection between financial stress, risk, and volatility 
has been frequently discussed, such as in Guidolin & Timmermann (2005). Building upon this, 
this chapter uses the previously created measure of the UK’s financial stress to examine the 
relationship between predictability and economic conditions. 
Table 5.11 FSI Components 
Market Variable Aspect of 
Financial 
Stress 
represented 
Calculation Source 
Interbank  Bank Beta 
(BETAFTAS) 
Strain on bank 
profitability and 
stability 
𝛽 =
cov(𝑟, 𝑚)
var(𝑚)
 
 
Datastream 
Commercial Bank Bond 
Spread 
(BNKBDSPR) 
Risk in bank debt 
markets 
10-year Commercial bank yields 
minus 10-year government bond 
yields 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Liquidity 
Spread 
(LIBORTBILL) 
Liquidity and 
counterparty risk in 
interbank lending 
3-month LIBOR minus 3-month 
UK Treasury Bill rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Interbank Cost of 
Borrowing 
(LIBORBANK) 
Risk premium in 
interbank borrowing 
3-month LIBOR minus BoE 
Bank rate 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Weighted Sterling 
Crashes 
(CMAXEFFEX) 
Flight from sterling 
towards foreign 
currencies 
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Debt Covered Interest Spread 
(CIPUKUS) 
Limited arbitrage 
and uncertainty in 
government bond 
markets 
(1 + 𝑟𝑡
∗) − (
𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝑡
∗)(1 + 𝑟𝑡) 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
UK-US Government 
Bond Spread 
(UKGOVTBUSGOVTB) 
Limited arbitrage 
and uncertainty in 
government bond 
markets 
10-year UK Government Bond 
Yield minus 10-year US 
Government Bond Yield 
Datastream, 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Yield Curve Spread 
(YLDCURVE10-3) 
Long-term 
uncertainty and cost 
of short-term 
borrowing. 
10-year government bond yield 
minus 3-month government bond 
yield 
Bank of 
England 
Interactive 
Database 
Equity Stock Market Crash 
Index 
(CMAXALL) 
Uncertainty in 
equity valuation and 
expectations of 
future bank 
profitability  
𝑥𝑡
max[𝑥 ∈ 𝑥𝑡−𝑗|𝑗 = 0,1, … ,365]
 
𝑥𝑡=FTSEALLSHARE price 
index 
Datastream 
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For the purposes of this chapter, the long sample FSI is used, as shown by table 5.11. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the simple standard deviation method is considered the simplest and 
most appropriate threshold mark for financial crises. Because of its computational simplicity, 
the standard deviation method can be used on all of the FSI weighting methods, as well as 
calculated using different levels of stringency. This makes robustness checks easier and more 
effective. For this reason, this chapter takes the benchmark definition of a stressful period as an 
observation that is one standard deviation above the mean. The following results are robust to 
this measure, as testing found the results qualitatively consistent when using 1.5 or two standard 
deviations. At the most stringent benchmark of two standard deviations, the effects described 
below are stronger in most cases. 
Treating the FSIs in the same manner as the business cycle indicators, 𝐼𝑡
𝐹𝑆 and 𝐼𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑆 
represent periods of financial stress and periods of relaxed financial conditions, respectively. 
Stressful periods are defined as periods when the FSIs indicate stress levels more than one 
standard deviation above the sample mean with  𝐼𝑡
𝐹𝑆 being valued at one during these periods. 
𝐼𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑆is the simple inverse of this, indicating periods of relatively normal financial conditions 
The Financial stress measure shown in Figures 5.14 and 5.15 are from the VE, CDF and PC 
aggregations of the index, where the periods highlighted in the figures are months when any of 
the FSIs indicate average stress values above one standard deviation from the sample mean. 
This could be considered a relaxed interpretation of financial stress, however all three of the 
measures mostly corroborate the timings of financial stress episodes, with differences being 
solely in the start and finish of such periods. For example, all of the FSIs indicate stress between 
2011 and 2012, however the PC FSI only indicates one-month of high stress, while the CDF 
aggregation finds three. In any case, using more stringent benchmarks yield qualitatively similar 
results.  When measuring predictability, the 𝐼𝑡
𝐹𝑆 and 𝐼𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑆 indicators are calculated from the 
stressful or non-stressful periods found in the VE calculation. 
Looking at Figures 5.14 and 5.15 periods highlighted in green are the same periods of 
recession as shown earlier, however now in addition periods of red denote months when both 
the business cycle was in recession and the financial system was in a period of financial stress. 
Amber periods denote times when the financial system was stressed, but the overall economy 
was in expansion. For all of the plots, the highest 𝑅2 statistics occur when the economy is both 
in recession and suffering from financial stress, during the financial crisis period. While it is 
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impossible to say with certainty which of the two factors if either are the driving force, it is 
clear that recession and financial stress together correlate with high predictability. 
 The amber periods are of particular interest as they seem to correspond to periods of rising or 
high predictability, especially after the recession period between 2008 and 2009. Local periods 
of high  𝑅2 statistics during expansion correspond to periods of financial stress, best shown by 
the 2010 high-point. However, there are several periods of high 𝑅2 statistics that are not denoted 
as either stressful periods or recession, such as the time-period between 2002 and 2003. A 
possible explanation for this period of high predictability is the 2002 US stock market 
downturn, which did not cause an economic recession in the UK, but significant financial stress 
in the US (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009). A spill-over effect from US financial stress may be the 
root of the higher predictability, however it is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine this 
by including a US financial stress measure. Another period of relatively large 𝑅2 statistics is 
during the middle of 2011, which are apparent in Figures 5.14 in 5.15 to not be captured by the 
financial stress indicator. Looking at the monthly average values of the FSIs during this period, 
they are all close to but below the one standard deviation threshold, meaning that financial stress 
was above average during this period but not sufficiently so compared to other stressful 
episodes. Whether these issues are down to the FSIs failing to capture stressful periods, or more 
likely an indication of more factors at play than the business and financial cycles, is unclear. 
However overall, the 𝑅2 statistics appear to demonstrate a link between financial stress and 
predictability that explains some of the increased predictability since the financial crisis, and 
the unexpected relationship between economic expansion and the forecasting ability of the 
technical indicators.
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Figure 5.14 FTSE100 Technical and Economic PC model performance over time 
  Using the same in-sample and out-of-sample 𝑅2 statistics as before but using financial 
stress periods rather than recession or expansion yields the results found in tables 5.12 and 5.13. 
For the sake of conciseness, these tables only include the variables that were found to have 
performed both in-sample and out-of-sample, specifically the term spreads, credit spreads, 
inflation and the on-balance volume indicators. The PC regression results are also included, 
even though the PC models for the FTSE100 were all found to perform poorly out-of-sample.  
The results of the other variables are contained in the appendix and follow largely the same 
patterns. The in-sample Table 5.12 reports the 𝑅2 statistics for the overall sample, recessions, 
expansions, financial stress periods and non-stressful periods.  
For both equity premiums and almost all of the indicators, predictability is noticeably 
higher during financially stressful periods. Almost all of the 𝑅2𝐹𝑆 statistics are positive and 
above the 0.005 level. In addition, periods of low financial stress show 𝑅2 statistics lower than 
the sample predictability, with almost all of the predictors exhibiting predictability lower than 
the 0.005 threshold to be considered economically exploitable.  The only exception to this 
pattern is from the longer-term credit spreads, which appear to yield the most predictability 
during expansion periods and perform poorly during periods of high financial stress. Of interest 
here is that this is at odds with the shortest (5-years) credit spread that has the largest 𝑅2 
statistics during financial stress. This may indicate the different information the respective 
credit spreads contain, the shortest maturity spread may indicate upcoming debt-market risk in 
the short-term, containing relevant trading information for investors trading with shorter-term 
profits in mind, while the longer spreads contain more information about long-term risk premia. 
The fact that the longer default return spreads are have smaller 𝑅2 statistics lends credence to 
this explanation.  
The out-of-sample performance of these variables also show that predictability is highly 
concentrated around financial stress periods, especially in the case of the on-balance technical 
indicators. During these periods the on-balance indicators strongly outperform the historical 
  
Overall these results suggest a strong relationship between periods of financial stress 
and predictability for both the economic and technical indicators. While these results do not 
refute the relationship between the business cycle and predictability in any way, it is clear that 
the financial cycle contributes a significant element to this predictability, particularly in the case 
of the technical indicators. 
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Table 5.12 In-Sample predictive comparisons 
FTSE100 𝑹𝟐 𝑹𝟐Rec 𝑹𝟐Exp 𝑹𝟐𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝟐𝑵𝑭𝑺  FTSEALLSHARE 𝑹𝟐 𝑹𝟐Rec 𝑹𝟐Exp 𝑹𝟐𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝟐𝑵𝑭𝑺 
TMS(3-5) 0.0014 0.0000 0.0027 0.0068 -0.0001  TMS(3-5) 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0017 0.0066 -0.0010 
TMS(3-10) 0.0039 0.0017 0.0059 0.0099 0.0022  TMS(3-10) 0.0032 0.0007 0.0056 0.0130 0.0004 
TMS(3-15) 0.0056 0.0029 0.0080 0.0109 0.0041  TMS(3-15) 0.0051 0.0018 0.0082 0.0155 0.0021 
DRS(5) 0.0059 0.0103 0.0019 0.0146 0.0034  DRS(5) 0.0046 0.0078 0.0016 0.0209 0.0000 
DRS(10) 0.0026 -0.0010 0.0058 -0.0073 0.0054  DRS(10) 0.0024 -0.0016 0.0062 -0.0037 0.0041 
DRS(15) 0.0027 -0.0019 0.0066 -0.0176 0.0084  DRS(15) 0.0024 -0.0018 0.0062 -0.0140 0.0077 
INF(-1) 0.0012 -0.0027 0.0049 0.0108 -0.0015  INF(-1) 0.0019 -0.0022 0.0057 0.0145 -0.0017 
INF(-2) 0.0011 -0.0017 0.0037 0.0125 -0.0021  INF(-2) 0.0016 -0.0013 0.0043 0.0155 -0.0024 
OBV(1,9) 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0026 0.0021  SVAR 0.0171 0.0102 0.0236 -0.0049 0.0233 
OBV(1,12) 0.0010 0.0014 0.0006 -0.0080 0.0039  OBV(1,9) 0.0016 0.0000 0.0032 0.0114 -0.0012 
OBV(2,9) 0.0038 0.0073 0.0009 0.0207 0.0003  OBV(1,12) 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 0.0158 -0.0020 
OBV(2,12) 0.0038 0.0064 0.0016 0.0132 0.0015  OBV(2,9) 0.0114 0.0064 0.0161 0.0437 0.0020 
OBV(3,9) 0.0027 0.0043 0.0013 0.0092 0.0020  OBV(2,12) 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 0.0158 -0.0020 
OBV(3,12) 0.0063 0.0142 -0.0004 0.0168 0.0037  OBV(3,9) 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0034 0.0083 -0.0003 
       OBV(3,12) 0.0074 0.0011 0.0132 0.0248 0.0040 
             
PC Tech 0.0155 0.0418 -0.0072 0.0078 0.0177  PC Tech 0.0055 0.0077 0.0035 0.0248 -0.0002 
PC Econ 0.0237 0.0140 0.0321 0.031121 0.021317  PC Econ 0.0310 0.0288 0.0331 0.0365 0.0293 
PC All 0.0172 0.0208 0.0147 0.0114 0.0190  PC All 0.0405 0.0366 0.0440 0.0503 0.0377 
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Table 5.13a Out-of-Sample Predictive Comparisons 
FTSE100 OOS OOS 
Start 
𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑵𝑭𝑺 
TMS(3-5) 1994m01 -0.0012 0.0051 -0.0068 0.0170 -0.0065 
TMS(3-10) 1994m01 0.0011 0.0071 -0.0042 0.0148 -0.0029 
TMS(3-15) 1994m01 0.0014 0.0050 -0.0018 0.0105 -0.0013 
DRS(5) 2001m01 0.0210 0.0561 -0.0099 0.0655 0.0068 
DRS(10) 2001m01 0.0110 0.0344 -0.0096 0.0303 0.0049 
DRS(15) 2007m09 -0.0016 -0.0126 0.0097 -0.0112 0.0039 
INF(-1) 1994m01 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0020 0.0179 -0.0074 
INF(-2) 1994m01 -0.0058 -0.0094 -0.0026 0.0191 -0.0130 
OBV(1,9) 2003m11 -0.0106 0.0004 -0.0205 -0.0142 -0.0090 
OBV(1,12) 2004m02 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0190 0.0090 
OBV(2,9) 2003m11 0.0013 0.0157 -0.0115 0.0371 -0.0157 
OBV(2,12) 2004m02 0.0062 -0.0001 0.0116 0.0221 -0.0012 
OBV(3,9) 2003m11 -0.0096 -0.0016 -0.0167 0.0381 -0.0323 
OBV(3,12) 2004m02 0.0068 0.0066 0.0069 0.0348 -0.0062 
       
       
PC Tech 2004M02 -0.0021 0.0165 -0.0179 0.0251 -0.0148 
PC Econ 2007M09 -0.0253 -0.0552 0.0051 -0.0646 -0.0032 
PC All 2007M09 -0.0681 -0.0312 -0.1056 0.0179 -0.1165 
  
  
2
0
9
 
Table 5.13b Out-of-Sample Predictive Comparisons 
FTSEALLSHARE OOS OOS Start 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑵𝑭𝑺 
TMS(3-5) 1985m03 -0.0076 -0.0105 -0.0055 -0.0086 -0.0075 
TMS(3-10) 1985m03 -0.0091 -0.0123 -0.0067 -0.0092 -0.0091 
TMS(3-15) 1985m03 -0.0013 0.0023 -0.0039 0.0027 -0.0020 
DRS(5) 2001m01 0.0065 0.0332 -0.0167 0.0365 -0.0036 
DRS(10) 2001m01 0.0075 0.0306 -0.0128 0.0298 -0.0001 
DRS(15) 2007m09 -0.0025 -0.0145 0.0100 -0.0121 0.0036 
INF(-1) 1985m03 0.0078 0.0342 -0.0115 0.0229 0.0052 
INF(-2) 1985m03 0.0095 0.0329 -0.0076 0.0236 0.0071 
SVAR 1995M03 0.0142 0.0092 0.0187 -0.0192 0.0243 
OBV(1,9) 2008m02 0.0018 0.0025 0.0011 0.0180 -0.0091 
OBV(1,12) 2008m05 0.0160 0.0002 0.0291 0.0125 0.0180 
OBV(2,9) 2008m02 0.0116 0.0057 0.0170 0.0562 -0.0183 
OBV(2,12) 2008m05 0.0124 -0.0074 0.0289 0.0479 -0.0089 
OBV(3,9) 2008m02 0.0017 0.0024 0.0010 0.0180 -0.0093 
OBV(3,12) 2008m05 0.0204 0.0067 0.0319 0.0372 0.0105 
       
PC Tech 2008M05 0.0188 0.0107 0.0256 0.0413 0.0054 
PC Econ 2007M09 0.0400 0.0563 0.0231 0.0813 0.0137 
PC All 2008M05 0.0635 0.0120 0.1065 0.0704 0.0594 
 
  
  
2
1
0
 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
01
/1
9
98
07
/1
9
98
01
/1
9
99
07
/1
9
99
01
/2
0
00
07
/2
0
00
01
/2
0
01
07
/2
0
01
01
/2
0
02
07
/2
0
02
01
/2
0
03
07
/2
0
03
01
/2
0
04
07
/2
0
04
01
/2
0
05
07
/2
0
05
01
/2
0
06
07
/2
0
06
01
/2
0
07
07
/2
0
07
01
/2
0
08
07
/2
0
08
01
/2
0
09
07
/2
0
09
01
/2
0
10
07
/2
0
10
01
/2
0
11
07
/2
0
11
01
/2
0
12
07
/2
0
12
01
/2
0
13
07
/2
0
13
01
/2
0
14
07
/2
0
14
01
/2
0
15
07
/2
0
15
01
/2
0
16
07
/2
0
16
01
/2
0
17
FTSE100 PCECON R^2 10-year Rolling Estimates
Recession no Stress Stress no Recession Stress and Recession Expansion R^2
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
02
/1
9
95
09
/1
9
95
04
/1
9
96
11
/1
9
96
06
/1
9
97
01
/1
9
98
08
/1
9
98
03
/1
9
99
10
/1
9
99
05
/2
0
00
12
/2
0
00
07
/2
0
01
02
/2
0
02
09
/2
0
02
04
/2
0
03
11
/2
0
03
06
/2
0
04
01
/2
0
05
08
/2
0
05
03
/2
0
06
10
/2
0
06
05
/2
0
07
12
/2
0
07
07
/2
0
08
02
/2
0
09
09
/2
0
09
04
/2
0
10
11
/2
0
10
06
/2
0
11
01
/2
0
12
08
/2
0
12
03
/2
0
13
10
/2
0
13
05
/2
0
14
12
/2
0
14
07
/2
0
15
02
/2
0
16
09
/2
0
16
FTSE100 PCTECH R^2 10-year Rolling Estimates
Stress no Recession Recession no Stress Stress and Recession Expansion R^2
Figure 5.14 FTSE100 Technical and Economic PC model performance over time 
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5.5 Conclusions 
 This chapter has examined equity premium prediction for the UK using the most popular 
and successful economic and technical indicators over the longest sample that reliable UK 
financial data can provide, comparing the performance of these indicators with one another and 
the results found in the literature, especially the recent work conducted by Neely et al (2014). 
For economic indicators results are found that are commensurate with much of the recent 
literature on US equity premium forecasting; only a select few predictors can provide consistent 
forecasting ability both in and out of sample. On the other hand, this chapter establishes that 
the success of these indicators is not a statistical fluke or an idiosyncrasy of US financial 
markets, rather that term and credit spreads contain relevant and stable information for equity 
traders. Furthermore, if market efficiency can be connected to the failure of return 
predictability, then the results found for economic indicators suggest UK financial markets are 
of a comparable market efficiency to the US in this regard. For technical indicators similar 
results are found to the economic variables, that the majority of trend-following trading rules 
cannot predict equity premium, with only the indicators that utilise both trade volumes and 
pricing trends having any success. Unlike Neely et al (2014) the combination of the information 
from these indicators into principal components does not consistently yield superior predictive 
performance, with the in and out-of-sample performance resting heavily on the model selection 
used in the principal component procedure. These results suggest two potential conclusions, 
firstly that the UK financial markets are more efficient than their US counterparts in that trading 
rules are not economically exploitable. The second conclusion is that the later sample used in 
this chapter is the key factor in the non-performance of technical indicators, with Neely et al 
(2014) using data from as early as the 1950s, where trading rules may have been more 
successful. This conclusion supports the argument that market efficiency has improved since 
the 1980s. 
On the other hand, this chapter also finds evidence of strong variability in the 
performance of forecasting variables, variability that can successfully explained by with respect 
to both the economic and financial conditions of the United Kingdom. This chapter tests to see 
whether the business cycle, a factor that is well-established in the literature as cause of time-
varying predictability in the US, is relevant for equity premium prediction in the UK. This 
chapter finds that there is substantial component of predictability related to the business cycle, 
however that the business cycle alone is insufficient in explaining the time-varying nature of 
equity prediction. The final novel contribution of this chapter is therefore to explicitly display 
the effect of financial stress on the predictive ability of both economic and technical indicators 
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as an addition to the business cycle. This chapter finds results showing that periods of high 
financial stress, such as the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis, significantly increase the 
predictive performance of both types of indicators when compared to periods of relaxed 
financial circumstances, an effect that is even more pronounced than the results found for the 
business cycle. These results open the way for future examination as to whether it is the business 
cycle or rather financial conditions that impacts changing predictive performance, an analysis 
that is beyond the scope of this chapter but of interest to any study that examines economic 
forecasting or the effects of financial stress on market efficiency. 
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6. Thesis Conclusion 
 Judging the effects of monetary policy during a financial crisis is a difficult task. The 
unprecedented use of QE in such an unstable economic climate makes differentiating the 
outcomes of the policy from the general volatility of the period problematic. This thesis has 
attempted to isolate any potential effects of QE on asset pricing through a range of econometric 
methods, simultaneously modelling financial stress and its own impact on pricing. Previous 
research into QE has been constrained heavily by theoretical assumptions on portfolio balance 
theory, signalling theory and other asset pricing channels, this thesis has used these channels as 
a basis for possible impact but has not modelled such channels explicitly. Instead this thesis has 
followed an empirically rigorous but theoretically agnostic approach, judging QE through 
quantifiable effects without attempting to characterise these effects through a theoretical 
framework. Throughout this thesis, the empirical analyses have shown that QE had much 
narrower effect on financial markets than previously understood. While much of the results 
echo other studies in finding significant effects on gilt yields, at least in the short term, this 
thesis has presented evidence that depress gilt yields did not transmit to rising asset prices or 
reduced financial stress. Chapters 2 and 4 shows that gilt yields possess the necessary links with 
other UK assets to be a vector for monetary policy transmission, and that QE auctions, 
announcements and purchase periods significantly impacted gilt pricing and volatility. 
However, these same analyses show that corporate bonds were not systematically affected in 
the same way by QE and that UK equities are shown to be largely unaffected by the policy. The 
final chapter of the thesis has shown that equity market efficiency was significantly affected by 
financial stress and the business cycle after the onset of QE, indicating that QE did little to 
restore pre-financial crisis market efficiency. The conclusion drawn from the results of all the 
chapters of this thesis is that UK equities markets were largely unaffected by QE. 
 These findings have a range of implications for economic study. First and foremost, this 
thesis presents evidence that portfolio-balance and signalling channels are not as determinate 
in asset pricing as previously understood. Although there is evidence found throughout this 
thesis that shows government bonds were significantly impacted by the QE announcements and 
purchases, the evidence that these effects were transmitted through to other financial 
instruments is sadly more lacking. The portfolio balance channel in particular has been shown 
to be less extensive than anticipated, with equity prices and corporate bonds showing mixed 
and limited responses to the QE purchases. This thesis also provides evidence that not all Bank 
of England announcements had their intended effects on supporting asset prices through the 
signalling and macro news channels, as many announcements and QE periods were 
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characterised by higher volatility and market uncertainty. Furthermore, although QE was not a 
policy aimed at improving financial conditions, at least over the long term, the failure of the 
policy to reduce the symptoms of financial stress and general asset volatility has implications 
on the policy and its usage in future. Upon review of these conclusions, proponents of QE could 
consider that QE seemingly is not a solution to adverse financial conditions or liquidity 
problems in the short term. This interpretation is also of potential interest to policy-makers, 
monetary policy theorists and researchers studying asset pricing. The weak responses of the 
other assets to gilt price changes also suggest that in times of financial or economic duress, the 
links between asset markets are much weaker, presenting a potential obstacle for the efficient 
pricing of financial assets. Another important implication of this thesis is that financial stress 
has a significant impact on market efficiency, at least with regards to equity markets. The 
financial cycle has been proven to be a significant contributor to financial market inefficiency, 
alongside the business cycle. This creates an avenue for future study or revision into market 
efficiency, arbitrage pricing and preferred habitat theories during times of economic duress.  
 It is important note to overstate the implications of these conclusions for there are 
several limitations of this thesis to consider. In terms of focus this thesis has not attempted to 
judge QE in terms of its declared objectives. These have always been macroeconomic in scale, 
with relatively little consideration of the effect on asset pricing apart from as a transitory 
objective. Furthermore, this thesis offers no implications about whether QE prevented 
economic or financial downturn, or whether the policy was cost effective with regards to the 
potential cost of future inflationary effects. The scale of this thesis’ critique of QE can therefore 
be limited to the argument that QE required stable financial market function to transmit its 
intended effects to the wider economy, a factor the policy did not achieve. This leads on to the 
second limitation of the thesis, the focus on the short term. The empirical studies have focused 
on capturing QE effects at short periodicities, with time-windows of a few months at maximum. 
For this reason, this thesis cannot conclude that QE had no effects on asset pricing over the 
longer-term. This was not a stated objective of the thesis, as any examination of QE’s 
macroeconomic effects both in the short and long-term would be prohibitively extensive for an 
individual thesis. However, it should be noted that none of the conclusions drawn from this 
thesis can be considered the full picture when quantifying the effects of QE. In addition, while 
the focus of this chapter has been on UK markets, and efforts were made to ensure that the 
assets studied were primarily affected by UK QE only, this thesis has not and could not isolate 
a UK specific effect from spill-over effects of foreign financial circumstances. The ECB and 
FEDs use of QE in particular will have undoubtedly had an effect on UK asset pricing, a fact 
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which has not been compensated for due to the inherent complexity of such a task. The final 
key limitation of this thesis is the lack of theoretical modelling in terms of the potential effects 
of QE and financial crisis on asset pricing. While the focus on empirical examination was a 
stylistic choice with its own strengths, it cannot be ignored that the lack of theoretical structures 
in the empirical examinations might have led to the over/under-estimation of the effects of QE. 
The mixed results found for corporate bonds and equities may have gained some additional 
interpretation if their pricing had been modelled more explicitly within a theoretical framework. 
 These limitations leave avenues for potential future research. First and foremost, the 
financials stress index created in this thesis could be expanded upon to further examine the 
interaction between QE and financial conditions. Chapter 3 discusses the effect of QE events 
on the level of the index, however further research could examine how monetary policy or QE 
affected the likelihood of Financial stress reaching a crisis threshold. Alternatively, the stress 
index could be adapted to focus more on indicators that capture the liquidity, bank-lending and 
channels of QE, and therefore be used to analyse the policy more thoroughly. Further to this, 
the index itself could be investigated in more detail. At the time of writing, this index is the 
most comprehensive measure of financial stress that exists for the United Kingdom, with other 
indexes being either narrower in scope or shorter in sample. However currently the index is 
untested in terms of success rates for capturing crisis events, merely using the same 
methodology as studies who have tested their respective indices. Further research into testing 
and improving this index could therefore produce a measure that is valuable for academic and 
policy-making purposes.  
 Apart from the financial stress index, there remains many unanswered questions from 
this thesis that could be explored in future research. One interesting potential area could be the 
links between QE, market efficiency and constrained arbitrage because of the financial crisis. 
The results of chapter 4 in particular find that financial stress is associated with greater success 
in return predictability and thereby to reduced market efficiency. The model in chapter 4 
however does not analyse the interaction between stress and stock forecasting, merely linking 
the two informally. Future research could model the interaction between stress and 
predictability more explicitly and thereby provide a stronger contribution to forecasting 
literature. 
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Appendix to Chapter 1 
7.1.1 VEC Coefficient Tables 
The coefficient estimates of the endogenous variables in the system were estimated by 
OLS with Newey-West standard errors and are reported in the appendix for each VAR model.  
Each column refers to the dependent variable and the value in each cell is the estimated lagged 
coefficient. T-stats are reported in the second row of each cell. Significant coefficients are 
denoted with *, ** and *** for 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance, respectively. As an 
example, the first column twelfth row denotes the effect of 5 years to maturity commercial bank 
bond yields lagged 2-periods on the FTSE100.  
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A-Table 1.1a Coefficient Table Commercial Yield Model 
 
FTSE 
100 
Comm 
5 
Comm 
15 
Comm 
25 
Dollar Euro Govt 
5 
Govt 
15 
Govt 
25 
FTSE100 
(-1) 0.117 -0.437 -0.023 0.093 -0.031 0.032 -0.275 0.095 0.086  
1.939 -1.649 -0.101 0.471 -0.582 0.984 -0.956 0.352 0.348 
FTSE100 
(-2) 0.002 0.343 0.010 -0.019 0.115*** 0.032 0.596 0.210 0.143  
0.029 1.256 0.043 -0.091 2.092 0.963 2.017 0.753 0.564 
FTSE100 
(-3) -0.081*** -0.332** -0.191 -0.022 0.031 -0.031 -0.574*** -0.504** -0.253  
-1.347 -1.257 -0.855 -0.113 0.580 -0.977 -2.009 -1.866 -1.034 
FTSE100 
(-4) -0.077** 0.321 -0.118 -0.422*** 0.051 0.092** 0.130 0.091 -0.272  
-1.315 1.249 -0.540 -2.213 0.976 2.938 0.469 0.345 -1.142 
Comm5 (-1) 0.030 0.096 -0.145*** -0.164* -0.008 -0.011 -0.105 -0.317* -0.291*  
0.874 0.630 -1.119 -1.449 -0.266 -0.585 -0.636 -2.030 -2.055 
Comm5 (-2) -0.136*** -0.110 -0.126 -0.145* -0.021 0.006 -0.158 -0.176 -0.155  
-3.980 -0.736 -0.987 -1.305 -0.699 0.340 -0.974 -1.144 -1.117 
Comm5 (-3) 0.000 -0.222 -0.053 -0.016 -0.007 -0.023 0.080 -0.040 -0.043  
-0.013 -1.475 -0.415 -0.143 -0.221 -1.233 0.491 -0.259 -0.309 
Comm5 (-4) 0.042 0.334*** 0.242*** 0.108 0.043* 0.017 0.477*** 0.315** 0.227*  
1.224 2.206 1.885 0.959 1.410 0.916 2.910 2.034 1.617 
Comm15(-1) -0.003 -0.283 -0.179 -0.208 0.025 0.020 0.111 0.271 0.343  
-0.041 -0.801 -0.596 -0.790 0.354 0.452 0.289 0.747 1.046 
Comm15(-2) -0.066 -0.143 -0.282 -0.052 -0.034 -0.017 -0.283 -0.258 -0.223  
-0.816 -0.405 -0.944 -0.199 -0.478 -0.388 -0.742 -0.716 -0.681 
Comm15(-3) -0.018 0.280 0.226 0.197 0.162* 0.050 -0.304 0.228 0.141  
-0.229 0.801 0.763 0.759 2.301 1.168 -0.802 0.639 0.434 
Comm15(-4) -0.097 -0.293 -0.130 -0.037 -0.066 0.012 -0.354 -0.098 -0.075  
-1.211 -0.834 -0.436 -0.142 -0.929 0.271 -0.933 -0.273 -0.230 
Comm25(-1) -0.044 0.004 0.002 0.170 -0.007 -0.019 -0.352 -0.345 -0.278  
-0.605 0.011 0.006 0.710 -0.105 -0.492 -1.009 -1.049 -0.931 
Comm25(-2) 0.143 0.373 0.481*** 0.201 0.079 0.062 0.501* 0.742*** 0.693***  
1.947 1.160 1.765 0.843 1.220 1.572 1.441 2.256 2.325 
Comm25(-3) 0.023 -0.120 -0.232 -0.253 -0.123 -0.028 0.300 -0.305 -0.172  
0.311 -0.367 -0.836 -1.045 -1.871 -0.694 0.848 -0.913 -0.567 
Comm25(-4) 0.018 0.073 -0.013 -0.030 0.094 -0.006 -0.070 -0.242 -0.123  
0.244 0.230 -0.047 -0.127 1.471 -0.144 -0.205 -0.746 -0.418 
Dollar(-1) -0.073 0.047 -0.136 0.033 0.197*** -0.062*** -0.254 -0.577** -0.447**  
-1.016 0.151 -0.510 0.140 3.121 -1.620 -0.749 -1.798 -1.535 
Dollar(-2) -0.116** -0.030 -0.061 0.034 -0.115 -0.033 -0.286 -0.013 -0.020  
-1.594 -0.095 -0.226 0.145 -1.789 -0.838 -0.825 -0.039 -0.068 
Dollar(-3) -0.013 0.551*** 0.453* 0.199 0.174 0.112 0.735 0.821** 0.598*  
-0.177 1.730 1.676 0.840 2.701 2.892 2.130 2.518 2.020 
Dollar(-4) 0.157* -0.093 -0.056 0.201 -0.090 -0.056 -0.027 -0.083 0.067  
2.230 -0.301 -0.212 0.878 -1.451 -1.479 -0.080 -0.262 0.235 
Notes. Dependent Variables are shown along the first row. T-stats are given in the second row of each section, and are shown 
in italics. 
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A-Table 1.1b Coefficient Table Commercial Yield Model 
 FTSE 
100 
Comm
5 
Comm 
15 
Comm 
25 
Dollar Euro Govt 
5 
Govt 
15 
Govt 
25 
Euro(-1) -0.342** 0.050 0.019 -0.319 -0.111 0.280*** 0.107 0.404 0.037 
 -3.216 0.108 0.049 -0.923 -1.184 4.926 0.212 0.848 0.086 
Euro(-2) 
-0.022 0.158 0.542 0.641 
-
0.231*** 
-
0.116*** 0.317 0.520 0.803 
 -0.197 0.326 1.315 1.778 -2.360 -1.955 0.602 1.046 1.782 
Euro(-3) 
0.030 -0.281 -0.740** 
-
0.631*** 0.036 -0.018 -0.461 -0.924* 
-
0.997*** 
 0.266 -0.573 -1.782 -1.735 0.361 -0.307 -0.869 -1.845 -2.194 
Euro(-4) -0.274** -0.263 -0.239 -0.461 0.061 0.091** -0.556 -0.375 -0.550 
 -2.522 -0.552 -0.591 -1.305 0.632 1.576 -1.080 -0.771 -1.245 
Govt5(-1) -0.004 0.460*** 0.383*** 0.305*** 0.013 0.019 0.517*** 0.360** 0.243*  
-0.120 3.134 3.079 2.800 0.455 1.054 3.251 2.398 1.783 
Govt5(-2) 0.133** -0.114 -0.025 -0.024 0.032 0.004 -0.063 0.032 0.002  
4.089 -0.803 -0.210 -0.228 1.114 0.248 -0.408 0.221 0.012 
Govt5(-3) 0.030 0.330** 0.104 0.038 0.001 -0.004 0.153 0.057 0.010  
0.895 2.276 0.847 0.356 0.024 -0.199 0.973 0.387 0.077 
Govt5(-4) 
-0.045** 
-
0.240*** 
-
0.196*** -0.062 -0.009 0.020* -0.315*** -0.226** -0.149  
-1.399 -1.690 -1.628 -0.590 -0.331 1.130 -2.049 -1.555 -1.128 
Govt15(-1) 0.022 -0.230 -0.057 -0.008 -0.017 -0.003 -0.437** -0.067 -0.124  
0.418 -1.013 -0.294 -0.048 -0.369 -0.124 -1.775 -0.289 -0.588 
Govt15(-2) 0.045 0.531*** 0.544*** 0.490*** -0.033 -0.024 0.405** 0.265* 0.344**  
0.876 2.369 2.864 2.945 -0.727 -0.889 1.669 1.155 1.656 
Govt15(-3) -0.040 -0.267 -0.062 -0.008 -0.059 -0.015 0.033 0.055 0.235  
-0.773 -1.183 -0.326 -0.049 -1.307 -0.540 0.133 0.238 1.125 
Govt15(-4) 
0.064 0.206 0.151 0.070 -0.023 
-
0.087*** 0.161 0.154 0.062  
1.275 0.941 0.813 0.431 -0.518 -3.266 0.678 0.686 0.307 
Govt25(-1) -0.023 0.146 0.143 0.047 -0.009 0.007 0.301 0.154 0.094  
-0.463 0.685 0.790 0.296 -0.201 0.265 1.307 0.709 0.475 
Govt25(-2) 
-0.105*** 
-
0.489*** 
-
0.592*** 
-
0.551*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.310** 
-
0.553*** 
-
0.679***  
-2.214 -2.346 -3.349 -3.559 -0.023 -0.186 -1.373 -2.595 -3.515 
Govt25(-3) 0.040 0.010 -0.003 0.012 0.037 0.011 -0.210 -0.076 -0.294  
0.819 0.049 -0.017 0.073 0.849 0.435 -0.908 -0.346 -1.482 
Govt25(-4) -0.025 -0.073 -0.058 -0.049 -0.010 0.064*** 0.106 0.072 0.046  
-0.544 -0.360 -0.336 -0.326 -0.250 2.570 0.483 0.348 0.242 
Notes. Dependent Variables are shown along the first row. T-stats are given in the second row of each section, and are 
shown in italics. 
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A-Table 1.2a Coefficient Table Corporate Yield Model 
 
FTSE 
100 
Corp 
5 
Corp 
15 
Corp 
30 
Dollar Euro Govt 
5 
Govt 
15 
Govt 
25 
FTSE100 
(-1) 0.094* 
-
2.124*** 
-
0.823*** -2.322** -0.054* 0.028 -0.447 -0.189 -0.214  
1.572 -4.422 -2.171 -1.596 -1.053 0.908 -1.637 -0.726 -0.915 
FTSE100 
(-2) 0.030 -0.359 -0.487** -1.263* 0.154*** 0.029 0.710 0.328 0.272  
0.483 -0.722 -1.240 -0.838 2.910 0.914 2.510 1.218 1.120 
FTSE100 
(-3) -0.014 -0.610** -0.927 0.214 0.043** -0.055 -0.128 -0.190 -0.017  
-0.226 -1.200 -2.315 0.139 0.799 -1.681 -0.444 -0.692 -0.070 
FTSE100 
(-4) -0.019 -0.447 -0.312 -0.770** 0.070* 0.079** 0.256 0.080 -0.245  
-0.299 -0.870 -0.769 -0.494 1.285 2.409 0.874 0.288 -0.978 
FTSE100 
(-5) 0.090 0.735* 0.170 -2.160** 0.131*** 0.039 0.769*** 0.271 -0.016 
 1.411 1.428 0.419 -1.386 2.403 1.183 2.625 0.973 -0.066 
Corp5(-1) 0.008 0.134*** 0.250 0.071 0.008*** -0.007* 0.122*** 0.083*** 0.067***  
1.038 2.105 4.977 0.369 1.131 -1.837 3.351 2.414 2.159 
Corp5(-2) 
0.009*** 
-
0.266*** -0.257 0.066 0.016*** 0.001 0.085 0.077** 0.072***  
1.063 -3.887 -4.774 0.318 2.202 0.226 2.178 2.097 2.153 
Corp5(-3) 
0.005 0.098** 
-
0.275*** 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.041 0.017 0.003  
0.514 1.344 -4.799 0.042 -0.052 0.798 0.984 0.426 0.096 
Corp5(-4) 0.006* 0.075 0.133 -0.277* 0.012** -0.002 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.066***  
0.639 1.006 2.272 -1.230 1.486 -0.519 1.838 1.985 1.815 
Corp5(-5) 
0.002 
-
0.251*** 
-
0.179*** -0.182 
-
0.018*** -0.002 -0.087*** 
-
0.082*** 
-
0.059*** 
 0.210 -3.653 -3.305 -0.875 -2.514 -0.440 -2.215 -2.221 -1.758 
Corp15(-1) -0.011** -0.068 -0.433 -0.175 0.005 -0.004 -0.052 -0.051 -0.046  
-1.099 -0.817 -6.630 -0.699 0.518 -0.731 -1.110 -1.146 -1.128 
Corp15(-2) 0.000 -0.027 -0.125 -0.303* -0.008 -0.011* 0.001 -0.024 -0.052**  
-0.041 -0.321 -1.862 -1.179 -0.865 -2.102 0.014 -0.512 -1.255 
Corp15(-3) 
0.000 -0.227** -0.215** -0.006 -0.006* -0.003 -0.061 -0.060** 
-
0.064***  
-0.017 -2.853 -3.437 -0.027 -0.679 -0.643 -1.348 -1.404 -1.641 
Corp15(-4) 
-0.003 -0.055 -0.164** 0.225 0.000 -0.004 -0.052** 
-
0.091*** -0.065  
-0.324 -0.773 -2.949 1.054 0.034 -0.831 -1.304 -2.380 -1.890 
Corp15(-5) -0.007 -0.051 0.022 0.161 0.006*** -0.007 0.006 -0.038** -0.024 
 -0.875 -0.756 0.421 0.786 0.848 -1.580 0.147 -1.037 -0.722 
Notes. Dependent Variables are shown along the first row. T-stats are given in the second row of each 
section, and are shown in italics. 
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A-Table 1.2b Coefficient Table Corporate Yield Model 
 FTSE 
100 
Corp 
5 
Corp 
15 
Corp 
30 
Dollar Euro Govt 
5 
Govt 
15 
Govt 
25 
Corp30(-1) 
-0.001 0.006 0.011 
-
0.312*** 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.012*** 0.014***  
-0.392 0.340 0.778 -5.841 0.470 -0.238 0.406 1.217 1.655 
Corp30(-2) 
0.001*** 0.010*** 0.005 
-
0.208*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.015***  
0.546 0.549 0.318 -3.792 0.212 2.666 0.097 1.138 1.671 
Corp30(-3) 
0.000 0.018** -0.006 
-
0.279*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***  
-0.132 0.981 -0.429 -5.086 1.369 1.523 1.687 1.719 1.929 
Corp30(-4) 
-0.001*** -0.013** 0.001 
-
0.216*** 0.001*** -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.002  
-0.581 -0.719 0.049 -3.865 0.732 -0.516 -0.166 0.305 -0.198 
Corp30(-5) 
0.000 -0.005 0.011** 
-
0.132*** 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006*** 0.001 
 -0.102 -0.264 0.797 -2.451 -0.091 0.743 0.330 0.607 0.129 
Dollar(-1) -0.063 -0.967** -0.854 -1.329* 0.202*** -0.050** -0.276 -0.454** -0.275  
-0.865 -1.639 -1.836 -0.744 3.230 -1.326 -0.821 -1.424 -0.957 
Dollar(-2) -0.201** 0.063 0.054 2.499 -0.129** -0.055** -0.433 -0.191 -0.108  
-2.618 0.102 0.110 1.335 -1.965 -1.386 -1.232 -0.572 -0.358 
Dollar(-3) 0.004 -0.145 0.046 -0.741 0.220 0.123 0.693 0.699** 0.475  
0.058 -0.239 0.097 -0.404 3.429 3.165 2.010 2.135 1.607 
Dollar(-4) 0.107* 0.766 -0.716 1.704 -0.072** -0.031 0.110 -0.234 -0.181  
1.405 1.244 -1.475 0.914 -1.108 -0.791 0.315 -0.704 -0.604 
Dollar(-5) 0.121*** -0.572 -0.357 0.114 -0.120** -0.083 -0.120 0.144 0.291 
 1.628 -0.957 -0.756 0.063 -1.884 -2.165 -0.353 0.444 0.998 
Euro(-1) -0.308** -1.685 0.511 -2.462** -0.162** 0.234*** 0.155 0.247 -0.137 
 -2.658 -1.803 0.694 -0.870 -1.632 3.921 0.292 0.490 -0.301 
Euro(-2) -0.022 0.757 -0.363 -2.396 -0.153** -0.097 0.731 0.552 0.798 
 -0.187 0.786 -0.477 -0.821 -1.500 -1.575 1.332 1.059 1.697 
Euro(-3) 
0.043 -0.191 -0.467 
-
2.510*** 0.028 -0.046 -0.631 
-
1.102*** 
-
1.062*** 
 0.365 -0.200 -0.621 -0.870 0.273 -0.748 -1.165 -2.140 -2.287 
Euro(-4) -0.223*** -1.665 -0.947 -3.075* 0.025 0.097 -0.223 0.266 0.111 
 -1.905 -1.766 -1.273 -1.077 0.254 1.616 -0.416 0.522 0.240 
Euro(-5) 0.132* 1.546*** 0.038 -7.948 0.235*** 0.052 0.016 -1.014 -1.083 
 1.156 1.678 0.052 -2.846 2.401 0.876 0.031 -2.035 -2.408 
Notes. Dependent Variables are shown along the first row. T-stats are given in the second row of each 
section, and are shown in italics. 
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A-Table 1.2c Coefficient Table Corporate Yield Model 
 FTSE 
100 
Corp 
5 
Corp 
15 
Corp 
30 
Dollar Euro Govt 
5 
Govt 
15 
Govt 
25 
Govt5(-1) -0.002 0.002 -0.374 0.095 0.003 0.029* 0.209*** -0.056 -0.091*  
-0.080 0.010 -2.277 0.151 0.141 2.195 1.763 -0.497 -0.892 
Govt5(-2) -0.001 0.141 0.161 -0.108 -0.012 0.003 -0.354** -0.232* -0.232**  
-0.019 0.653 0.943 -0.164 -0.522 0.225 -2.880 -1.980 -2.195 
Govt5(-3) 0.012 -0.112 0.120 0.227* 0.031*** -0.014* 0.159 0.080 0.042  
0.460 -0.515 0.700 0.345 1.352 -0.997 1.286 0.681 0.398 
Govt5(-4) -0.053*** -0.176 -0.069 -0.142 -0.002 0.029** -0.082 -0.147 -0.170**  
-2.016 -0.827 -0.412 -0.221 -0.105 2.120 -0.678 -1.275 -1.641 
Govt5(-5) -0.007 0.214* 0.229 1.152 0.044*** 0.010 0.131 0.149 0.134 
 -0.269 1.068 1.447 1.900 2.074 0.775 1.145 1.372 1.367 
Govt15(-1) 0.055*** 0.056 0.865 0.450 -0.017 -0.021 -0.096 0.336 0.283*  
1.185 0.152 2.954 0.401 -0.428 -0.905 -0.453 1.676 1.562 
Govt15(-2) 0.046*** 0.249 0.408 0.252 -0.007 -0.006 0.460** 0.342*** 0.426***  
0.983 0.656 1.363 0.219 -0.167 -0.231 2.133 1.667 2.302 
Govt15(-3) -0.024 0.204 0.519 -0.675 -0.020 0.006 -0.149 0.039 0.192*  
-0.531 0.556 1.796 -0.608 -0.508 0.240 -0.712 0.195 1.076 
Govt15(-4) 
0.052*** 0.133 0.415* 0.264 -0.015 
-
0.057*** 0.242** 0.508*** 0.478*  
1.146 0.362 1.430 0.237 -0.384 -2.419 1.157 2.552 2.661 
Govt15(-5) 
0.008 0.790 -0.186 -0.568 
-
0.074*** -0.013 -0.168 -0.368 -0.383* 
 0.189 2.205 -0.659 -0.523 -1.948 -0.565 -0.825 -1.897 -2.189 
Govt25(-1) 
-0.057*** 0.007 -0.234 
-
0.640*** 0.004 0.014 0.007 -0.145 -0.168  
-1.531 0.022 -0.981 -0.699 0.131 0.738 0.038 -0.888 -1.137 
Govt25(-2) 
-0.050*** 0.010 -0.279* 0.301 0.033 0.019 -0.222 
-
0.319*** 
-
0.418***  
-1.342 0.033 -1.189 0.333 1.029 0.995 -1.310 -1.977 -2.875 
Govt25(-3) 0.029 -0.154 -0.388 1.349 0.001 0.012 -0.020 -0.079 -0.244**  
0.796 -0.528 -1.687 1.528 0.028 0.619 -0.123 -0.502 -1.719 
Govt25(-4) -0.041*** -0.016 -0.624 0.064 0.018 0.045 -0.168 -0.380** -0.344  
-1.132 -0.054 -2.707 0.073 0.564 2.409 -1.013 -2.404 -2.412 
Govt25(-5) -0.048 -1.116** 0.069 -0.010 0.034* 0.002 0.036 0.283 0.260* 
 -1.316 -3.826 0.299 -0.012 1.093 0.130 0.215 1.793 1.829 
Notes. Dependent Variables are shown along the first row. T-stats are given in the second row of 
each section, and are shown in italics. 
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A-Figure 1.1 Yields in Levels GOVT5 Impulse Responses Commercial Yield model 
A-Figure 1.2 Yields in Levels GOVT15 Impulse Responses Commercial Yield model 
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A-Figure 1.3 Yields in Levels GOVT25 Impulse Responses Commercial Yield model 
A-Figure 1.4 Yields in Levels GOVT5 Impulse Responses Corporate Yield model 
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A-Figure 1.5 Yields in Levels GOVT15 Impulse Responses Corporate Yield model 
A-Figure 1.6 Yields in Levels GOVT25 Impulse Responses Corporate Yield model 
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7.2 Appendix to Chapter 4 
7.2.1 Principal Component Model Selection Tables 
 
A-Table 1.3 FTSE100 Principal Component Model Selection 
Model Stats FTSE100 AIC SIC Adj-𝑹𝟐 
PC1 Tech**  5.819451 5.839948 -0.002604 
PC1 +PC2  5.823142 5.853887 -0.003724 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 5.826617 5.867611 -0.004637 
PC1 Econ 5.62124 5.645066 0.006177 
PC1 +PC2**  5.619177 5.654916 0.011344 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 5.624289 5.671941 0.009392 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 5.626382 5.685947 0.010417 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 +PC5 5.629417 5.700894 0.0105 
PC1 All 5.629483 5.653309 -0.002049 
PC1+PC2 5.624667 5.660405 0.005902 
PC1+PC2+PC3 5.625001 5.672653 0.008686 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4 5.62992 5.689485 0.006909 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 +PC5** 5.629183 5.700661 0.010731 
 
 
A-Table 1.4 FTSEALLSHARE Principal Component Model Selection 
Model Stats FTSEALL AIC SIC Adj-𝑹𝟐 
PC1 Tech** 5.887883 5.904924 -0.001039 
PC1+PC2  5.891517 5.917078 -0.002657 
PC1+PC2+PC3 5.895392 5.929473 -0.004525 
PC1 Econ 5.616692 5.640518 0.008685 
PC1 +PC2  5.617338 5.653077 0.011163 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3** 5.619395 5.667046 0.012233 
PC1 +PC2 +PC3 +PC4 5.624654 5.684219 0.010125 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4+PC5 5.6253 5.696778 0.01257 
PC1 All 5.628205 5.652031 -0.002794 
PC1+PC2 5.621601 5.657339 0.006939 
PC1+PC2+PC3 5.623386 5.671037 0.008283 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4 5.625288 5.684852 0.009498 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4+PC5** 5.626423 5.6979 0.011461 
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7.2.2 In-Sample Predictor Performance FSI sample (Unbalanced Sample) 
A-Table 1.5 FTSE100 In-Sample Predictor Performance FSI sample 
FTSE100 𝑹𝟐 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑵𝑭𝑺 
Sample 1991m01 -2017m02 
TBL 0.0017 -0.0017 0.0048 0.0023 0.0016 
LTY(5) 0.0010 -0.0014 0.0031 -0.0003 0.0014 
LTY(10) 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0012 -0.0005 0.0004 
LTY(15) 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
TMS(3-5) 0.0014 0.0000 0.0027 0.0068 -0.0001 
TMS(3-10) 0.0039 0.0017 0.0059 0.0099 0.0022 
TMS(3-15) 0.0056 0.0029 0.0080 0.0109 0.0041 
DRS(5) 0.0059 0.0103 0.0019 0.0146 0.0034 
DRS(10) 0.0026 -0.0010 0.0058 -0.0073 0.0054 
DRS(15) 0.0027 -0.0019 0.0066 -0.0176 0.0084 
INF(-1) 0.0012 -0.0027 0.0049 0.0108 -0.0015 
INF(-2) 0.0011 -0.0017 0.0037 0.0125 -0.0021 
INDMAN 0.0108 0.0078 0.0134 0.0150 0.0096 
INDPROD 0.0024 -0.0017 0.0061 -0.0032 0.0040 
DY 0.0177 -0.0014 0.0351 -0.0488 0.0367 
PE 0.0014 -0.0029 0.0051 -0.0142 0.0073 
MA(1,9) 0.0023 0.0013 0.0032 0.0081 0.0007 
MA(1,12) 0.0009 0.0031 -0.0011 0.0064 -0.0006 
MA(2,9) 0.0015 0.0043 -0.0010 0.0037 0.0009 
MA(2,12) 0.0007 0.0036 -0.0020 0.0032 -0.0001 
MA(3,9) 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 
MA(3,12) 0.0017 0.0060 -0.0023 0.0037 0.0011 
MOM(9) 0.0068 0.0104 0.0035 0.0137 0.0048 
MOM(12) 0.0008 0.0032 -0.0013 0.0077 -0.0011 
OBV(1,9) 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0026 0.0021 
OBV(1,12) 0.0010 0.0014 0.0006 -0.0080 0.0039 
OBV(2,9) 0.0038 0.0073 0.0009 0.0207 0.0003 
OBV(2,12) 0.0010 0.0014 0.0006 -0.0080 0.0039 
OBV(3,9) 0.0027 0.0043 0.0013 0.0092 0.0020 
OBV(3,12) 0.0063 0.0142 -0.0004 0.0168 0.0037 
DYS 0.0043 0.0147 -0.0051 0.0297 -0.0029 
SVAR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 
      
PC Tech 0.0155 0.0418 -0.0072 0.0078 0.0177 
PC Econ 0.0237 0.0140 0.0321 0.031121 0.021317 
PC All 0.0172 0.0208 0.0147 0.0114 0.0190 
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A-Table 1.6 FTSEALLSHARE In-Sample Predictor Performance FSI sample 
FTSEALLSHARE 𝑹𝟐 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑵𝑭𝑺 
Sample 1991m01 -2017m02 
TBL 0.0037 -0.0013 0.0084 0.0030 0.0039 
LTY(5) 0.0034 -0.0008 0.0073 -0.0025 0.0050 
LTY(10) 0.0018 -0.0013 0.0047 -0.0035 0.0033 
LTY(15) 0.0007 -0.0011 0.0025 -0.0029 0.0018 
TMS(3-5) 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0017 0.0066 -0.0010 
TMS(3-10) 0.0032 0.0007 0.0056 0.0130 0.0004 
TMS(3-15) 0.0051 0.0018 0.0082 0.0155 0.0021 
DRS(5) 0.0046 0.0078 0.0016 0.0209 0.0000 
DRS(10) 0.0024 -0.0016 0.0062 -0.0037 0.0041 
DRS(15) 0.0024 -0.0018 0.0062 -0.0140 0.0077 
INF(-1) 0.0019 -0.0022 0.0057 0.0145 -0.0017 
INF(-2) 0.0016 -0.0013 0.0043 0.0155 -0.0024 
INDMAN 0.0102 0.0056 0.0147 0.0170 0.0083 
INDPROD 0.0021 -0.0020 0.0059 -0.0024 0.0033 
DY 0.0117 -0.0017 0.0245 -0.0353 0.0252 
PE 0.0023 -0.0037 0.0074 -0.0184 0.0083 
MA(1,9) 0.0023 0.0081 -0.0033 0.0038 0.0018 
MA(1,12) 0.0034 0.0153 -0.0079 0.0047 0.0030 
MA(2,9) 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
MA(2,12) 0.0007 0.0067 -0.0049 0.0062 -0.0008 
MA(3,9) 0.0003 -0.0013 0.0019 -0.0022 0.0010 
MA(3,12) 0.0002 -0.0025 0.0027 -0.0031 0.0011 
MOM(9) 0.0038 0.0018 0.0057 0.0115 0.0016 
MOM(12) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0001 
OBV(1,9) 0.0016 0.0000 0.0032 0.0114 -0.0012 
OBV(1,12) 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 0.0158 -0.0020 
OBV(2,9) 0.0114 0.0064 0.0161 0.0437 0.0020 
OBV(2,12) 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 0.0158 -0.0020 
OBV(3,9) 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0034 0.0083 -0.0003 
OBV(3,12) 0.0074 0.0011 0.0132 0.0248 0.0040 
DYS 0.0026 0.0101 -0.0044 0.0243 -0.0036 
SVAR 0.0171 0.0102 0.0236 -0.0049 0.0233 
      
PC Tech 0.0055 0.0077 0.0035 0.0248 -0.0002 
PC Econ 0.0310 0.0288 0.0331 0.0365 0.0293 
PC All 0.0405 0.0366 0.0440 0.0503 0.0377 
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7.2.3 Out-of-Sample Predictor Performance (Un-balanced Sample) 
A-Table 1.7 FTSE100 Out-of-Sample Predictor Performance Unbalanced Sample 
FTSE100 OOS OOS Start 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑵𝑭𝑺 
TBL 1994m01 -0.0369 -0.0576 -0.0186 -0.0341 -0.0377 
LTY(5) 1994m01 -0.0306 -0.0509 -0.0126 -0.0334 -0.0298 
LTY(10) 1994m01 -0.0371 -0.0619 -0.0152 -0.0384 -0.0367 
LTY(15) 1994m01 -0.0409 -0.0678 -0.0171 -0.0391 -0.0413 
TMS(3-5) 1994m01 -0.0012 0.0051 -0.0068 0.0170 -0.0065 
TMS(3-10) 1994m01 0.0011 0.0071 -0.0042 0.0148 -0.0029 
TMS(3-15) 1994m01 0.0014 0.0050 -0.0018 0.0105 -0.0013 
DRS(5) 2001m01 0.0210 0.0561 -0.0099 0.0655 0.0068 
DRS(10) 2001m01 0.0110 0.0344 -0.0096 0.0303 0.0049 
DRS(15) 2007m09 -0.0016 -0.0126 0.0097 -0.0112 0.0039 
INF(-1) 1994m01 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0020 0.0179 -0.0074 
INF(-2) 1994m01 -0.0058 -0.0094 -0.0026 0.0191 -0.0130 
INDMAN 1994m01 -0.1052 -0.0805 -0.1271 -0.0713 -0.1150 
INDPROD 1994m01 -0.0084 0.0108 -0.0254 0.0196 -0.0165 
DY 1996m02 -0.0305 -0.0284 -0.0323 -0.0165 -0.0348 
PE 2003m08 -0.0177 -0.0229 -0.0129 -0.0232 -0.0150 
MA(1,9) 1994m10 -0.0863 -0.1019 -0.0722 -0.0726 -0.0905 
MA(1,12) 1995m01 -0.0373 -0.0543 -0.0221 -0.0338 -0.0384 
MA(2,9) 1994m10 -0.0753 -0.0956 -0.0570 -0.0578 -0.0807 
MA(2,12) 1995m01 -0.0851 -0.1288 -0.0460 -0.0781 -0.0872 
MA(3,9) 1994m10 -0.0786 -0.1055 -0.0543 -0.0806 -0.0780 
MA(3,12) 1995m01 -0.0964 -0.1289 -0.0674 -0.0797 -0.1015 
MOM(9) 1994m11 -0.0301 -0.0246 -0.0351 -0.0079 -0.0369 
MOM(12) 1995m02 -0.0592 -0.0957 -0.0273 -0.0819 -0.0525 
OBV(1,9) 2003m11 -0.0106 0.0004 -0.0205 -0.0142 -0.0090 
OBV(1,12) 2004m02 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0190 0.0090 
OBV(2,9) 2003m11 0.0013 0.0157 -0.0115 0.0371 -0.0157 
OBV(2,12) 2004m02 0.0062 -0.0001 0.0116 0.0221 -0.0012 
OBV(3,9) 2003m11 -0.0096 -0.0016 -0.0167 0.0381 -0.0323 
OBV(3,12) 2004m02 0.0068 0.0066 0.0069 0.0348 -0.0062 
DYS 1994m01 -0.0528 -0.0817 -0.0273 -0.1291 -0.0308 
SVAR 1994M03 -0.0443 -0.0557 -0.0344 -0.0521 -0.0421 
       
PC Tech 2004M02 -0.0021 0.0165 -0.0179 0.0251 -0.0148 
PC Econ 2007M09 -0.0253 -0.0552 0.0051 -0.0646 -0.0032 
PC All 2007M09 -0.0681 -0.0312 -0.1056 0.0179 -0.1165 
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A-Table 1.8 FTSEALLSHARE Out-of-Sample Predictor Performance Unbalanced Sample 
FTSEALLSHARE OOS OOS Start 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑵𝑭𝑺 
TBL 1985m03 -0.0048 0.0270 -0.0280 0.0259 -0.0101 
LTY(5) 1985m03 0.0024 0.0324 -0.0194 0.0303 -0.0024 
LTY(10) 1985m03 0.0052 0.0336 -0.0156 0.0310 0.0007 
LTY(15) 1985m03 -0.0101 0.0423 -0.0482 0.0414 -0.0189 
TMS(3-5) 1985m03 -0.0076 -0.0105 -0.0055 -0.0086 -0.0075 
TMS(3-10) 1985m03 -0.0091 -0.0123 -0.0067 -0.0092 -0.0091 
TMS(3-15) 1985m03 -0.0013 0.0023 -0.0039 0.0027 -0.0020 
DRS(5) 2001m01 0.0065 0.0332 -0.0167 0.0365 -0.0036 
DRS(10) 2001m01 0.0075 0.0306 -0.0128 0.0298 -0.0001 
DRS(15) 2007m09 -0.0025 -0.0145 0.0100 -0.0121 0.0036 
INF(-1) 1985m03 0.0078 0.0342 -0.0115 0.0229 0.0052 
INF(-2) 1985m03 0.0095 0.0329 -0.0076 0.0236 0.0071 
INDMAN 1985m03 0.0037 0.0118 -0.0022 0.0187 0.0011 
INDPROD 1985m03 0.0038 0.0125 -0.0026 0.0092 0.0029 
DY 1985m03 -0.0718 -0.0561 -0.0832 -0.0387 -0.0774 
PE 2003m08 -0.0745 -0.1245 -0.0313 -0.1206 -0.0506 
MA(1,9) 1985m12 -0.0124 -0.0273 -0.0015 -0.0259 -0.0101 
MA(1,12) 1986m03 -0.0292 -0.0766 0.0056 -0.0533 -0.0250 
MA(2,9) 1985m12 -0.0055 0.0036 -0.0122 0.0064 -0.0076 
MA(2,12) 1986m03 -0.0459 -0.1147 0.0045 -0.1117 -0.0345 
MA(3,9) 1985m12 -0.0034 -0.0058 -0.0017 -0.0052 -0.0031 
MA(3,12) 1986m03 -0.0026 -0.0178 0.0086 -0.0221 0.0008 
MOM(9) 1985m12 -0.0986 -0.1438 -0.0654 -0.1636 -0.0872 
MOM(12) 1986m03 -0.1140 -0.2167 -0.0387 -0.2448 -0.0913 
OBV(1,9) 2008m02 0.0018 0.0025 0.0011 0.0180 -0.0091 
OBV(1,12) 2008m05 0.0160 0.0002 0.0291 0.0125 0.0180 
OBV(2,9) 2008m02 0.0116 0.0057 0.0170 0.0562 -0.0183 
OBV(2,12) 2008m05 0.0124 -0.0074 0.0289 0.0479 -0.0089 
OBV(3,9) 2008m02 0.0017 0.0024 0.0010 0.0180 -0.0093 
OBV(3,12) 2008m05 0.0204 0.0067 0.0319 0.0372 0.0105 
DYS 1985m03 -0.0011 0.0113 -0.0102 -0.0520 0.0076 
SVAR 1995M03 0.0142 0.0092 0.0187 -0.0192 0.0243 
       
PC Tech 2008M05 0.0188 0.0107 0.0256 0.0413 0.0054 
PC Econ 2007M09 0.0400 0.0563 0.0231 0.0813 0.0137 
PC All 2008M05 0.0635 0.0120 0.1065 0.0704 0.0594 
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7.2.4 Out-of-Sample Predictor Performance (Balanced Sample) 
A-Table 1.9 FTSE100 Out-of-Sample Predictor Performance Balanced Sample 
FTSE100  
OOS 1995m01 
𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  MSFE-
Adjusted 
RMSE MAE 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 
HA  
  
0.0171 0.0131 
  
       
TBL 0.0014 0.6782 0.0171 0.0130 -0.0058 0.0078 
LTY(5) -0.0026 -0.5846 0.0171 0.0131 -0.0023 -0.0028 
LTY(10) -0.0116 -1.2971 0.0172 0.0132 0.0025 -0.0241 
LTY(15) -0.0390 -1.0775 0.0174 0.0136 0.0024 -0.0761 
TMS(3-5) -0.0016 -0.3210 0.0171 0.0131 0.0022 -0.0050 
TMS(3-10) 0.0005 0.3567 0.0171 0.0131 0.0027 -0.0014 
TMS(3-15) 0.0022 0.8764 0.0171 0.0131 0.0027 0.0019 
INF(-1) -0.0017 0.1447 0.0171 0.0131 0.0004 -0.0036 
INF(-2) 0.0000 0.3393 0.0171 0.0130 -0.0003 0.0002 
INDMAN -0.1171 -1.8000 0.0181 0.0138 -0.0966 -0.1354 
INDPROD -0.0182 -1.3253 0.0173 0.0132 -0.0046 -0.0303 
DY -0.4335 0.2758 0.0205 0.0170 -0.4069 -0.4573 
MA(1,9) -0.0884 -1.6778 0.0178 0.0136 -0.1058 -0.0728 
MA(1,12) -0.0373 -1.4903 0.0174 0.0134 -0.0543 -0.0221 
MA(2,9) -0.0729 -1.5750 0.0177 0.0135 -0.0948 -0.0533 
MA(2,12) -0.0851 -1.1711 0.0178 0.0137 -0.1288 -0.0460 
MA(3,9) -0.0761 -0.9043 0.0177 0.0135 -0.1042 -0.0510 
MA(3,12) -0.0964 -1.6335 0.0179 0.0137 -0.1289 -0.0674 
MOM(9) -0.0237 -2.4401 0.0173 0.0133 -0.0227 -0.0246 
MOM(12) -0.0757 -1.3404 0.0177 0.0136 -0.1139 -0.0416 
DYS -0.0870 -1.4642 0.0178 0.0136 -0.1537 -0.0274 
SVAR -0.0464 -0.1652 0.0175 0.0135 -0.0583 -0.0356 
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A-Table 1.10 FTSEALLSHARE Out-of-Sample Predictor Performance Balanced Sample 
FTSEALLSHARE 
OOS 1995m01 
𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  MSFE-
Adjusted 
RMSE MAE 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 
HA  
  
0.0169 0.0128 
  
       
TBL 0.0024 0.9595 0.0169 0.0127 -0.0073 0.0114 
LTY(5) 0.0010 0.9001 0.0170 0.0127 -0.0148 0.0158 
LTY(10) -0.0021 -0.2377 0.0170 0.0128 -0.0022 -0.0020 
LTY(15) -0.0275 -0.7852 0.0172 0.0133 0.0074 -0.0602 
TMS(3-5) -0.0039 -0.3598 0.0170 0.0130 0.0057 -0.0129 
TMS(3-10) -0.0005 0.2041 0.0170 0.0129 0.0063 -0.0069 
TMS(3-15) 0.0021 0.6894 0.0169 0.0129 0.0059 -0.0014 
INF(-1) -0.0007 0.1447 0.0170 0.0128 0.0037 -0.0048 
INF(-2) 0.0002 0.3393 0.0170 0.0128 0.0027 -0.0022 
INDMAN -0.1082 -1.8949 0.0179 0.0135 -0.0748 -0.1395 
INDPROD -0.0174 -1.3723 0.0171 0.0130 0.0023 -0.0359 
DY -0.2922 0.3386 0.0193 0.0158 -0.2169 -0.3628 
MA(1,9) -0.1244 -1.5862 0.0180 0.0137 -0.1562 -0.0947 
MA(1,12) -0.0860 -2.2110 0.0177 0.0135 -0.1163 -0.0576 
MA(2,9) -0.0409 -1.0895 0.0173 0.0131 -0.0383 -0.0434 
MA(2,12) -0.0544 -1.5947 0.0174 0.0133 -0.0723 -0.0377 
MA(3,9) -0.0631 -0.7244 0.0175 0.0133 -0.0763 -0.0507 
MA(3,12) -0.0606 -1.1707 0.0175 0.0133 -0.0797 -0.0428 
MOM(9) -0.0470 -2.2385 0.0174 0.0132 -0.0407 -0.0530 
MOM(12) -0.0560 -1.1965 0.0174 0.0132 -0.0766 -0.0367 
DYS -0.1164 -1.1744 0.0179 0.0136 -0.1921 -0.0454 
SVAR 0.0063 1.1708 0.0169 0.0131 0.0189 -0.0055 
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7.2.5 Out-of-Sample R-squared Statistics Comparisons (Balanced Sample) 
A-Table 1.11 FTSE100 Out-of-Sample R-Squared Statistics Comparisons Balanced Sample 
FTSE100  
OOS 1995m01 
𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑵𝑭𝑺 
TBL 0.0014 -0.0058 0.0078 0.0000 0.0018 
LTY(5) -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0028 0.0042 -0.0047 
LTY(10) -0.0116 0.0025 -0.0241 0.0112 -0.0184 
LTY(15) -0.0390 0.0024 -0.0761 0.0185 -0.0564 
TMS(3-5) -0.0016 0.0022 -0.0050 0.0083 -0.0046 
TMS(3-10) 0.0005 0.0027 -0.0014 0.0076 -0.0016 
TMS(3-15) 0.0022 0.0027 0.0019 0.0062 0.0011 
INF(-1) -0.0017 0.0004 -0.0036 0.0099 -0.0052 
INF(-2) 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0117 -0.0035 
INDMAN -0.1171 -0.0966 -0.1354 -0.0845 -0.1269 
INDPROD -0.0182 -0.0046 -0.0303 0.0068 -0.0257 
DY -0.0433 -0.0406 -0.0457 -0.0210 -0.0500 
MA(1,9) -0.0884 -0.1058 -0.0728 -0.0755 -0.0923 
MA(1,12) -0.0373 -0.0543 -0.0221 -0.0338 -0.0384 
MA(2,9) -0.0729 -0.0948 -0.0533 -0.0580 -0.0774 
MA(2,12) -0.0851 -0.1288 -0.0460 -0.0781 -0.0872 
MA(3,9) -0.0761 -0.1042 -0.0510 -0.0800 -0.0750 
MA(3,12) -0.0964 -0.1289 -0.0674 -0.0797 -0.1015 
MOM(9) -0.0237 -0.0227 -0.0246 -0.0113 -0.0275 
MOM(12) -0.0757 -0.1139 -0.0416 -0.0945 -0.0701 
DYS -0.0870 -0.1537 -0.0274 -0.2154 -0.0483 
SVAR -0.0464 -0.0583 -0.0356 -0.0581 -0.0428 
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A-Table 1.12 FTSEALLSHARE Out-of-Sample R-Squared Statistics Comparisons Balanced Sample 
FTSEALLSHARE 
OOS 1995m01 
𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐  𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Rec 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 Exp 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑭𝑺 𝑹𝑶𝑺
𝟐 𝑵𝑭𝑺 
TBL 0.0024 -0.0073 0.0114 -0.0002 0.0032 
LTY(5) 0.0010 -0.0148 0.0158 -0.0080 0.0038 
LTY(10) -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0020 0.0041 -0.0040 
LTY(15) -0.0275 0.0074 -0.0602 0.0192 -0.0420 
TMS(3-5) -0.0039 0.0057 -0.0129 0.0142 -0.0096 
TMS(3-10) -0.0005 0.0063 -0.0069 0.0137 -0.0049 
TMS(3-15) 0.0021 0.0059 -0.0014 0.0120 -0.0010 
INF(-1) -0.0007 0.0037 -0.0048 0.0161 -0.0059 
INF(-2) 0.0002 0.0027 -0.0022 0.0186 -0.0055 
INDMAN -0.1082 -0.0748 -0.1395 -0.0785 -0.1174 
INDPROD -0.0174 0.0023 -0.0359 0.0098 -0.0259 
DY -0.0292 -0.0216 -0.0362 -0.0114 -0.0347 
MA(1,9) -0.1244 -0.1562 -0.0947 -0.0959 -0.1333 
MA(1,12) -0.0860 -0.1163 -0.0576 -0.0592 -0.0943 
MA(2,9) -0.0409 -0.0383 -0.0434 -0.0344 -0.0429 
MA(2,12) -0.0544 -0.0723 -0.0377 -0.0623 -0.0520 
MA(3,9) -0.0631 -0.0763 -0.0507 -0.0737 -0.0597 
MA(3,12) -0.0606 -0.0797 -0.0428 -0.0765 -0.0557 
MOM(9) -0.0470 -0.0407 -0.0530 -0.0303 -0.0522 
MOM(12) -0.0560 -0.0766 -0.0367 -0.0760 -0.0498 
DYS -0.1164 -0.1921 -0.0454 -0.2864 -0.0635 
SVAR 0.0063 0.0189 -0.0055 -0.0069 0.0104 
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